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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation examines the effect of the legal environment on access to several types of 
external finance, and on the decision to invest, for the 3 countries that make up the East African 
Community (EAC). The results suggest that well defined creditor rights are positively correlated 
with access to bank loans. Strong creditor rights places pressure on firms to keep good quality 
financial records. More lending takes place in this environment. A good quality legal system also 
improves access to non-bank finance, namely trade credit and leasing finance. The analysis 
demonstrates that collateral in the form of machinery and equipment improves access to bank 
finance. Collateral appears to be of greater importance when legal enforcement costs are 
relatively low and information asymmetry is more acute. The results also show that the property 
rights environment is important for investment. However, the protection of property rights has a 
more meaningful effect on investment in an environment where the costs of corruption are lower 
and courts are more efficient. Access to bank finance has a significant positive effect on 
investment. Thus, a legal system that improves the flow of funds from banks to firms promotes 
growth enhancing activities. Internal sources of finance are also found to be important for 
investment. It is recommended that strong emphasis is placed on improving the laws protecting 
the rights of creditors over property pledged as collateral and over information they can obtain 
from debtors. Debtor rights over assets in their possession should also be strengthened.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background to the Study 
 
A positive relationship has been established between the quality of the legal system and access to 
external finance in both developed and developing countries (La Porta et al, 1997; La Porta et al, 
1998). According to Fabbri (2001), the legal system affects financial markets in two ways. 
Firstly, it does so through the content of the law which defines the rights and powers of outside 
investors.  The content of the law is also important for defining the property rights borrowers 
have over assets they use as collateral. Evidence suggests that an improvement in property rights 
leads to better access to credit (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). Secondly, the legal system affects 
financial markets through how effectively the laws can be enforced. This second channel is 
widely referred to as legal formalism (Djankov et al, 2003). More efficient enforcement is 
associated with greater access to credit and lower collateral constraints (Japelli et al, 2005). This 
implies that the legal system can have a positive impact on economic growth via financial 
markets. 
 
The full benefits of the legal environment on economic growth will be realized when legal 
institutions not only enhance the availability of finance, but also enhance its use in productive 
activities. The legal system needs to protect firms pursuing profitable investment opportunities as 
much as it protects the suppliers of finance. Where the property rights of firms are better defined 
and protected, the likelihood of expropriation by government and other powerful groups declines 
(Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). This has a positive effect on investment. Thus, the legal system 
provides a transmission mechanism from finance to growth. Better quality legal systems 
enhance access to finance and promote investment, ultimately boosting economic growth. 
Notably, investment whether it is pursued using external finance or internal sources, will be 
affected by the property rights environment.  
 
A well developed legal system plays an important role in protecting the rights of creditors partly 
because it facilitates the flow of information about borrowers to creditors. Creditors use this 
information to make decisions about lending, and to aid them in taking appropriate action in the 
event of default. According to Brownbridge (1998), the problems of moral hazard and adverse 
selection are major reasons for the poor performance and low lending that characterize banks in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Improving the legal environment can have a positive impact on 
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information availability in financial markets, which will in turn make banks more willing to 
provide loans.   
 
In sub-Saharan Africa where most formal finance is provided by the banking sector, collateral 
becomes an integral part of debt contracts. Stock markets in SSA are still underdeveloped, 
characterized by low capitalization and a limited number of listed firms (Ndikumana, 2001). 
Notably, even in developed countries banks are the main providers of external finance (Gorton 
and Winton, 2003). The provisions of the law and the efficiency of the enforcement process will 
have a bearing on the role that collateral plays in the provision of bank finance. However, 
Nkurunziza (2005b) argues that given the weakness of the legal systems in most of SSA, the 
collateral mechanism in these countries is ineffective in enforcing contracts between banks and 
borrowers. Similarly, Fleisig and de la Pena (2003) explain that poor laws and legal institutions 
in developing countries make collateral in the form of real estate and movable property 
ineffective in improving loan terms.  
 
The problem of poor contract enforcement is compounded by the weakness of secondary markets 
for capital goods in African countries. Even if the bank is able to repossess the assets pledged as 
collateral, selling the assets to recover the loan is difficult. Collier and Gunning (1999) find that 
very few African manufacturing firms use secondhand equipment. They also find that when the 
equipment is sold, it involves a large discount. Gunning and Pomp (1995) report that in 
Zimbabwe new capital goods sell at a discount of up to 50 percent.  
 
When collateral is effective as a contract enforcement mechanism, it can lead to favourable loan 
terms for firms requiring bank credit (Qian and Strahan, 2005). In particular, banks may be 
willing to demand lower collateral requirements, and a firm may be able to obtain bank finance 
at lower interest rates and with longer maturity. These benefits have positive implications for the 
profitability of the firm and for its long-term investment plans. In contrast, if the quality of the 
legal system is poor, mechanisms that do not depend on the court system to enforce financial 
agreements will be relied upon more heavily. Traditional forms of collateral will be replaced 
with collateral substitutes1. These substitutes enable the borrower to pledge less in terms of 
physical assets (Rodriguez-Meza, 2004). Although more widely used in informal financial 
markets, collateral substitutes can also play a role in formal debt markets.  
                                                
1 Collateral substitutes are meant to address the problem of inadequate tangible assets required as security for a bank 
loan. See section 1.5 for a detailed definition. 
 3
Under a weak legal environment, banks will ration credit more severely, and firms will benefit 
from the availability of sources of finance that do not depend on the collateral mechanism. Two 
sources of finance that tackle the problem of inadequate collateral are trade credit and leasing 
finance (Fafchamps, 1997; Gallardo, 1999). Trade credit refers to credit extended by a seller who 
allows delayed payment for his products. The products are normally intermediate goods for the 
buyer. In several African countries, trade credit is the most important source of working capital 
(see Fafchamps et al, 1994; Fafchamps et al, 1995 and Bigsten et al, 2003). Financial leasing is a 
contractual arrangement between two parties, which allows one party (the lessee) to use an asset 
owned by the other (the lessor) in exchange for specified periodic payments. Mutesasira et al 
(2001) find that there is a large unmet demand for leasing among small firms in Uganda and 
Tanzania.  
 
Using manufacturing sector data collected through Investment Climate surveys, this dissertation 
examines how the legal environment affects access to external finance and investment in the East 
African Community (EAC). The dissertation makes an important contribution towards 
understanding how the institutional framework affects economic activity in SSA. The focus is on 
four main issues. First, is the relationship between the quality of the legal system on one hand, 
and access to external finance and the terms of this finance on the other. Second, is the effect of 
collateral and collateral substitutes on access to bank finance.  
 
The third issue the dissertation investigates is how the legal environment affects trade credit and 
leasing finance. Finally, the dissertation examines how property rights affect the investment 
decisions of these firms. To the best knowledge of the author this dissertation is the first attempt 
with firm level data to explore the relationship between the legal environment and different 
sources of external finance in the context of SSA. Furthermore, to the best knowledge of the 
author, it is also the first detailed attempt at investigating how property rights affect investment 
decisions by African manufacturing firms.  
 
1.2 The EAC Economies 
 
The East African economies of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania make up the EAC which was 
established in 19992. Table 1.1 below shows selected economic indicators for the three countries 
                                                
2 Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania had enjoyed a long history of co-operation under successive regional integration 
arrangements prior to 1999. These included the East African High Commission (1948-1961); the East African 
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for the period 1990-20033. Kenya is the largest economy in the region, with approximately twice 
the GDP of Uganda. Kenya also has a higher GDP per capita than Tanzania and Uganda. 
However, economic growth in Kenya has been far slower compared to the other countries, 
particularly since 1996. Tanzania and Uganda are among the fastest growing economies in 
Africa while real GDP per capita in Kenya has declined in recent years.  
 
During the period 1990-1995, the average inflation rate in the 3 countries was fairly high 
particularly in Tanzania where it was close to 30 percent. Between 2001 and 2003, all 3 countries 
succeeded in reducing inflation to single digit figures. Inflation in the most recent period is 
highest in Kenya.  
 
Table 1.1: Selected Economic Indicators, (period average) 
Country 1990-1995 1996-2000 2001-2003 
Kenya    
GDP (billions of US$, constant 2000) 10.8 12.3  13.4  
GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) 362.6 358.0 341.9 
GDP Growth Rate (%) 2.0 1.8 1.3 
Inflation Rate (%) 23.6 8.5 5.8 
Real Interest Rate (%) 8.6 16.7 7.9 
Uganda 
GDP (billions of US$, constant 2000) 3.6  5.3  6.6  
GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) 188.8 238.8 269.7 
GDP Growth Rate (%) 6.9 6.5 5.9 
Inflation Rate (%) 23.0 4.7 3.2 
Real Interest Rate (%) -8.0 16.8 15.9 
Tanzania 
GDP (billions of US$, constant 2000) 7.1  8.4  10.4  
GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) 257.0 260.7 294.2 
GDP Growth Rate (%) 2.7 4.1 6.9 
Inflation Rate (%) 28.9 12.7 3.2 
Real Interest Rate (%) -6.1 9.4 10.0 
Source: The World Bank (2005), World Development Indicators 
 
For the period 1990-1995 real interest rates in Uganda and Tanzania were negative, pointing to 
the financial repression that characterized these economies. However, following financial reform 
                                                                                                                                                       
Common Services Organization (1961-1967); the East African Community (1967-1977); and the East African Co-
operation (1993-1999). 
3 Our background analysis of the EAC economies is up to 2003. This is primarily because our main data source is 
for the period 2002-2003. Limiting our macroeconomic background data to this time frame gives our discussion 
meaningful context.  
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in these countries beginning in the early 1990s, the EAC as a whole now has positive real interest 
rates. This is important for mobilizing savings needed to undertake investment.  
The EAC identifies private sector development as crucial at the national level, and to the regional 
integration process. In all three countries, manufacturing activity constitutes an important part of 
the private sector. Table 1.2 shows manufacturing as a percentage of GDP in the 3 countries.  
Kenya has the largest manufacturing sector in the EAC, growing from an average contribution to 
GDP of 11 percent during 1990-1995 to account for approximately 14 percent of GDP during 
2001-2003. The World Bank (2004a) reports that the sector is one of the fastest growing, and the 
third largest formal private industry in Kenya. The sector has also registered growth in Uganda 
where it contributed about 10 percent of GDP during 2001-2003. Tanzania has the smallest 
manufacturing sector and is the only country to have experienced a decline in the contribution of 
this sector during 1990-2003. However, the sector is Tanzanias largest urban employer and the 
most reliable source of government revenue in terms of import sales, and corporate and 
individual income taxes4.  
 
Table 1.2: Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP), (period average) 
Country 1990-1995 1996-2000 2001-2003 
Kenya 11.0 11.4 13.1 
Uganda 6.2 9.0 9.6 
Tanzania 8.1 7.3 7.3 
Source: The World Bank (2005), World Development Indicators 
 
Table 1.3 shows the average annual growth in investment for the period 1990-2003. Kenya and 
Tanzania recorded very little new investment for each year in this period. However, Uganda 
experienced a relatively higher annual rate of capital formation. The importance of investment 
for economic growth implies that much effort is required to understand and remove the 
bottlenecks to investment in the EAC. The Investment Climate data used in this study is useful 
for this purpose.  
 
Table 1.3: Gross Capital Formation (Average Annual % Growth), 1990 - 2003 
Country Average % Annual Growth 
Kenya 2.0 
Uganda 7.4 
Tanzania 1.0 
Source: The World Bank (2005), World Development Indicators 
                                                
4 This information was obtained from the Tanzania National Website. 
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Kenya has the most developed financial sector in the EAC. Table 1.4 shows that domestic credit 
to the private sector as a percentage of GDP has been far greater in Kenya for the period 1990-
2003 than in Uganda and Tanzania. The same holds for the M2/GDP ratio. Important to note 
however, is that during this period there has been a sharp decline in credit provision in Kenya. 
There has also been a decline in credit to the private sector for Tanzania. Uganda is the only 
country to have registered growth for both indicators over this period.  
 
Table 1.4: Selected Financial Sector Indicators, (period average) 
Country 1990-1995 1996-2000 2001-2003 
Kenya       
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP)  33.3 32.0 23.3 
Money and quasi money (M2)    (% of GDP) 33.6 43.4 38.8 
Uganda       
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP)  4.3 5.7 6.5 
Money and quasi money (M2)     (% of GDP)  8.7 13.6 17.6 
Tanzania       
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP)  10.8 4.0 6.2 
Money and quasi money (M2)     (% of GDP)  19.6 18.5 19.5 
Source: The World Bank (2005), World Development Indicators 
 
In line with Table 1.4, Table 1.5 shows that Kenya has the most well developed banking sector in 
the EAC. It has close to twice the number of commercial banks in Tanzania and 3 times that of 
Uganda. Geographic branch penetration measures the number of bank branches per 1,000 square 
kilometres. Demographic branch penetration is the number of bank branches per 100,000 people. 
On both measures Kenya has the highest penetration.  
 
Table 1.5: Selected Banking Sector Indicators  
Country Number of 
Commercial Banks 
Geographic Branch 
Penetration 
Demographic Branch 
Penetration 
Kenya 43 0.77 1.38 
Uganda 15 0.67 0.53 
Tanzania 22 0.23 0.57 
Sources: Central Bank Websites and Beck et al (2005). 
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1.3    Collateral in East African Manufacturing 
 
Figure 1.1 shows the average collateral requirements faced by manufacturing firms in the three 
countries, and in Pakistan and China. For all EAC countries, the average collateral-to-loan value 
exceeds 100 percent. Notably the average value of collateral required is significantly higher in 
Kenya. In addition, the collateral-to-loan ratios in the EAC are substantially higher than in 
Pakistan and China. 
 
Figure 1.1: Collateral as a Percentage of Loan in the EAC, Pakistan and 
China
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 Source: World Bank (2002/03), Investment Climate Surveys  
 
Although the collateral-to-loan ratios are high in all three countries, the extent to which collateral 
is a constraint for firms in the EAC varies across the three countries. In Kenya only 4 percent of 
firms stated that inadequate collateral was the main reason for not applying for a bank loan. In 
Uganda the corresponding figure is 10 percent. Tanzanian firms were not asked to single out a 
main reason for not applying for a bank loan. Instead, they were asked which factors contributed 
to their decision not to apply for a bank loan. 52 percent of Tanzanian firms gave inadequate 
collateral as a reason for not applying for a loan. Only 2 Kenyan firms and 4 Ugandan firms 
reported that their loan applications were rejected due to inadequate collateral. In contrast, 12 
Tanzanian firms had their loan applications rejected because of insufficient collateral. This is 
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worth noting given that Tanzania had the least number of firms applying for a loan and the 
smallest sample in the ICA surveys5.  
 
The rate at which loan applications are rejected is far higher in Tanzania compared to Kenya and 
Uganda, as shown in Figure 1.2. The high rejection rate in Tanzania could be a result of 
inadequate collateral. It is consistent with the high proportion of Tanzanian firms who cite 
inadequate collateral as a deterrent to applying for bank credit. It is also consistent with the 
relatively larger number of Tanzanian firms whose loan applications have been rejected due to 
inadequate collateral.   
 
Figure 1.2: Loan Applications Rejected by Country
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Source: World Bank (2002/03), Investment Climate Surveys  
 
It appears that Kenyan firms are not seriously constrained by collateral despite the high collateral 
requirements. This can be partly explained by the relative size of the Kenyan economy and 
higher level of financial development. Furthermore, as Table 1.8 will show, Kenyan firms are 
clearly larger than Ugandan and Tanzanian firms. The literature review and empirical analysis 
will demonstrate that firm size is a critical determinant of access to external finance. Ugandan 
firms are moderately constrained by collateral. It will be seen in chapter 3 that the low rejection 
rate in Uganda is explained by the fact that only firms with substantial collateral apply for bank 
loans. Tanzanian firms appear to face serious collateral constraints. Why do Tanzanian firms 
                                                
5 Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania had 128, 121 and 112 loan applications, respectively. The survey covered 282, 300, 
and 276 Kenyan, Ugandan and Tanzanian firms, respectively.  
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appear more constrained by inadequate collateral than their counterparts in Kenya and Uganda? 
The findings indicate that this is partly because of poor quality legal content in Tanzania.   
 
Collateral is used to address moral hazard and adverse selection problems (Bester, 1985; Boot, 
Thakor and Udell 1991). The more serious these informational problems are, the more likely it is 
that banks will use collateral to exclude low quality borrowers from bank credit. Where the 
quality of information is poor, banks will depend more on collateral to signal the quality of 
borrowers and to reduce the incentive to deviate loan funds into activities other than the project 
for which they are intended. It is also possible that banks may demand very high collateral 
requirements as a way of rationing credit. The observation that Tanzanian firms face more severe 
collateral constraints may in part reflect a weaker financial-information system in that country. 
For example, it will be shown in chapter 2 that compared to Kenya a significantly lower share of 
Tanzanian firms have good quality financial records.  
 
1.4 Rationale for the Study  
 
Although it is widely accepted that the legal environment is important for the provision of 
external finance, there is limited evidence at the firm level on this relationship in the context of 
SSA in general, and the EAC in particular. Studies on credit access in SSA state that poor quality 
legal systems contribute to the limited flow of external funds (e.g., Bigsten et al, 2003), but little 
has been done to test this empirically. Recent evidence from the World Bank Doing Business 
Survey (2005) of 155 developed and developing countries shows that better legal protection is 
associated with a higher credit/GDP ratio. Policies aimed at improving the institutional 
environment under which formal financial markets function will be strengthened by a closer 
examination of this relationship.  
 
It is also important to distinguish the effect of the content of the law on the one hand, and of the 
enforceability of the law on the other. Fabbri (2001) states that any law, no matter how well 
formulated, is intrinsically useless if it can not be effectively enforced. This view is shared by 
Levine (1998) who argues that the enforcing of legal codes is as important as the legal codes 
themselves. As the dissertation will show in chapter 2, the legal environments in the 3 countries 
have significant differences with regard to these two aspects. Thus the EAC presents an excellent 
case study for examining how the legal environment can affect access to external finance and 
investment.  
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A crucial part of the protection that the legal system gives to creditors is to ensure that they have 
access to information about borrowers. Information asymmetry is recognized as a major 
deterrent to the proper functioning of financial markets. In the context of African countries, 
where information problems are generally acute, it is useful to examine the role that the lack (or 
availability) of information has on access to external finance. There is currently an absence of 
micro-level studies about this relationship.   
 
The legal system has important implications for investment via the property rights assigned to 
and enforced on behalf of firms. According to Johnson et al (2002), property rights are 
fundamental because entrepreneurs will not invest if they expect not to reap the return on their 
investment. Significantly less work has been done on this link compared to the literature on the 
relationship between the legal system and access to finance. This is particularly the case for SSA. 
It is critical that a better understanding of how property rights influence investment is obtained, 
given the important role that investment plays in stimulating economic growth. Acemoglu and 
Johnson (2005) argue that there are still many important questions that have not been answered 
with regard to how property rights affect economic activity.  
 
This dissertation examines in detail the importance of collateral for access to bank finance. It is 
worthwhile to assess the importance of collateral in the EAC for several reasons:  
 
• Collateral requirements in the EAC are extremely high. Figure 1.1 showed that collateral 
requirements in the EAC exceed the loan value and are higher than what obtains in other 
developing countries. This can result in firms failing to secure bank finance.  
 
• There are clear differences in the severity of collateral constraints across the three 
countries. It is likely that the legal environment is part of the reason. The more ineffective 
collateral is the more likely banks are to reject loan applications on the basis of 
inadequate collateral.  
 
• The weak institutional framework that characterizes developing countries makes 
information asymmetry more acute. Collateral is expected to play an important role in 
tackling these asymmetries. However, because the institutional framework is weak, 
collateral becomes less appropriate as a contract enforcement mechanism (Menkhoff et 
al, 2004; Nkurunziza, 2005b). 
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• Most of the cross-country literature on how the legal environment affects financial 
markets is based on what Qian and Strahan (2005) call the extensive margin - the impact 
on total credit supply. It is also important to examine what they refer to as the intensive 
margin - the impact on the terms of loans. In this study the author considers this latter 
channel as well by examining the relationship between the quality of the legal system on 
one hand, and collateral requirements and credit maturity on the other.  
 
• According to Haas (2004), a major shortcoming of the literature on law and finance is 
that there is no clear explanation of exactly how legal institutions affect financial 
development. He argues that the literature has consisted mainly of broad cross-country 
analysis, with little theoretic and microeconomic grounding. Examining collateral as one 
possible channel through which this relationship can be explained will be useful in 
addressing this deficiency in the literature.  
 
A better understanding of how collateral substitutes affect access to bank finance is important in 
finding strategies that improve the ability of firms to secure bank loans. According to Balkenhol 
and Schütte (2001), if banks were better informed about the benefits of collateral substitutes, 
they would be more willing to offer loan contracts using these substitutes. Banks may be 
reluctant to extend credit to firms because of adverse selection and moral hazard problems. 
Collateral substitutes provide unique information about borrowers, thus alleviating adverse 
selection. They also improve incentives for repayment (McKee, 2004), and thus reducing moral 
hazard.  
 
The EAC has identified private sector development as crucial at the national level, and to the 
regional integration process. Access to external finance is essential if meaningful private sector 
development is to take place. Indeed, bank finance has been found to have a significant role on 
firm growth in Africa. Nkurunziza (2005a) presents evidence showing that access to bank credit 
is an important determinant of manufacturing firm growth in Kenya. Based on eight African 
countries, van Biesebroeck (2005) finds that bank finance is strongly associated with higher 
productivity levels in manufacturing firms. In light of this, it is critical that ways of improving 
access to bank finance by African manufacturing firms are explored further in order for them to 
realize their full potential as part of the private sector. 
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Trade credit is a very important source of external finance for African manufacturing firms 
because it has the potential to address the collateral problem. This implies that policy 
interventions to improve access to external finance in Africa will benefit from further analysis of 
trade credit. Although there is a fair amount of work on trade credit in Africa, little has been 
done on the relationship between collateral and trade credit. Similarly, although leasing finance 
is acknowledged as a potentially important means of addressing collateral constraints (see 
Westley, 2003; Gallardo, 1999), there is little work on how it can play this role in the context of 
African firms. Note that trade credit and leasing finance address the financing needs of firms in 
different ways. Trade credit is used mainly for working capital requirements, i.e. to purchase raw 
materials. On the other hand leasing makes capital equipment available to firms. One could argue 
that trade credit performs the role of short-term bank credit while leasing finance substitutes for 
long term bank loans. These two sources of finance are complementary to one another with 
regard to the production process of the firm, and thus investigating both of them is a useful 
exercise.  
 
Focusing on the manufacturing sector is justified by several reasons. Firstly, securing finance is 
generally difficult for manufacturing firms (UNIDO, 1999). Given the capital-intensive nature of 
their activities, these firms tend to require medium to long-term and relatively large loans. Such 
financing is harder to secure than smaller loans required for shorter periods. Secondly, the 
manufacturing sector has the potential to make a significant contribution to economic 
development in the EAC as it has done in other regions. The phenomenal growth registered by 
the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICS) of East Asia is largely attributed to expansion in the 
manufacturing sector (see Radelet et al, 1997; Timner and Szirmai, 1997, Hallward-Driemeier et 
al, 2002).  
 
Thirdly, a large proportion of manufacturing firms in the EAC are Small and Medium Scale 
Enterprises (SMEs)6. Manufacturing SMEs in Africa face severe constraints in accessing 
external finance, and bank finance in particular (Bigsten et al, 2003; van Biersebroeck, 2005). 
Part of the reason for SMEs being excluded from bank finance is their limited access to 
collateral. However, SMEs play an important economic role in the EAC. It is estimated that the 
sector accounts for about a third of GDP and employs close to 20 percent of the labour force in 
Tanzania (Government of Tanzania, 2003). In Uganda approximately 800,000 SMEs provide 
                                                
6 56 percent, 74 percent and 80 percent of Kenyan, Ugandan and Tanzanian firms in the ICA surveys are SMEs.  
Micro firms are also included in our categorisation of SMEs.  
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employment to lower income sectors of the economy (Kasekende and Opondo, 2003). This 
implies that many manufacturing firms in the EAC are likely to face collateral constraints and 
addressing these constraints can have substantial economic benefits. 
 
In addition, the manufacturing sector promotes industrial development by facilitating 
technological transfer. Empirical evidence supports the premise that productivity spillovers do 
take place following technological transfer to the manufacturing sectors of developing countries 
(Kathuria, 2000). Finally, data is readily available to analyze this sector. The Regional Program 
on Enterprise Development (RPED) at the World Bank has undertaken Investment Climate 
Analysis (ICA) surveys of manufacturing firms in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania among others. 
This provides a detailed data source that can be used to investigate how the institutional 
environment affects manufacturing firms. This data source is relatively new and very limited 
analysis has been done using it.  
 
1.5   Objectives of the Study 
 
This study has two broad objectives. The first is to examine how the legal environment affects 
access to external finance and the terms on which it is made available. The second objective is to 
investigate how the legal environment (through the assignment and protection of property rights) 
affects investment.  More specifically the study will pursue the following objectives:  
 
• Examine the relationship between the quality of the legal system on the one hand, and 
access to bank finance, trade credit, and leasing finance on the other.  
• Investigate the relationship between the quality of the legal system and credit terms (i.e., 
maturity and collateral requirements).  
• Assess the relationship between the legal environment and information asymmetry.  
• Examine the effect of collateral and collateral substitutes on access to bank finance. 
• Assess the relationship between collateral and access to trade credit. 
• Investigate the relationship between the property rights environment and the decision to 
undertake fixed investment.  
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1.6  Definition of Terms Used in the Study 
 
Quality of the Legal System 
 
The quality of the legal system with regard to the functioning of credit markets depends on two 
factors. Firstly, it depends on the content of the law. This refers to the written law that defines 
the rights and powers of creditors and debtors. Although both parties are important, the law must 
in particular ensure that creditors are well protected in as far as recovering credit provided to 
debtors. Secondly, the quality of the legal system depends on how effectively the laws can be 
enforced. Enforceability is in turn affected by whether or not the judicial process is prone to 
corruption, the speed at which disputes over credit contracts are settled, and the overall capacity 
of the judicial system. For the legal system to be effective in facilitating the flow of external 
finance, the content of the law and the enforceability of the law are equally important. If 
creditors are well protected on paper, but are unable to recover debt in practice, then the legal 
system is poorly suited for the development of credit markets. 
 
The written law also defines the property rights of entrepreneurs over the investments they 
undertake. A good quality legal system will clearly define and protect these property rights, thus 
lessening the probability that firms will have their investment and the returns that are generated 
expropriated by powerful groups. The legal system also needs to enforce these rights in a manner 
that is free and transparent. Poor enforcement (even of well defined property rights) can 
discourage investment.  
 
Property Rights 
 
According to Barzel (1997), legal property rights are the rights assigned over an asset or 
commodity to a person and enforced in part by the government. These rights play an important 
role in facilitating third party adjudication and enforcement. Fleisig and de la Pena (2003) state 
that in the context of developing countries, property rights can be divided into two main 
categories in line with the main economic issues. The first relates to rights concerning the 
ownership, use and disposition of property. The second comprises security interests in property. 
This second group of property rights deals with the taking of property (including property where 
ownership is assigned to another party) and selling it in order to pay for a financial obligation 
such as a bank loan.  
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Equally important are the rights of firms over their investment (for example plant, equipment, 
buildings, land, and intellectual property) and over the returns generated by this investment. 
Norton (1998) states that property rights exist as basic legal rules and procedures for defining 
and settling ownership. Property rights allow enterprising economic agents to enter into 
contractual arrangements in their attempt to maximise wealth.  
 
Access to External Finance 
 
Access to external finance in this study refers to whether or not a firm has some source of 
finance that is not generated internally. It can also refer to the amount of external finance that a 
firm is able to obtain, but the study is limited only to the first definition7. The main sources of 
external finance used by African manufacturing firms are trade credit and bank finance. In 
addition to these two sources the study is also interested in access to leasing finance. According 
to the definition in this study, improving access to external finance means increasing the 
likelihood that a firm is able to obtain one of these sources.  
 
Bank Finance 
 
Bank finance refers to loans provided by commercial banks. The maturity of these loans varies 
substantially. Some loans are payable in a year, while others are payable over a period of up to 
20 years (largely via repeated roll-overs).  
 
Trade Credit 
 
Trade credit refers to credit extended by a seller to a buyer, whereby both the seller and buyer are 
firms (Cunat, 2004). The seller allows delayed payment for his products for a specific period of 
time. The products are usually intermediate goods for the buyer. Trade credit is used mainly to 
meet working capital requirements.  
 
Leasing  
 
Financial leasing is a contractual agreement between two parties, namely the lessee and the 
lessor (Gallardo, 1999). The lessee uses an asset owned by the lessor for a significant part of its 
                                                
7 For a discussion on why we do not use this definition of access to credit see Chapter 3.  
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useful life, in exchange for agreed upon periodic payments. Maintenance costs and the risk of 
obsolescence are borne by the lessee. The lessor remains the legal owner of the asset for the 
period of the lease contract. The lessee normally has the right to purchase the asset from the 
lessor for a nominal amount at the end of the contract. In contrast, an operating lease is short 
term in nature and is not a way of financing the purchase of equipment. The leasing company 
bears the risk of obsolescence and maintenance costs.  
 
Relationship Lending 
 
Relationship lending refers to the building of close ties between a firm and the bank, resulting in 
favourable credit terms being extended to the firm. Boot (2000) defines relationship lending as 
the provision of financial services by a financial intermediary that (a) invests in obtaining 
customer-specific information, often proprietary in nature; and (b) evaluates the profitability of 
these services through multiple interactions with the same customer over time and/or across 
products. He states that relationship lending is most directly aimed at resolving problems of 
asymmetric information by facilitating close monitoring and screening.  
 
Collateral 
 
In the context of developing countries, collateral is usually a physical asset pledged by a 
borrower to a lender until a loan is paid back. It is also possible for collateral to be in the form of 
intangible assets such as accounts receivable and inventory. If the borrower defaults the lender 
has the right to seize the collateral and sell it to recoup the loan (Balkenhol and Schutte, 2001). 
According to Nagarajan and Meyer (1998) collateral is defined as any physical asset with the 
following three characteristics: (a) appropriately leading to ease of liquidation in case of default, 
(b) absence of collateral-specific risks8, and (c) accrual of the returns to the borrower during the 
loan period either through direct economic returns from the use of the asset, or indirect returns 
from the investments made with loans obtained using the asset as collateral.  
 
For collateral to be an effective contract enforcement mechanism, Bell (1989) states that two 
assumptions must hold. Firstly, in case of default banks are able to repossess the collateral using 
the court system if need be. Secondly, a ready market with minimal transactions costs exists for 
                                                
8For example, the asset pledged as collateral is not more likely to lose its value during the course of the debt contract 
compared to other assets normally pledged as collateral.  
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trade in the assets put up as collateral. In addition, Rodriguez-Meza (2004) states that collateral 
should have value for the borrower implying that default is costly for the borrower. Collateral 
must also have value for the lender, which can be realized by selling the pledged assets.  
 
There are two important aspects to these definitions that make collateralization an obstacle to 
accessing bank finance. Firstly, there has to be a marketable asset. In many cases firms 
(especially smaller ones) do not have such assets, and if they do they are not of adequate market 
value to satisfy the requirements of banks. Secondly, there has to be a pledge by the borrower to 
the lender. This entails a formal contractual obligation that can be enforced by the legal system. 
If contract enforcement is poor as is the case in SSA, then lenders will be less willing to provide 
loans. 
 
Collateral Substitutes 
 
Balkenhol and Schutte (2001) explain that collateral substitute is a fairly loose term referring to a 
number of techniques used to address the shortfall in real, tangible assets that banks require firms 
to pledge in order to secure a loan. Collateral substitutes are used to augment inadequate 
traditional collateral items. They enable the borrower to offer an alternative form of state 
verification. Thus, in defining collateral substitutes the author attempts to address the absence 
of a physical asset. This is well demonstrated in informal financial markets where traditional 
collateral requirements are minimal or non-existent. McKee (2004) defines collateral substitutes 
as products designed to create strong incentives for repayment. Given the important role played 
by the legal system in ensuring that the collateral clause is enforced, a collateral substitute also 
captures the need for some institutional mechanism for enforcement purposes. This mechanism 
will normally be informal in nature.  
 
The most common collateral substitutes are based on some attribute of the borrower, or some 
institutional arrangement that improves the information available to the lender (like collateral, a 
collateral substitute should be able to alleviate the problem of information asymmetry). 
Rodriguez-Meza (2004) highlights that among the most commonly used collateral substitutes 
are: the borrowers reputation, the borrowers credit history, the value of a long-term relationship 
with a lending organization, peer pressure in solidarity groups, and credit guarantee systems. He 
states that the majority of collateral substitutes cannot be used to compensate lenders for the loss 
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of funds in case of default. He concludes that this makes collateral superior to collateral 
substitutes.  
 
Collateral Constraint  
 
High collateral requirements may lead to collateral constraints, but do not necessarily mean that 
firms are constrained by collateral in their demand for bank finance. Collateral is a constraint to 
accessing bank finance if firms do not apply for a bank loan because they lack adequate 
collateral. In addition, collateral is a constraint to accessing bank finance if a firms application is 
rejected because it lacks sufficient collateral. This means that collateral is a constraint only if its 
absence or inadequacy causes firms to be excluded from bank finance.  
 
The ultimate goal of reducing collateral constraints is to improve access to bank finance by 
firms. If firms with a demand for bank finance are likely to secure a bank loan or are able to 
obtain large loans, then collateral constraints are likely to be minor. In contrast, if a large part of 
demand for bank finance remains unmet collateral constraints are likely to be severe.  
 
Corruption  
 
Corruption is an act in which the power of public office is used for personal gain in a manner 
that contravenes the rules of the game (Jain, 2001). In addition to weak institutions, Aidt (2003) 
gives 2 other conditions that are necessary for corruption to arise and persist: 
! Discretionary power: the relevant public official must have the authority to design and 
administer regulations with discretion.  
! Economic rents: the discretionary power must permit the extraction of existing rents or the 
creation of new ones.  
 
1.7 Data Sources 
 
In this section the main data sources are discussed and a descriptive analysis of the 
manufacturing sectors of the ECA countries is undertaken. These sources are the Investment 
Climate Analysis (ICA) surveys of the manufacturing sector in the EAC countries, and the 
World Bank Doing Business survey data. The data are examined by size, age, and sector across 
the three countries.  
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1.7.1 The Investment Climate Data 
 
According to the World Bank (2004a), the objectives of the ICA are to assess the current 
performance of formal manufacturing firms, to identify the key constraints on their growth and 
competitiveness, and to prioritize and assess policy priorities to promote private sector 
development. The surveys were conducted by The Regional Program on Enterprise 
Development (RPED) at the World Bank. A broad range of topics are covered in the ICAs 
including investment, export participation, infrastructure, access to credit, use of courts to 
resolve disputes, and corruption. The data are mainly cross-sectional based on ICAs completed 
for Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania between 2002 and 2003. A few variables, for example sales 
and employment, have data for several years. The surveys covered 282 Kenyan, 300 Ugandan, 
and 276 Tanzanian manufacturing firms, respectively.  
 
1.7.1.1 The Sampling Process9 
 
Kenya 
The sample was drawn from a census conducted by the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) of 
nearly 2,000 formal manufacturing firms employing more than 250,000 full-time employees. In 
order to ensure representation of all types of firms, the sample was stratified across location, 
industry, and size. The nine manufacturing industries were: agro-industry, chemicals and paints, 
construction materials, furniture, metals, paper, printing, and publishing, plastics, textile and 
leather, and wood. 368 firms were selected randomly from the clusters, representing 
approximately 20 per cent of all formal firms. Several firms, in many cases non-African and 
foreign ones, refused to be interviewed. Where possible, these firms were replaced with other 
firms having the same characteristics as the ones that refused. Due to the high rate of refusal, 
however, the replacement strategy was only partly successful and, in the end, 282 firms 
completed the survey.  
 
Uganda 
A list of officially registered companies was obtained from the Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 
which compiled the list during a nationwide census conducted in 2001/02. The list includes all 
activities in the formal sector, which had a total of 182,687 permanent employees. The sampling 
frame was stratified by location, manufacturing industry, and size. Following the stratification of 
                                                
9 The sampling process is as explained by the ICA reports prepared by the World Bank. 
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the sample frame, firms were selected randomly in each cluster. A total sample of 410 firms was 
drawn, with an overall sampling rate of 28.5 percent. To obtain the correct distribution of 
manufacturing activities, nine broad industries were defined: agro-industry; chemicals and 
paints; construction materials; furniture; metals; paper, printing, and publishing; plastics; textiles 
and leather products; and wood. 
 
Tanzania 
These firms were randomly selected from a sampling frame that was stratified by firm size, sub-
sector and location. The sampling frame was constructed using lists from various government 
sources. The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) provided the most important list. The data were 
collected for 8 industries and in 10 regions of mainland Tanzania, including Zanzibar. The 
industries and regions covered in the survey were selected based on the relatively high 
concentration of manufacturing firms in these areas. The industries are: furniture and wood; 
textiles, garments, and leather; construction materials; paper, printing, and publishing; chemicals 
and paints; metals; plastics; and agribusiness. 
 
1.7.1.2 Distribution of Firms by Industry, Age and Size 
 
Table 1.6 shows the distribution of firms across the different industries. The furniture and wood 
industries are combined for Kenya and Uganda allowing us to have 8 industries for all 3 
countries. For all 3 countries, the agro-industry is the largest, with Uganda having the greatest 
number of firms in this industry. This is consistent with the heavy reliance on agriculture in these 
countries. Uganda also has by far the largest number of firms involved in construction materials, 
while Tanzania has the largest number of firms in the wood and furniture industry. Kenya has the 
most firms in plastics and metals. It also has the most firms involved in textiles, garments and 
leather products.  
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Table 1.6: Industry Distribution of Firms10 
Sector Kenya Uganda Tanzania 
Agro-industry 83 (29.4) 122 (40.7) 81 (29.3) 
Chemical and Paints 25 (8.9) 18 (6.0) 27 (9.8) 
Construction materials 17 (6.0) 40 (13.3) 11 (4.0) 
Metals 49 (17.4) 21 (7.0) 29 (10.5) 
Wood and Furniture 20 (7.1) 54 (18.0) 65 (23.6) 
Paper, Printing and Publishing 18 (6.4) 23 (7.7) 25 (9.1) 
Plastics 23 (8.2) 7 (2.3) 7 (2.5) 
Textile, Garments and Leather products 47 (16.7) 15 (5.0) 31 (11.2) 
Total 282 300 276 
Source:  World Bank (2002/03), Investment Climate Surveys  
Note:     Numbers in parentheses are percentage shares. 
 
It is clear from Table 1.7 that Kenyan firms are on average older than firms in Uganda and 
Tanzania. This is partly a result of economic and political developments that have taken place in 
Uganda and Tanzania in the post-independence period. Tanzania pursued socialism until 1985 
while Uganda was plagued by severe political unrest until 1986, when the current president came 
to power through a military coup. Furthermore, both Tanzania and Uganda undertook 
nationalization policies that served to curb foreign investment and entrepreneurship in these 
countries. On the other hand,  Kenya has pursued fairly market-oriented policies under a 
relatively stable political environment. Therefore, historically Kenya has enjoyed a more 
conducive environment for private sector development.  
 
Table 1.7: Age of Firms 
Age Kenya Uganda Tanzania 
Mean 27.1 13.3 18.0 
Standard Deviation 19.6 14.4 14.2 
Source: World Bank (2002/03), Investment Climate Surveys  
 
Kenya has a greater proportion of large firms compared to Uganda and Tanzania, as can be seen 
from Table 1.8. This is not surprising given that Kenyan firms are significantly older than their 
counterparts and that the Kenyan economy is the largest in the region. Less than 4 percent of 
Kenyan firms are micro in size, while the corresponding share for Uganda and Tanzania is 18 
percent and 17.6 percent, respectively11.  
                                                
10 The wood and furniture industries are combined for Kenya and Uganda.  
11 Micro enterprises have less than 10 employees, small firms have 10-49 employees, and medium firms have 50-99 
employees. Large firms have 100 employees or more. 
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Table 1.8: Size Distribution of Firms (%) 
Size Kenya Uganda Tanzania 
Micro 3.8 18.0 17.6 
Small 34.0 51.0 40.1 
Medium 17.6 11.3 17.6 
Large 44.7 19.7 24.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: World Bank (2002/03), Investment Climate Surveys  
 
1.7.2 The Doing Business Data 
 
The World Banks Doing Business (2005) indicators will be an important source for data on 
legal rights of creditors and borrowers, contract enforcement, and information availability with 
respect to credit markets in the EAC countries.  Indicators measure government regulations and 
their effect on businesses, especially on small and medium-size domestic firms across 155 
countries. The data are based on research of laws and regulations, with contribution and 
verification from more than 3,000 local government officials, lawyers, business consultants, and 
other professionals who routinely administer or advise on legal and regulatory requirements.  
 
Factual information is used in the data collection process, allowing for contact with various local 
respondents. This addresses potential misinterpretations of questions. Standard 
templates/questionnaires have been developed for all topics covered. The indicators are 
benchmarked to January 2005 and in the majority of cases refer to each countrys most populous 
city. It is assumed that this data is adequately reflective of what obtained in the EAC countries at 
the time of the ICA surveys in 2002/2003. That is, the institutional environment is not expected 
to have changed substantially over a period of 2 years.  
 
1.7.3 Other Data Sources 
 
Other data sources include the World Development Indicators prepared by the World Bank, and 
the International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  These sources 
have provided macroeconomic data used in this chapter and exchange rates used in chapter 3. 
 
1.8 Limitations of the Study 
 
This study is limited to the three countries that constitute the EAC.  Although this has been 
motivated in an earlier part of this chapter, it does impose some important restrictions. For 
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example, all three countries are former British colonies and hence have all adopted the British 
legal system. Thus less variation in the legal environment across countries is present as 
compared to related studies.  Furthermore, one could argue that there is more to learn by 
comparing countries that are more diverse geographically and in terms of economic policy 
objectives.  
 
Cross sectional data sets have limitations when used in econometric testing. These include 
missing variables, measurement error, misspecification error, and selection bias. These 
limitations of cross-sectional data can lead to biased results when using regression analysis.  
Hence it will be necessary to take appropriate measures to address these problems. While the 
study acknowledges that the data have limitations, useful insights can still be and are obtained. 
The data are rich and there is currently little research that has been done using them. 
Furthermore, it is expected that this study can form the basis for future studies that use more 
sophisticated estimation techniques such as panel data analysis when additional data becomes 
available.  
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CHAPTER 2: THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT AND EXTERNAL FINANCE: 
DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Two separate aspects of the legal system that can affect access to external finance were identified 
in chapter 1: the content of the law and the efficiency of the judiciary in enforcing the law. In this 
chapter descriptive analysis is used to examine the relationship between the legal environment 
and access to external finance.  Measures of the quality of the legal system are developed using 
ICA data. In addition, legal system indicators that are financial-market specific are obtained from 
the Doing Business data.  
 
The quality of the legal system can affect the functioning of financial markets by (a) reducing 
information asymmetry problems and (b) affecting the terms of finance. Therefore, the study 
compares the legal system measures against indicators of information availability. The legal 
indicators are also compared against bank collateral requirements and maturity for bank loans 
and trade credit. To the best of the authors knowledge this chapter is the first attempt to provide 
micro evidence on how the legal environment relates to both access to finance and the terms of 
finance for a group of African countries. Part of the novelty of the analysis is that the chapter 
examines micro data relating to two different types of external finance, namely bank finance and 
trade credit.  
 
In this chapter some similarities are drawn between an understanding of the content of the law 
and enforceability, and the separation of property rights and contracting institutions in Acemoglu 
and Johnson (2005). This is because this studys distinction is closely related to that made by 
these authors. This study holds that property rights relate more to what is assigned to individuals 
in the written law. On the other hand, Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) examine contracting 
institutions in terms of the cost of enforcing private contracts; similar to what is considered in 
this chapter. This comparison is helpful in formulating the hypotheses tested in this chapter.  
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2.2 Literature Review 
 
In this section a review is done on literature pertaining to the relationship between the legal 
environment on one hand, and access to external finance and the terms of this finance on the 
other. The section also reviews literature on how the legal system affects information 
asymmetry. 
 
2.2.1 Models Relating the Legal Environment and Access to External Finance 
 
The observed empirical relationship between the quality of the legal system and access to 
external finance has led to the development of models attempting to explain this phenomena. 
Fabbri (2001) develops a model to analyze how the degree of legal enforcement affects the level 
of private investment. The model assumes the government is responsible for enforcement, 
whereby enforcement refers to the repossession of collateral. It also assumes the presence of 
moral hazard in order to explain the existence of credit constraints. The model shows that 
financing constraints can also be explained by how effectively the legal rights of creditors can be 
enforced: more efficient enforcement is associated with more access to finance.  
 
Another model relating enforcement to access to external finance by firms is constructed by 
Krasa et al (2003). Their model considers both the ability and willingness to pay back a loan in 
the presence of an enforcement mechanism that resembles a court. The cost of enforcement is 
measured by a deadweight loss to the contracting parties that depends on accounting standards. 
Poor accounting standards lead to higher costs incurred by the court to verify the value of a 
firms assets, or to higher costs associated with corruption such as payments to court officials. 
An increase in this deadweight loss leads to a reduction in the lenders expected payoff. Their 
model predicts that firms in countries with poor institutions characterized by high costs of 
enforcement will find it difficult to raise external finance.  
 
Japelli et al (2005) argue that the cost of enforcing contracts is a key determinant of access to 
bank finance. They develop a model based on opportunistic debtors and inefficient courts. Poor 
judicial enforcement leads to an increase in opportunistic behaviour because borrowers anticipate 
that lenders will only be able to recover loans through the courts at a very high cost. The fraction 
of collateral that the bank can recover is used to measure judicial efficiency, with a higher 
fraction representing greater efficiency. They show that with a competitive banking sector an 
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increase in this fraction leads to a reduction in minimum collateral requirements and reduces the 
number of credit constrained borrowers. Their models predictions are supported by panel data 
on Italian provinces. Bank finance is found to be less widely available in provinces with longer 
trials and larger backlogs of pending cases. 
 
A distinction is made between property rights institutions: institutions that protect the rights of 
citizens against expropriation by the government and elite groups, and contracting institutions: 
institutions that enforce private contracts in Acemoglu and Johnson (2005). They develop a 
model to show how differences in property rights and contracting institutions affect financial and 
economic performance. Their model predicts that contracting institutions may influence the type 
of financial transactions, but have little effect on the level of financial intermediation. In contrast, 
the model predicts that property rights institutions have a significant effect on the level of 
financial intermediation. They argue that contracts between borrowers and creditors can be 
restructured to reduce the negative effects of costly contract enforcement. However, no 
contractual negotiations are possible with respect to property rights institutions as this would 
imply the state and elitist groups are willing to constrain their own expropriating behaviour.  
 
Lombardo and Pagano (2002) develop a model relating the law and equity markets. In their 
analysis they state that the legal system can affect equity markets through three distinct channels. 
First, legal limits to managerial discretion can affect the share of profits that managers can divert. 
Second, auditing and monitoring costs incurred by shareholders will be lower given regulations 
that improve the availability of information. Finally, more efficient law enforcement could 
increase the set of business contracts that can be enforced in court. Similar to the bank-based 
models, their model predicts that better legal institutions increase the equilibrium quantity of 
external equity.  
 
2.2.2 Empirical Evidence 
 
La Porta et al (1997) and La Porta et al (1998) are the seminal works on investigating the 
relationship between the legal environment and access to external finance. Based on a sample of 
developed and developing countries they find that the legal environment (encompassing both 
legal rules and enforcement) is important for the size and extent of a countrys capital markets. 
They argue that a good legal environment protects lenders against expropriation by borrowers, 
making lenders more willing to provide funds in exchange for securities. Their evidence suggests 
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that countries with poorer investor protection measured by the nature of the legal rules and the 
ability to enforce them have smaller and thinner capital markets.  
 
In addition La Porta et al (1997) make an important distinction about how legal origin affects the 
rights of creditors and outside investors. They find that countries which have adopted English 
common law have laws offering the strongest protection to shareholders and creditors. In 
contrast, countries of French civil law origin offer the least protection. The quality of 
enforcement is found to be highest in Scandinavian and German civil law countries. Enforcement 
is poorest in countries having adopted French civil law. To investigate further the importance of 
legal origin, La Porta el at (1998) assess its role in explaining cross-country differences in access 
to external finance. They show that whether a countrys commercial and company law is based 
on British, French, German or Scandinavian legal origins has a significant role in explaining the 
level of bank and stock market development. Their findings are supported by Beck et al (2001) 
and Beck et al (2003).  
 
Levine (1998) investigates the relationship between the legal environment and banking 
development for a sample of developed and developing countries. He finds that countries where 
the written law gives preference to the rights of creditors have better developed banking sectors 
measured by bank credit to the private sector as a share of GDP. His results also show that 
enforcement is important. Countries with strong enforcement of contracts are characterized by 
better developed banks compared to countries where enforcement is weak. The observed 
divergence can be linked to legal origin.  
 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) assess whether an underdeveloped legal system 
negatively affects the ability of firms to invest in profitable projects. Based on a sample of thirty 
developed and developing countries they find that countries with better developed legal systems 
are associated with firm growth that is more dependent on long-term debt and equity.  Better 
functioning legal systems are associated with greater dependence on long-term external finance. 
They also find that the return on capital in countries with well-developed legal systems is lower 
relative to countries with underdeveloped legal systems. This leads them to conclude that strong 
legal systems are associated with lower profitability and hence a higher dependence on external 
finance.  
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Based on firm level data from the World Business Environment Survey for thirty-eight countries, 
Beck et al (2004) examine whether the independence of the judiciary and adaptability of the 
legal system (i.e. the ability of legal traditions to adapt to the contracting needs of the economy) 
affect the constraints that firms face in obtaining external finance. They find that firms in 
countries with legal systems of French origin report higher obstacles due to collateral 
requirements, lack of access to long-term loans, and bank bureaucracy. They conclude that the 
adaptability of a countrys legal system is more significant for explaining constraints faced by 
firms in accessing external finance than the political independence of the judiciary.  
 
Using data for a group of 57 developed and developing countries Qian and Strahan (2005) 
examine how the legal and institutional environment affects bank loan terms. They find that in 
countries where creditors rights over collateral are better protected loans are more likely to be 
secured, have lower interest rates, and have longer maturity. Their findings also suggest that in 
countries with high legal enforcement costs domestic banks tend to lend to low quality 
borrowers, while foreign banks lend to high quality borrowers at high interest rates.  
 
Cristini et al (2001) test the hypothesis that poor legal enforcement has a negative effect on credit 
markets using provincial data from Argentina. They find strong results in support of this 
hypothesis. Provinces with poor legal enforcement have significantly less credit available to 
borrowers and have a higher ratio of non-performing bank loans. Similar evidence is found in the 
case of Brazil by Pinheiro and Cabral (1999). Using state-level data they find that the quality of 
judicial enforcement has a significant effect on credit/GDP ratios.  
 
2.3 The Legal Environment and Information Asymmetry 
 
The legal environment can affect access to external finance via its impact on information 
asymmetry. Laws requiring that debtors keep financial records and make this information 
available to creditors can play a role in alleviating adverse selection and moral hazard. However 
this channel has received limited attention in the literature. The impact of the legal system on the 
quality of financial information has been studied mainly in the context of equity markets. Gul 
and Qiu (2002) examine the relationship between measures of legal protection, law enforcement, 
and corporate governance on one hand, and country level scores of information asymmetry on 
the other, for a group of 22 emerging markets. Their results show that countries with stronger 
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legal protection, enforcement and corporate governance are associated with lower levels of 
information asymmetry.  
 
Eleswarapu and Venkataraman (2004) analyze the trading costs of 412 American Depository 
Receipts (ADRs) from 44 countries that are traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). 
They find that stocks from countries with better legal enforcement have lower adverse selection 
risk and trading costs. Their results show that information risk (reflected in trading costs) is 
lower for countries with better accounting standards.  
 
Much of the literature on the relationship between the legal system and information asymmetry 
relates to disclosure of financial information. Kothari (2000) presents a summary of literature on 
the effects disclosure of financial information on the risks associated with financial markets. He 
states that the quality of financial information depends on both the quality of standards governing 
the disclosure of accounting information, and the enforcement of standards. If enforcement of 
disclosure standards is weak then the quality of disclosure tends to be poor.  
 
The use of disclosure regulations is motivated by some researchers as a response to market 
failures. According to Watts and Zimmerman (1986) and Beaver (1998) accounting information 
can be viewed as a public good because shareholders implicitly pay for it to be produced but are 
unable to charge potential users for its use.  Free riding on information by potential investors 
leads to under production of information in the economy, and therefore the need for regulation. 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) and Beaver (1998) also argue that disclosure regulation can be a 
result of factors other than market failures. Regulators may be interested in protecting less 
informed investors. Minimum disclosure requirements minimize the information gap between 
informed and uninformed investors.  
 
2.4 Summary of Literature Review 
 
The literature review revealed that the quality of the legal system has a positive impact on access 
to external finance. A better quality legal system provides better protection for creditors rights, 
is associated with more effective enforcement, and leads to lower levels of information 
asymmetry.  
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Gaps in the literature have been identified in line with the objectives of the study. There is 
limited firm level evidence on how the legal environment affects access to external finance in 
SSA. In particular little has been done to disentangle the relative roles of the two aspects of the 
legal environment; the content of the law and the enforceability of the law. Furthermore, little is 
known about the relationship between the legal environment and information asymmetry in SSA. 
Finally, firm level evidence on how the legal environment relates to the terms of external finance 
in SSA is extremely limited. 
 
2.5 Measuring the Quality of the Legal System 
 
To measure the quality of the legal system indicators on (a) the content of the law and (b) 
enforceability are required. Indicators of these 2 aspects are developed and discussed in this 
section.  
 
2.5.1 Content of the Law Indicators 
 
The quality of the content of law is measured based on responses to a question about the 
consistency and predictability of regulations affecting firms. It is expected that better quality 
legal content translates into stronger rights for creditors over assets pledged as collateral by 
borrowers, and less ambiguity over the ability of borrowers to pledge these assets. The ICA 
survey asked firms whether they think that government officials interpret business regulations in 
a consistent and predictable way based on a scale ranging from 1 to 6. Responses of 1 means that 
a firm fully disagrees that officials interpret regulations in a consistent and predictable manner. A 
response of 6 means that a firm fully agrees that the interpretation is predictable and consistent. 
The study argues that the better the content of the law the more likely it is that the interpretation 
by officials will be consistent and predictable.  
 
Figure 2.1 shows that at just over 40 percent, Tanzania has the smallest share of firms agreeing 
that government officials interpret regulations in a consistent and predictable manner. Uganda 
has the highest share of 60 percent, which is marginally higher than what obtains in Kenya. From 
Figure 2.1 one can argue that Tanzania has the lowest quality legal content. This indicator does 
have an important limitation. It is very broad in the sense that it does not specifically address the 
functioning of financial markets.  
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Figure 2.1: Share of Firms Agreeing that Interpretation of Regulations is 
Consistent and Predictable (%)
0
20
40
60
80
Kenya Uganda Tanzania
Pe
rc
en
t
Share of Firms that Agree
 
  Source: World Bank (2002/03), Investment Climate Surveys  
  Kenya (n=268) Uganda (n=285) Tanzania (n=266) 
Thus, it would be meaningful to augment this indicator with another indicator that can at least 
partly address these limitations. This is done using the Doing Business legal rights index, which 
reflects the legal rights of borrowers and lenders. This index has the advantage of being based on 
credit markets. Using data collected through the study of collateral and insolvency laws, the 
index measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws facilitate lending. Among 
aspects covered by the index are: the extent to which secured creditors are able to seize their 
collateral when a debtor enters reorganization; whether general, rather than specific, description 
of assets is permitted in collateral agreements; and if a registry that includes charges over 
movable property exists. The index ranges from 0 to 10, higher scores indicating that collateral 
and bankruptcy laws are better designed to expand access to credit. The disadvantage of this 
index is that it is not specific to the manufacturing sector on which this study focuses. 
Table 2.1 shows that Kenya has better legal rights for borrowers and lenders compared to 
Uganda and Tanzania. Interestingly Uganda and Tanzania are ranked equally on the basis of this 
index.  
Table 2.1: Legal Rights Index 
Kenya Uganda Tanzania 
8 5 5 
Source: World Bank (2005), Doing Business in 2005 Database 
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Based on the 2 indicators it can be concluded that Kenya has the best quality legal system in 
terms of legal content. This is clear with reference to financial markets in particular based on the 
Legal Rights Index.  
 
2.5.2 Cost of Enforcement Indicators 
 
Enforcement is measured by responses to a question about the impact of bribes paid to judges on 
the outcome of commercial court cases. Using a scale ranging from 0 (no impact) to 4 (decisive 
impact), firms were asked to state the extent to which bribes to judges affected the outcome of 
commercial court cases. A greater impact of bribes on judicial decisions suggests a higher 
prevalence of corruption. This would lead to higher enforcement costs. Figure 2.2 shows that 
Kenya has a significantly higher share of firms that impact court decisions through bribes to 
judges. 
 
Figure 2.2: Share of Firms  that Impact Court Decisions by Bribing Judges 
(%)
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  Kenya (n=193) Uganda (n=159) Tanzania (n=108) 
 
Uganda has the lowest share of just below 30 percent. Similar to the content of law indicator 
taken from the ICA survey data, this measure is not specific to credit markets. Therefore, the 
study makes use of other measures of enforcement costs that are specific to credit markets. These 
are (a) the number of days it takes to recover overdue debt through the courts and (b) the cost of 
enforcement as a percentage of outstanding debt. These indicators are obtained from the Doing 
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Business Survey. Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4 show that Kenya has the highest enforcement costs in 
terms of time and financial cost. This is consistent with the high prevalence of corruption in the 
Kenyan judiciary that one observes in Figure 2.2. Enforcement costs are least in Uganda based 
on both the days to recover overdue debt and on the share of debt required to enforce contracts. 
 
Figure 2.3: Number of Days to Recover Overdue Debt through Courts
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Figure 2.4: Cost of Enforcing Contract (% of Debt)
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The legal indicators show that Kenya has the most well developed legal system in terms of legal 
content. Tanzania appears to have the least developed system with respect to legal content, 
though only marginally different from Uganda. However, enforcement costs are higher in Kenya 
compared to Uganda and Tanzania. Uganda has the lowest enforcement costs based on all the 
indicators. These observed differences can not be used to conclude that one country has a better 
legal system than another. Both the written law and cost of enforcement are critical components 
for a legal system that enables financial decisions to take place. In chapter 3 an investigation of 
the collateral mechanism provides more insight into the importance of enforcement costs.  
 
2.6 Testing of Hypotheses   
 
The previous section described the indicators that are used to measure the quality of the written 
law and the costs associated with enforcement. In this section a descriptive analysis based on 5 
hypotheses is undertaken. 
 
Hypothesis 1:  Better quality legal content is associated with greater access to bank finance 
and trade credit.  
 
Rationale: Borrowers will be more capable of pledging collateral where their rights over assets 
are more clearly defined. In addition, better defined rights over collateral for creditors will lead 
to greater provision of bank finance. Based on the redistribution view (see Love et al, 2005) it 
is expected that higher levels of bank finance will be associated with greater provision of trade 
credit. Firms successful in securing bank finance redistribute it to firms unable to do so in the 
form of trade credit. Hypothesis 1 is tested by assessing the relationship between the content of 
law indicators and measures of access to bank credit and trade credit.  
 
Hypothesis 2: More efficient enforcement of debt contracts is associated with greater access to 
bank finance and trade credit. 
 
Rationale: Banks will be more willing to lend in an environment where the costs associated with 
repossessing collateral are low. Again the redistribution view suggests that the greater 
willingness of banks to extend credit will be associated with higher levels of trade credit. In 
addition, because firms use the courts to settle disputes over trade credit disputes, a more 
efficient legal system will be characterized by greater access to trade credit.  Hypothesis 2 is 
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tested by examining the relationship between the cost of enforcement indicators and measures of 
access to bank finance and trade credit.  
 
It would be useful to assess whether the differences in the legal indicators from the ICA data are 
statistically significant across countries. Hypotheses 1 and 2 are based on the premise that the 
quality of the written law and legal enforcement are significantly different across countries. 
However, no appropriate test was found for this purpose. Difference in means tests appear the 
most intuitive. However, when these tests are done using t-scores and z-scores they require 
continuous data. The variables used in this chapter are dichotomous (e.g. interpretation of 
government laws is either consistent or not consistent; firms either have a loan or dont have a 
loan).  
 
The alternative would be to use non-parametric tests that deal with dichotomous variables. These 
tests include the Fisher exact test, the Cochran Q test and the McNemar change test (see 
Conover, 1980 and Siegel and Castellan Jr., 1988).  Although the Fisher exact test considers 
independent samples (independence is a plausible assumption when looking at 3 different 
countries), it requires 2 factors and 2 categories. For example size (small and large) and age 
(young and old). The comparisons in this chapter are not structured in this way. On the other 
hand, the Cochran Q test and the McNemar change test are conducted on related samples, 
usually looking at before and after effects on the same sample. Other non-parametric tests such 
as the Wilcoxon test require that the data are ordinal. Given these limitations on available tests, 
the comparison of variables is done without making any conclusion about whether the observed 
differences are significant.  
 
Figure 2.5 shows that a far larger proportion of Kenyan firms have access to bank finance in the 
form of ordinary loans and overdrafts compared to Ugandan and Tanzanian firms. It also shows 
that Kenyan firms have greater access to trade credit. The greater access to external finance in 
Kenya is partly a result of Kenya having larger firms compared to the other countries and a 
higher level of financial development (see Tables 1.4, 1.5 and 1.8). There are clearly factors not 
directly related to the legal environment that influence access to external finance.  
 
The share of Ugandan and Tanzanian firms with access to bank loans and trade credit is fairly 
similar. However Tanzanian firms appear to have marginally better access to overdraft facilities 
than Ugandan firms. Figure 2.5 suggests that in the context of the EAC, where legal content is 
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superior (Kenya) access to external finance greater. This supports hypothesis 1. It is an important 
finding given that emphasis is normally placed on enforcement in the literature (for example 
Cristini et al, 2001; Japelli et al, 2005).  Factors external to the legal environment contributing to 
greater access in Kenya have been mentioned in the previous paragraph and in chapter 1.  
 
Figure 2.5: Share of Firms by Type of External Finance (% of 
                  all firms)
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  Source: World Bank (2002/03), Investment Climate Surveys  
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It is also interesting to examine how access to external finance varies by size in the three EAC 
countries. Micro firms in Uganda and Tanzania have better access to bank loans compared to 
Kenyan firms as shown by Figure 2.6.  
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Figure 2.6: Share of Firms with a Bank Loan (%)
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The observation that no Kenyan micro firms have a bank loan may reflect the significant 
presence of large firms in Kenya, and that micro firms are unable to compete with these large 
firms for bank credit. It may also be that micro firms in Kenya have no demand for loans. 
However for small, medium and large firms, Kenyan firms have far greater access to bank loans 
relative to their counterparts. Access to bank loans increases with size in all 3 countries.  
 
Although Kenyan micro firms do not obtain ordinary bank loans Figure 2.7 shows that 40 
percent of these firms have access to overdraft facilities. In contrast only 2 percent of Ugandan 
micro firms and 4 percent of Tanzanian micro firms have an overdraft facility. Similarly to the 
trend with ordinary bank loans, there is a general increase in access to overdrafts with size in the 
3 countries.  
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Figure 2.7: Share of Firms with Overdraft (%)
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Figure 2.8 shows that amongst micro firms, trade credit is used least in Tanzania. It is also in 
Tanzania that it is used least amongst large firms. However, in the small and medium sized 
categories, Ugandan firms use trade credit the least. Notably, for all size groups Kenyan firms 
use trade credit more than Ugandan and Tanzanian firms. This supports the redistribution view. 
Greater access to bank credit is associated with more use of trade credit. In addition, there is a 
general increase in the use of trade credit with size. This is despite the fact that large firms are 
most likely to have collateral to pledge for bank loans. Large firms may also have better access 
to internal sources of finance. Smaller firms with the least collateral and less internal resources 
may benefit from better access to trade credit.  
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Figure 2.8: Share of Firms that Receive Trade Credit (%)
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Given the fact that Kenyan firms have greater access to bank finance and trade credit, it is not 
surprising that they rely less on internal sources of finance for their working capital and 
investment needs. Figure 2.9 shows that Ugandan and Tanzanian firms depend more heavily on 
retained earnings to finance working capital and new investment.  
 
Figure 2.9: Share of Retained Earnings in Working Capital and New 
Investment (%)
0
20
40
60
80
100
Kenya Uganda Tanzania
Pe
rc
en
t
Working Capital New Investment
 
  Source: World Bank (2002/03), Investment Climate Surveys  
  Kenya (n=172) Uganda (n=202) Tanzania (n=166) 
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The evidence supports the first hypothesis. It appears that better quality legal content is 
positively associated with access to external finance. This is captured by the positive relationship 
depicted in Figure 2.10.  
 
Figure 2.10: Access to Bank Loans versus Legal Content
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However, the second hypothesis can not be accepted on the basis of our evidence. There is no 
indication that  low enforcement costs are associated with better access to external finance. This 
is shown by Figure 2.11. Kenya which has the highest enforcement costs also has the most 
access to bank finance and trade credit.  
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Figure 2.11: Access to Bank Loans versus Cost of Enforcement
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This result is interesting in the sense that in order for superior creditor rights to meaningfully 
affect access to external finance, those rights must be effectively enforced. It was emphasised in 
chapter 1 that legal content and legal enforcement are equally important for the functioning of 
credit markets. There are likely to be other factors behind the observed differences in access to 
external finance in the EAC other than the legal environment. The discussion in section 2.6 will 
consider some of these factors.  
 
Hypothesis 3:   Better quality legal content is associated with less information asymmetry.  
 
Rationale: If the law clearly defines the rights of creditors over information about their debtors 
there will be less information asymmetry between the two parties. This information serves a 
critical role in the decisions taken by creditors. 
 
Hypothesis 3 is tested by investigating the relationship between the content of law indicators and 
measures of information availability. The measures of information availability from the ICA are 
the share of firms that keep annual accounts and the share of firms that have their accounts 
audited by an outside agency. Figure 2.12 shows that Kenya has the best financial information 
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available compared to Uganda and Tanzania. Less than 60 percent of Ugandan firms have their 
accounts audited.   
 
Figure 2.12: Share of Firms with Financial Accounts (%)
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Use is made of the credit information index from the Doing Business survey. The index is 
measured on a scale of 0 to 6, with higher values indicating that more credit information is 
available from either a public registry or a private bureau to facilitate lending decisions. From  
Table 2.2 one sees that credit information is extremely poor in Uganda and Tanzania. However, 
Kenya has relatively good credit information available.  
 
Table 2.2: Credit Information Index 
Kenya Uganda Tanzania 
5 0 0 
Source: World Bank (2005), Doing Business in 2005 Database 
 
The evidence supports hypothesis 3.  In the case of the EAC, better quality legal content is 
associated with better availability of financial information. Strong creditor rights place pressure 
on firms to keep good quality financial records. More lending takes place in this environment.  
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The relative ease of information flow in Kenya means that debtors can be more easily disciplined 
by means other than the formal collateral channel. Thus, although enforcement costs are high, 
debtors in Kenya would work hard to protect their reputations. The availability of financial 
information partly explains why high enforcement costs in Kenya coexist with relatively high 
access to bank finance.  
 
Hypothesis 4:   Better quality legal content is associated with lower collateral constraints.  
 
Rationale: If the content of the law is of high quality then banks will have greater confidence that 
their rights as creditors are protected. They will be less worried that default is associated with 
non-recovery of the loans they have extended. Therefore, banks will be less prone to using 
collateral requirements as a means of preventing firms from obtaining loans.   
 
To test hypothesis 4 the study examines measures of collateral constraints. These measures are: 
the share of firms that did not apply for a bank loan due to inadequate collateral and the number 
of firms whose loan applications were rejected because of inadequate collateral. Table 2.3 shows 
these measures for the 3 countries. In Uganda the share of firms not applying for loans due to 
inadequate collateral is more than twice as high as it is in Kenya. Although the corresponding 
figure for Tanzania is not available, it is likely that the Tanzanian share is close to what is 
observed in Uganda given the similarities observed between the two countries thus far12. 
Tanzania has the largest share of firms whose loan applications are rejected due to inadequate 
collateral.  This share is again twice as high in Uganda as it is in Kenya. Table 2.3 suggests that 
collateral constraints in Kenya are less severe compared to Uganda and Tanzania. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
12 The survey data on Tanzania does not allow us to calculate this share. However approximately 50 percent of 
Tanzanian firms indicated that collateral was one of the factors affecting their decision of whether or not to apply for 
a bank loan.  
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Table 2.3: Collateral and Bank Finance (%) 
  
Firms not 
applying  (% of 
all firms) 
Applications 
rejected (%) 
Kenya  4 1.6 
Uganda 10 3.3 
Tanzania - 10.7 
Source: World Bank (2002/03), Investment Climate Surveys  
Kenya (n=228) Uganda (n=300) Tanzania (n=270) 
The little evidence available supports the hypothesis that better quality legal content is associated 
with lower collateral constraints. 
 
Hypothesis 5: More costly legal enforcement is associated with higher collateral requirements.  
 
Rationale: Banks will factor the cost of enforcement into the collateral requirements they place 
on firms. This implies that other things held constant, Kenya will have the highest collateral 
requirements. If enforcement costs can be incorporated into collateral requirements banks will 
still be willing to lend. This may partly explain the earlier finding of better access to bank 
finance in Kenya even though enforcement costs are very high.  
 
Figure 2.13 shows that the average collateral-to-loan value in Kenya is higher than in the other 
countries. The hypothesis that more costly enforcement is associated with higher collateral 
requirements is supported by the data.  
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Figure 2.13: Collateral as a Percentage of Loan Value (%)
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For every size group the collateral-to-loan ratio is higher in Kenya than in Uganda and Tanzania 
as shown in Figure 2.14. For Kenya and Uganda medium firms face the highest collateral 
requirements. In the case of Tanzania medium and large firms face similar requirements. 
 
Figure 2.14: Collateral/Loan Ratio by Firm Size (%)
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Hypothesis 6: Better quality legal content is associated with longer maturity for bank loans and 
trade credit.  
 
Rationale: When banks have better protection against risk through the collateral mechanism they 
will be less concerned about putting borrowers on a short lease in terms of loan maturity.  
Firms will typically enjoy loans of longer maturity when creditor rights are strong. The terms on 
which firms secure bank finance could in turn affect the terms on which they provide trade 
credit. Firms may choose to redistribute trade credit in line with the maturity of their bank 
credit. 
 
There is no evidence to support the hypothesis that better quality legal content is associated with 
longer maturity. According to Table 2.6 there are no meaningful differences in bank loan 
maturity across the 3 countries, although maturity in Tanzania is slightly lower relative to the 
other 2 countries. There is also no support for the argument that trade credit maturity is affected 
by bank credit maturity. No identifiable pattern can be seen between the 2 maturities shown in 
Table 2.6.  
 
Table 2.6: Maturity on Bank Loans and Trade Credit 
  Kenya  Uganda Tanzania 
Loan (years) 3.69 3.71 3.26 
Trade Credit (days) 56.5 33.5 45.8 
Source: World Bank (2002/03), Investment Climate Surveys  
Kenya (n=93)  Uganda (n=42) Tanzania (n=53) 
2.7 Further Discussion of Results 
 
In line with the findings of previous work, the descriptive analysis does present some evidence 
supporting the argument that the quality of the legal system has an important relationship with 
access to external finance and the terms of this finance. This chapter has investigated this 
relationship using several hypotheses. The analysis suggests that the content of law is important 
for access to external finance.  Kenyan firms have greater access to bank loans, overdraft 
facilities and trade credit. It appears that the protection of creditor rights is relatively more 
important than the cost of enforcing these rights through a court of law. This is consistent with 
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) who argue that property rights institutions are more important 
than contracting institutions for the functioning of financial markets. However, high enforcement 
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costs do make the sourcing of bank finance extremely costly as shown by the strikingly high 
collateral requirements in Kenya.  
 
The Kenyan results are taken with caution for several reasons. First, as chapter 3 will show, 
collateral turns out to be insignificant for access to bank finance in Kenya. This suggests that the 
superior creditor protection is not what drives the better access to bank finance that is observed. 
If creditor protection over collateral was important, collateral would have a meaningful effect on 
banks decisions to extend loans. Second, the analysis does not control for other factors that 
impact access to external finance. According to Haas (2004) this is a major weakness of the law 
and finance literature. Factors such as bank supervision, natural endowments, political stability, 
the level of economic development, and social capital are likely to be important. These factors 
are likely to be behind the interesting observation that although contract enforcement costs are 
highest in Kenya, Kenyan firms still have the most access to external finance. For example, 
because Kenya has historically enjoyed a higher level of economic development than in Uganda 
and Tanzania, access to external finance will be more favourable for Kenyan firms even if legal 
enforcement in Kenya is of poor quality. Furthermore, the analysis in this chapter has not 
controlled for firm size, an important determinant of access to credit.  
 
Third, the analysis can not claim that causality runs in any particular direction. For example, 
greater access to credit in Kenya increases the likelihood that disputes over financial contracts 
will arise. A greater demand for court services in Kenya for the resolution of these conflicts may 
be the reason behind the high enforcement costs observed in that country. It is also possible that 
the superior creditor rights in Kenya are a response to the expansion of the formal credit market, 
rather than a cause of this expansion.  
 
Creditor protection in Kenya appears to work through the information channel rather than 
through collateral. The content of the law is positively associated with the availability of 
financial information as expected. Kenya has the largest share of firms keeping financial records 
and that have these records audited by an outside agency. Based on the credit information index 
access to credit information in Kenya is good with a score of 5 out of a possible 6. Notably 
Uganda and Tanzania have the lowest possible score. There is an indirect effect of the quality of 
the legal system on access to external finance. Better legal protection leads to better financial 
information, which in turn has a positive effect on access to external finance. This financial 
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information will be important as a collateral substitute in Kenya given the ineffectiveness of 
traditional collateral in affecting bank lending.  
 
The legal environment relates strongly to collateral requirements through the cost of 
enforcement. Kenya has significantly higher collateral requirements than Uganda and Tanzania.  
Banks appear to factor in the cost of debt recovery via legal channels into the collateral 
requirements they place on firms. Thus, the terms of bank credit are dependent on the legal 
system. Nevertheless, collateral constraints appear to be least severe in Kenya. This finding is 
interesting given that collateral requirements are highest in Kenya. It suggests that in reality 
collateral is not important for access to bank finance for Kenyan firms as will be shown in 
chapter 3. If it were, then the high requirements would translate into poor access to bank loans. 
Notably, the country where the legal content is weakest (Tanzania) seems to have the most 
severe collateral constraints. Creditor rights appear to be important for the extent to which banks 
are willing to use collateral as an enforcement mechanism in that country. 
 
It must be pointed out that although the evidence supports the hypothesis on the relationship 
between enforcement costs and collateral requirements, there are other factors that can affect the 
observed collateral requirements. First, the indivisibility of collateral increases the likelihood of 
high collateral-to-loan ratios for small loans (Isaksson, 2002a) Second, the absence of secondary 
markets for capital goods makes it difficult to correctly value assets pledged as collateral. While 
these factors are important, they are unlikely to undermine the studys argument. The impact of 
enforcement costs must be present if the large difference observed between Kenya and the other 
2 countries is to be adequately explained.  
 
Average loan maturity has no significant difference across the 3 countries. The evidence in this 
chapter does not support the idea that poorer protection of creditor rights is associated with banks 
putting borrowers on a short leash. The analysis provides no evidence supporting the argument 
that bank finance maturity has an impact on trade credit maturity. Other factors such as the 
relationship between firms are likely to be of more importance when agreeing on trade credit 
terms, than the terms on which firms are able to secure bank finance.  The observation that 
Kenya has significantly longer maturity for trade credit (although not for loans) could be 
indicative of strong network effects, or of a relatively greater tendency for payments to be 
delayed. Weaker enforcement in Kenya may promote opportunistic behaviour by firms using 
trade credit. This issue is considered in chapter 4.  
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2.8 Conclusions 
 
There exists a large body of empirical evidence showing that the quality of the legal system 
affects access to external finance. More recently attempts have been made to develop theoretical 
models to explain this relationship. Despite the importance of these works in explaining how the 
institutional framework affects financial markets, there has been little work examining how the 
legal system relates to access to finance at the micro level, particularly in the context of African 
countries. This chapter takes a step to address this gap using the EAC as a case study. 
 
Proxies on the quality of the legal system focusing on two aspects - the content of the law and 
the enforceability of the law  were presented.   These proxies were then compared against 
measures of access to bank finance and trade credit. The analysis indicated that in the case of the 
EAC the content of the law is important for overall access to external finance. In particular, the 
evidence showed that better quality legal content is associated with a significantly lower level of 
information asymmetry. This means that better legal protection is associated with greater access 
to external finance partly because it promotes the flow of information between creditors and 
borrowers.  
 
No evidence was found to suggest that enforcement costs affect access to external finance. This 
is partly because the chapter does not isolate this effect explicitly. An attempt to do this is made 
in chapter 3 by investigating the collateral mechanism. Moreover, there are other factors that 
affect access to external finance such as the level of economic and financial development, and 
firm size which need to be kept in mind when interpreting the results. Also important to note is 
that based on the analysis in this chapter the author is unable to claim causality running from 
legal environment to access to external finance. 
 
In addition, this chapter assessed the correlation between the quality of the legal system and the 
terms of bank finance and trade credit. It was found that higher enforcement costs are strongly 
correlated with higher collateral requirements. No evidence was found supporting the view that 
better legal content allows firms to enjoy longer maturity on their loans. Network effects and 
opportunistic behaviour in an environment of weak enforcement may explain trade credit 
maturity.  
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CHAPTER 3: COLLATERAL, COLLATERAL SUBSTITUTES AND ACCESS TO 
BANK FINANCE  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
A key channel through which the legal system ensures the flow of credit is by protecting 
creditors rights over collateral and enforcing those rights in the event of default. Where the legal 
system is effective, the likelihood that firms will be able to access bank finance increases with 
their ability to offer collateral. This means that collateral is critical to the first part of the 
transmission mechanism explained in chapter 1. However, Nkurunziza (2005b) argues that given 
the poor quality of legal systems in SSA, collateral is an irrelevant enforcement mechanism. The 
weakness of the legal system is compounded by the thinness of secondary markets for capital 
goods in these countries. Empirical evidence on the role of collateral in developing countries is 
extremely limited (Menkhoff, 2004). It is therefore a useful exercise to explore further the 
significance of collateral for access to bank finance by manufacturing firms in SSA. To the best 
knowledge of the author this is the first effort to empirically examine the impact of collateral on 
access to bank finance for a group of African countries.  
  
In chapter 2 it was observed that the legal systems in the 3 countries have some important 
differences. Kenya has the most well defined creditor rights but by far the most costly contract 
enforcement. Creditor rights appear poorest in Tanzania while Uganda is most efficient with 
respect to enforcement. It was also observed that collateral constraints are more severe in 
Tanzania and Uganda relative to Kenya. In this chapter an investigation is made into the 
implications of collateral use in light of these differences.    
 
The use of collateral substitutes can be effective in an environment where enforcement is weak 
or where firms do not have sufficient collateral. The literature review will show that these 
substitutes include reputation, relationship lending, financial records, and ethnicity. This chapter 
will add to the existing knowledge on the importance of different collateral substitutes for credit 
access in SSA. In particular, to the best knowledge of the author this is the first attempt using 
firm level data to investigate how relationship banking affects access to bank finance in the 
context of SSA.  
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3.2 Literature Review 
 
In this section a review of literature on the role of collateral and collateral substitutes in financial 
agreements between banks and borrowers is made.  
 
3.2.1 The Role of Collateral  
 
According to Fleisig and de la Pena (2003), the key economic feature of collateral and a lending 
system based on collateral lies in granting priority to a creditor in recovering credit through some 
property belonging to the debtor. This requires that the creditor has a secured interest; that is a 
right of satisfaction from the property. In the event of default, the creditor with a secured 
interest has priority over the general claims of unsecured creditors to sell the item pledged as 
collateral in order to recover the loan. In a collateralized system creditors must have the legal 
right to take possession of assets over which others have ownership rights.  
 
The analysis of credit constraints faced by borrowers with a demand for bank loans is to a large 
extent based on the premise of information asymmetry. According to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), 
credit rationing can obtain as an equilibrium outcome in light of adverse selection and moral 
hazard. Berger and Udell (2002) explain that firms with profitable investment opportunities are 
unable to pursue them because potential providers of outside finance cannot verify the quality of 
the project (adverse selection), or ensure that funds are not used to finance other riskier projects 
that were not considered by the supplier of funds (moral hazard).   
 
Earlier literature on collateral viewed it as a disincentive for the borrower faced with the option 
of defaulting on a loan (Barro, 1976; Benjamin, 1978). Under this argument collateral increases 
the probability that the lender will recover the loan by making default costly. In more recent 
times the use of collateral in credit markets has been motivated as a means to alleviate 
information asymmetries. These two views are highly correlated: the more acute the information 
asymmetry between the borrower and the bank, the more likely the firm is to default. Under 
specific conditions collateral can effectively substitute for information (Isaksson, 2002b). The 
conditions suggested are: the legal system functions properly, the value of collateral is adequate, 
and the collateral value is not eroded over time.  
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In financial markets characterized by adverse selection collateral can signal a high credit quality 
borrower to the lender. When borrowers know their credit quality but lenders do not, the 
likelihood that collateral is pledged is higher for borrowers of superior credit quality (Bester, 
1985; Chan and Kantas, 1985; Besanko and Thakor, 1987). Theories of collateral based on 
adverse selection predict that collateral is associated with high quality borrowers, who use 
collateral to send a signal to the lender. Banks offer potential borrowers two different types of 
contracts to select from: one with collateral and low interest rates, and one with no collateral and 
a high interest rate. High quality borrowers will select the contract with collateral so as to enjoy 
the lower interest rate. Low quality borrowers choose the contract with the high interest rate.  
 
In contrast, in the presence of moral hazard it is the poor quality borrowers who are more likely 
to be required to pledge collateral. Boot, Thakor and Udell (1991) show that when information 
asymmetry is present in the form of hidden action, low quality borrowers obtain loans that 
require collateral while good quality borrowers get loans without collateral. When financial 
markets have moral hazard problems collateral gives the borrower an incentive to apply effort 
and reveal the actual state of his project to the bank after securing the loan (Bester, 1987, 1994). 
 
As Balkenhol and Schutte (2001) point out, small borrowers lack assets of sufficient market 
value to pledge as collateral. Similarly, Berger and Udell (1998) explain that bank lending is not 
easily accessible to small firms because their balance sheets do not reflect adequate tangible 
assets that can be pledged as collateral. These firms undergo a financial growth cycle. Smaller 
firms, which are generally younger and informationally opaque, rely heavily on inside finance. 
Growth over time allows access to private external equity and private debt (banks, finance 
companies) and ultimately to public equity and debt markets. This implies that a small firms 
probability of securing an external debt contract is positively related to the value of 
collateralizable assets.  
 
The need for collateralized lending can be reduced by improving information available on 
borrowers. Theories of financial intermediation emphasize that banks are characterized by scale 
economies and/or comparative advantage in generating information about borrowers (Diamond, 
1984, 1991; Boyd and Prescott, 1986). As a result of this unique ability, banks will specialize in 
lending to borrowers where information asymmetry is particularly acute. However, we observe 
that relative to other sources of finance, banks rely most on collateralized lending. This 
dependence on collateral may actually reduce the incentive for banks to collect information on 
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borrowers. Manove et al (2001) argue that in the presence of asymmetric information the use of 
collateral in debt contracts may reduce the screening effort of banks leading them to fund a high 
proportion of poor quality investment projects.  
 
3.2.2 Collateral Substitutes 
 
In this section the literature on key collateral substitutes is reviewed.  In the context of Africa, 
Bigsten et al (2003) suggest that ethnicity, legal status, ownership structure, networks, firm age, 
keeping of records, and links with the financial sector can serve as collateral substitutes for firms 
requiring bank finance. Similarly, in a study on access to credit by the Micro and Small 
Enterprise (MSE) sector in Kenya, Kimuyu and Omiti (2000) consider legal status, ethnicity, 
networks, firm age, ownership structure and links with financial institutions as potential 
collateral substitutes for small firms in Kenya. Literature supporting the suggestions of these 
authors is examined.  
 
3.2.2.1 Reputation 
 
Although it is an intangible asset, reputation is valuable for a firm. A firms name sends a 
message to the market about the reputation of the firm (Tadelis, 1999). Kreps and Wilson (1982) 
were among the first to formally demonstrate that markets characterised by imperfect 
information give rise to reputation effects. Diamond (1989) examines the role of reputation in 
debt markets. He argues that reputation is built from observing over time the behaviour of certain 
exogenous characteristics of a borrower. He finds that the value of reputation in debt markets 
increases in the presence of asymmetric information. In the presence of significant information 
asymmetry a good reputation will over time reduce the incentives of borrowers to select high-
risk projects.  
 
An infinitely repeated game model developed by Martinelli (1997), predicts that the length of a 
small firms credit history will be negatively correlated with the interest rate it faces and 
positively correlated to the size of the loan it gets from lenders. A longer relationship allows the 
firm to build reputation based on repeated interaction with the lender. The model ignores the 
possibility of using collateral as a way of accurately describing the evolution of small business 
credit terms. 
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Nkurunziza (2005b) argues that in African countries collateral is a poor contract enforcement 
instrument in formal financial markets. The reasons are that these countries are characterized by 
corrupt legal systems, inadequate secondary markets for physical assets, and unmotivated loan 
officers who do not adequately enforce the collateral clause following default. Using an infinitely 
repeated game approach he demonstrates that as a result of this, financial contracts are 
maintained by reputation rather than the threat of recovering collateral. A borrower must build a 
good reputation with his bank over repeated interaction. He concludes that reputation is 
positively correlated with firm age and the threat of terminating future loans increases the 
likelihood that a borrower will pay back his loan in each period13.  
 
Isaksson (2002b) alludes to the importance of reputation effects as a contract enforcement 
mechanism in African financial markets. He explains that enforcement can be carried out in 
several ways. These include through legal action; terminating the relationship; and threatening to 
expose the borrower to other lenders, which would harm the reputation of the borrower.   
 
3.2.2.2 Relationship Lending14 
 
Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995, 1998, 2002) suggest that because of high 
borrowing costs due to asymmetric information in credit markets, small firms benefit from 
relationship lending. Under this lending technology, the financial institution through contact over 
time collects information on the firm, the entrepreneur and the local community. Information can 
be obtained from a repayment history over several years, financial statements, as well as soft 
data about the character and reliability of the entrepreneur. A key element of the relationship is 
its length in that its value increases with time.  
 
Based on an infinitely repeated game analysis Boot and Thakor (1994) examine the impact of 
relationship lending on the collateral requirements of banks and the interest rate they charge on 
loans. Their model suggests that collateral requirements will be lower the longer the relationship 
between the borrower and the bank. It also predicts that a longer relationship will result in access 
to bank credit at lower interest rates. Thus, relationship lending produces valuable information 
                                                
13 The literature on African manufacturing uses firm age widely as a proxy for reputation (for example Isaksson, 
2002a; Bigsten et al, 2003). Firm age is also used to measure reputation in studies from other regions (for example 
Berger and Udell, 1995).  
14 Much of the literature on relationship lending refers to SMEs. Evidence suggests that the majority of 
manufacturing firms in Tanzania and Uganda are SMEs implying that relationship lending is relevant to this study.  
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about the quality of the borrower. Similarly, Berger and Udell (1995) suggest that one of the 
benefits to a small firm from relationship lending is lower collateral requirements.  
 
An opposing strand of the literature views relationship lending as detrimental to the financing 
conditions of firms. According to this line of thought, long term relationships give banks 
monopoly power over firms that lead to a positive correlation between the length of the 
relationship and the cost of debt. This is because banks have an incentive to undertake 
opportunistic behaviour in a contracting relationship with a firm (Fischer, 1990 in Harhoff and 
Korting, 1998). As an example they explain that after securing the debt contract with the firms at 
a low interest rate, banks may decide to raise interest rates in future periods. In a competitive 
banking environment it may be difficult to justify this argument given that firms can switch to 
other banks at a fairly low cost15.  
 
Greenbaum et al (1989) argue that banks can extract rents from firms because of the high costs 
firms would incur in conveying information about their quality to other banks. Banks will tend to 
set lower prices as a means of establishing a relationship that will lead to future monopoly 
profits. As a result, in the long run the interest rate and other non-price terms of debt are not 
reflective of the firms low probability of default. Similarly, Sharpe (1990) explains that banks 
compete to fund profitable projects forwarded by entrepreneurs.  Banks attempt to attract young 
firms with below cost interest rates with the expectation that these firms are locked-in or 
captured when they are old, allowing higher interest rates to be charged. Where firms can have 
multiple relationships with banks this lock-in effect could have less impact on the cost of 
borrowing than what is argued by these authors.  
 
3.2.3  Empirical Evidence on Collateral and Collateral Substitutes 
 
Menkhoff et al (2004) examine the role of collateral in emerging markets compared to developed 
markets using Thailand as an example. Using a data set of 560 credit files of Thai commercial 
banks their evidence shows that both the prevalence and degree of collateralization are higher 
than what obtains in developed countries. They find that Thai banks use collateral mainly as a 
way of mitigating the higher credit risks of small and young firms.  
 
                                                
15 Opportunistic behaviour is likely to be present in SSA where the banking system is generally uncompetitive.  
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Collateral requirements placed on African manufacturing firms are generally very high. Based on 
a study of 6 countries, Bigsten et al (2003) report that the collateral required is more than twice 
the value of the loan. They also find that most loans in Africa are collateralized. In their 
empirical analysis the functioning of loan markets is modeled as a two-stage process. In the first 
stage the firm decides whether or not it has demand for bank credit. In the second stage they ask 
whether or not this demand is satisfied by the banking sector16. Their evidence suggests that 
collateral requirements placed on large firms exceed those placed on micro and medium firms. 
However, small firms on average face higher collateral-to-loan ratios compared to large firms.  
 
Several empirical studies show that firm size is an important determinant of access to bank credit 
in African manufacturing17. Based on firm level data for Kenya, Biggs et al (1996) find that 
small firms have limited access to finance relative to large firms. They suggest that firm age, 
whether the firm keeps accounts, and characteristics of the owner could be used as collateral 
substitutes. Their results show that younger firms that do not keep records are more likely to be 
credit constrained. Fafchamps et al (1995) and Cuevas et al (1993) examine the nature of 
enterprise finance in Zimbabwe and Ghana respectively. These studies also show that firm size is 
an important determinant of access to bank finance.  
 
Bigsten et al (2003) cite as their most significant finding the strong bias in credit allocation faced 
by small firms. This bias is present even after controlling for factors meant to explain why small 
firms are unable to obtain credit, such as whether the firms kept accounts and location. They also 
find that younger firms are more likely to be credit constrained. Firms with one owner and those 
that do not keep records face a higher probability of being credit constrained.  
 
Isaksson (2002a) uses firm level panel data for the period 1993-95 to determine the factors 
affecting banks decisions to extend loans to Kenyan manufacturing enterprises. He finds that an 
increase in the share of tangible assets in total assets significantly increases the probability that 
firms will obtain a long-term loan, and that banks generally prefer to lend to large firms18. He 
argues that this may indicate that the legal contract enforcement mechanism is effective in 
Kenya. In addition, Isaksson finds that Asian owned firms in Kenya pledge the highest amount 
                                                
16 In section 3.4.3.1 a similar approach is used to test the robustness of our results.  
17Firm size is conventionally measured by employment in firm level studies on SSA.   
18 This is the only study we have identified that directly examines the effect of collateralizable assets on access to 
bank credit by African manufacturing firms.  
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of collateral and pay the highest interest rates and suggests that this may be a result of ability to 
pay relative to African owned firms.  
 
Based on a baseline survey of the Micro and Small Enterprise (MSE) sector in Kenya, Kimuyu 
and Omiti (2000) find that relatively more educated entrepreneurs operating older, larger, 
formally registered enterprises borrow more from commercial banks. Entrepreneurs with 
education higher than secondary level borrow more than those with lower levels of education. 
They also find that older entrepreneurs have higher demand for credit citing that this reflects 
their experience in business, which is closely correlated with age. 
 
Green et al (2002) investigate the factors affecting the debt-equity decisions and success of loan 
applications for MSEs in Kenya. They find that age has a negative effect on the probability of 
incurring debt. They interpret this as evidence that older firms are more likely to raise their initial 
capital as equity, and that borrowing has become more feasible for younger firms. In addition, 
more educated individuals have a higher likelihood of borrowing. Their findings also show that 
asset tangibility measured by owning land and being housed in permanent structure has a 
positive impact on the likelihood that firms will obtain bank credit.  
 
3.2.3.1 Relationship Lending 
 
Based on data from the National Survey of Small Business Finance, Petersen and Rajan (1994) 
find that small firms in the United States who enjoy close relationships with their banks have 
greater access to credit relative to other small firms. A small downward effect on loan interest 
rates is observed. They measure the firm-bank relationship by the length of the relationship and 
the number of banks a firm borrows from, where a longer relationship and fewer banks are 
interpreted as a stronger relationship. Firm age is also used to proxy for relationship strength, and 
is negatively related to interest rates. Using the same database as Petersen and Rajan (1994), 
Berger and Udell (1995) find that stronger relationships measured by length and number of 
lenders, lead to lower interest rates and less collateral requirements for small firms. They point 
out that age reflects reputation because it captures information that becomes known by the 
market as a whole, and not just the firms lenders.  
 
Harhoff and Korting (1998) examine the role of relationship lending in explaining the collateral 
requirements and the cost of credit faced by German SMEs. Their findings suggest that longer 
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more concentrated relationships are beneficial for firms. Relationship lending leads to greater 
credit availability and lower collateral requirements, and to a less extent, lower loan interest 
rates. In the case of Spanish SMEs, Canovas and Solano (2003) find that firms with more 
concentrated financial relationships (i.e. fewer banks per firm) access debt at a lower cost. 
Jimenez and Saurina (2003) find that Spanish banks are generally willing to take on more risk 
the closer the bank-borrower relationship while Jimenez et al (2006) find that relationship 
lending decreases the likelihood that collateral will be required, particularly for long-term loans.  
 
In the case of Belgium, Degryse and Van Cayseele (1998) find that relationship lending has two 
opposing effects on loan interest rates. Utilising data obtained from a major Belgian bank their 
results show that the length of the bank-firm relationship leads to higher loan interest rates. 
However, widening the relationship by purchasing other products from the bank is associated 
with lower interest rates. Therefore, the price effect is more a function of the scope of the 
relationship than its length. They also find that the length of the relationship has a small negative 
effect on the likelihood of pledging collateral.  
 
Several studies have found that the informational monopoly enjoyed by Japanese main banks 
leads them to extracts rents in the form of higher interest rates. Consequently firms with main 
banks in Japan tend to have lower profits (Nakatani, 1984; Weinstein and Yafeh, 1995 and 
1998). Morck et al (2000) find that equity ownership by a main bank is negatively related with 
firm value for listed Japanese firms. Nam (2004) concludes that although relationship banking in 
Japan can lead to greater access to credit, it is associated with the extraction of monopoly rents 
and high levels of corporate inefficiency.  
 
Menkhoff et al (2004) find that in Thailand longer credit relationships are not associated with 
lower collateral requirements. They argue that these relationships have no impact in terms of 
reducing information asymmetry between banks and their clients. Rather, their evidence suggests 
that longer relationships lead to lock-in effects as banks demand higher collateral. This is a 
surprising finding because a longer relationship is meant to reduce the information asymmetry 
problem that collateral is expected to address.  
 
Based on firm level data Habyarimana (2003) estimates the effect of losing a banking 
relationship on firm performance in Uganda during the banking crisis of 1998-1999. He finds 
that firms that lost a banking relationship declined by 10-15 percent relative to unaffected firms 
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over the three years following the crisis. Affected firms find it difficult to borrow from 
uninformed lenders. Furthermore, older firms that lost a banking relationship faced larger growth 
declines compared to younger unaffected firms. His evidence supports the view that the banking 
relationship reflects valuable information to the lender.  
 
3.3 Summary of Literature Review 
 
Collateral plays two main roles: (1) it acts as a disincentive for default by the borrower and (2) it 
alleviates information asymmetry problems. Reputation and relationship lending are identified as 
two important collateral substitutes having a positive impact on access to bank finance. This 
stems from the ability of these substitutes to alleviate the information asymmetry that exists 
between firms and banks. Other factors that affect the likelihood that a firm will secure bank 
finance include the level of education and keeping of financial records.  
 
Important gaps exist in the literature. There is limited empirical evidence on how collateral 
affects access to external finance by firms in SSA. Only one study (Isaksson, 2002a) has been 
identified that directly investigates the impact of collateralizable assets on access to bank finance 
by manufacturing firms in Kenya. There is also limited knowledge about how collateral 
substitutes affect access to bank finance in the EAC. In particular, the role of relationship lending 
is largely unknown.  
 
3.4 Empirical Analysis 
 
In this section the effect of collateral and collateral substitutes on access to bank finance in the 
EAC is empirically investigated. This is done do bearing in mind that the role of collateral is to a 
large extent dependant on the quality of the legal system.  
 
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics on Collateral and Collateral Substitutes 
 
To begin, an examination of how the availability of collateral and collateral substitutes differs 
across the three countries is done. The study argues that collateral is an important determinant of 
access to bank finance. It is useful to investigate the extent to which firms ability to raise 
collateral differs before testing the importance of collateral in obtaining bank finance. The 
literature review showed that manufacturing firms in Africa use collateral substitutes to improve 
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their chances of obtaining bank credit. Three collateral substitutes mentioned in the literature are 
financial accounts, ethnicity and a relationship with a financial institution.  
 
Collateral 
 
Figure 3.1 shows that the majority of loans in all 3 countries require collateral. This suggests that 
collateral does play some role in these countries. Furthermore, collateral as a share of the loan 
value is significantly higher in Kenya than in Uganda and Tanzania19. The corresponding figures 
for Pakistan and China are 70.9 percent and 86.8 percent respectively. This is significantly lower 
than what one observes in the EAC. Although Kenya has the highest collateral requirements, a 
slightly lower share of Kenyan loans is backed by collateral compared to Ugandan and 
Tanzanian loans. 
 
The extremely high collateral requirements in the EAC are a cause for concern. Apart from high 
enforcement costs other factors are likely to be present. Some of these factors were mentioned in 
chapter 2. First, the indivisibility of collateral increases the likelihood of high collateral-to-loan 
ratios for small loans (Isaksson, 2002a) Second, the absence of secondary markets for capital 
goods makes it difficult to correctly value assets pledged as collateral. Third, firms may overstate 
the value of their collateral as a way of improving their chances of obtaining loans. This is 
plausible in an environment where underdeveloped secondary markets may accurate valuation 
difficult. Fourth, collateral requirements may reflect central bank requirements based on the risk 
profile of the lending banks (Nkurunziza, 2005b).  
  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
19 Chapter 2 showed that this is a result of the higher enforcement costs obtaining in Kenya.  
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Figure 3.1: Collateral Requirements in the EAC, Pakistan and China
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Table 3.1 shows the replacement values of firms business premises and leasehold. It gives an 
indication of the value of real estate owned by firms. Kenyan firms appear to have more 
collateralizable real estate than Ugandan and Tanzanian firms.  
 
Table 3.1: Replacement Value of Business Premises (US$) 
  Kenya  Uganda  Tanzania  
Mean 12,983,210,926.30 661,993.80 2,472,635.50 
Standard Deviation 190,929 ,572, 445 2,080, 551.8 9,900,887.7 
Source: World Bank (2002/03), Investment Climate Surveys 
Kenya (n=215) Uganda (n=174) Tanzania (n=234) 
 
The means test described below is used to test whether the mean value of real estate for Kenya is 
significantly different to that of Uganda and Tanzania. A description of this test can be found in 
standard statistics texts such as (Johnson and Bhattacharyya, 1986). The test is based on the 
following assumptions:  
 
! X1, X2, Xn1 is a random sample of size n1 from population 1 whose mean is denoted by µ1 and 
whose standard deviation is denoted by σ1. 
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! Y1, Y2, Yn2 is a random sample of size n2 from population 2 whose mean is denoted by µ2 and 
whose standard deviation is denoted by σ2. 
 
! The samples are independent. 
To test for the equality of means the following test statistic is used: 
 
Z =  
YX
n
s
n
s
−
+
2
2
2
1
2
1  
 
where: 
 
X  is the mean of the sample drawn from population 1 and Y is the mean of the sample drawn 
from population 2.  
1s  is the standard deviation of the sample drawn from population 1 and 2s  is the standard 
deviation of the sample drawn from population 2. 
 
The Z statistics are equal to 0.99 when comparing Kenya with both Uganda and Tanzania. This 
means that there is no significant difference in the value of real estate between Kenya and the 
other countries.  
 
Similarly, from Table 3.2 one observes that the mean replacement values for firms machinery 
and equipment are higher in Kenya compared to Uganda and Tanzania. The means test is 
performed again yielding similar results to what was found in the case of real estate. The Z 
statistics are equal to 1.02 against Uganda and 1.01 against Tanzania. The analysis suggests that 
there is no significant difference in collateral ownership across manufacturing firms in East 
Africa20. This means that the greater access to bank finance enjoyed by Kenyan firms observed 
in chapter 2 cannot be attributed to these firms having more collateral. Rather, it will be 
explained by the relative effectiveness of collateral as an enforcement mechanism and by the 
relevance of collateral substitutes.  
 
 
 
                                                
20 This is a result of the large variation in collateral value in Kenya as shown by the standard deviations in Tables 3.1 
and 3.2.  
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Table 3.2: Replacement Value of Machinery and Equipment (US$) 
  Kenya  Uganda  Tanzania  
Mean 301,668, 724.5 1,713,396.6 3,900,349.7 
Standard Deviation 4,455,023,357.1 9,457,053.8 18,001,613.9 
Source: World Bank (2002/03), Investment Climate Surveys  
Kenya (n=229) Uganda (n=274) Tanzania (n=247) 
It is clear from Figure 3.2 that Ugandan manufacturing firms have the youngest machinery and 
equipment in the EAC. This is largely because capital accumulation in Uganda only resumed 
when economic reforms were instituted in the late 1980s and early 1990s, following decades of 
political unrest.  
 
Figure 3.2: Age of Machinery and Equipment
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  Source: World Bank (2002/03), Investment Climate Surveys  
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Over 40 percent of the machinery and equipment in Uganda is less than 5 years old, while the 
corresponding shares for Kenya and Tanzania are 19 percent and 26 percent respectively. Figure 
3.2 shows that Kenyan firms have the oldest machinery and equipment. This is again consistent 
with the observation that Kenyan firms are on average far older than Ugandan and Tanzanian 
firms.  
 
According to Figure 3.3 almost all firms in Kenya keep annual accounts and have these accounts 
audited by an outside agency. Uganda has the lowest level of financial information available in 
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terms of both the keeping of annual accounts and having the accounts audited. The implication of 
this observation is that information asymmetry between lenders and firms in Kenya, is less 
compared to Uganda and Tanzania.  
 
Figure 3.3: Share of Firms with Financial Accounts (%)
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 Source: World Bank (2002/03), Investment Climate Surveys  
Kenya (n=253) Uganda (n=296) Tanzania (n=271) 
Figure 3.4 shows that Kenya has the smallest share of principal owners who are African. Kenya 
also has by far the largest share of principal owners who are of Asian origin. In Uganda and 
Tanzania Africans comprise the greatest share of principal owners. This ethnic composition may 
be important if it is associated with linkages to the financial sector, better quality business 
management skills, or access to assets that can be pledged as collateral.  
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Figure 3.4: Ethnic Origin of Principal Owner (%)
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Table 3.3 shows that the average length of bank relationships in Kenya is longer than in Uganda 
and Tanzania. This is consistent with the fact that Kenyan firms are older than their counterparts. 
On average Ugandan firms have the shortest relationships with banks.   
 
Table 3.3: Length of Bank Relationship (years) 
  Kenya Uganda Tanzania 
Mean 15.0 7.3 10.0 
Standard Deviation 13.4 6.3 9.6 
Source: World Bank (2002/03), Investment Climate Surveys  
Kenya (n=222) Uganda (n=272) Tanzania (n=237) 
3.4.2  Testing of Hypotheses 
 
The hypotheses to be tested are presented below.  The variables used in the estimation and their 
main limitations are also discussed.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Firms with more collateral have better access to bank loans.  
Hypothesis 2: Firms with effective collateral substitutes have better access to bank loans. 
 
Hypothesis 1 allows us to indirectly test two issues. First, the role played by collateral gives an 
indication as to how effective the legal system is in providing protection to creditors and 
enforcing debt contracts. If collateral is important for access to bank finance one can infer that 
the legal systems are important for the functioning of formal credit markets. Second, one can 
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infer whether or not secondary markets effectively facilitate the sale of collateral to recover 
overdue debt. If the thinness of secondary markets for real estate and equipment and machinery 
in SSA prohibits the meaningful valuation and sale of these assets, then one would expect 
collateral not to be important for access to bank finance. This means that the observed impact of 
collateral will give an indication of how relevant secondary markets are for valuing and 
facilitating the sale of real assets.  
 
3.4.2.1 Variables and Estimation Procedures 
 
The data used in the estimation procedure are taken from the ICA surveys completed in the ECA 
countries between 2002 and 2003. As explained in chapter 1, the data are mainly cross-sectional.  
 
The dependent variable is the probability that the firm had a loan at the time of the survey in 
2002/2003. The majority of firms in the study obtained their latest loans between 2000 and 2003. 
This is shown by Table 3.4. In Tanzania loans held by firms in 2003 were obtained in that year 
or in previous years. Table 3.4 shows that in the case of Kenya and Uganda all loans held in 
2003 were obtained prior to that year.  
 
Table 3.4: Percentage of Firms Receiving Latest Loan in Specific Year  
  Kenya Uganda Tanzania 
Before 1993 2.97 0 1.89 
1993 -1999 21.78 20.32 9.44 
2000 10.89 11.86 7.55 
2001 15.84 13.56 13.21 
2002 48.51 54.24 52.83 
2003 - - 15.09 
Source: World Bank (2002/03), Investment Climate Surveys  
Kenya (n=93)  Uganda (n=60) Tanzania (n=53) 
The dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the firm has a bank loan and 0 otherwise. Given that 
the dependent variable is binary the author estimates a probit model by maximum likelihood21. 
Thus we have equation (1) below:  
 
Loan              = 1            (1) 
No Loan    = 0 
 
                                                
21 Our estimation is done using Stata/SE 8.2.  
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Table 3.5 shows the share of firms reporting they have loans in each country. A higher share of 
Kenyan firms has loans relative to Ugandan and Tanzanian firms. Table 3.5 also shows that 
access to bank loans is similar between Uganda and Tanzania.  
 
Table 3.5: Share of Firms with a Bank Loan (%) 
Kenya 39.0 
Uganda 20.0 
Tanzania 19.2 
Source: World Bank (2002/03), Investment Climate Surveys 
Kenya (n=93)  Uganda (n=60) Tanzania (n=53) 
One may ask why the question of access to bank finance is being investigated in a binary 
framework rather than using the actual amount loaned to the firm. The amount of loan obtained 
also provides a measure of access to finance. As discussed by Nkurunziza (2005a), there are 3 
important reasons why the amount of loan is not used. First, given the occurrence of credit 
rationing, if a firm is able to secure bank finance it overcomes an important entry barrier. In 
overcoming this hurdle, securing a loan is more important than the value of the loan. Over time, 
reputation effects become useful in negotiating the amount of the loan.  Second, the amount of 
loan is a variable that suffers from a high level of measurement error. Firms are known to 
manipulate their balance sheets for reasons including tax evasion. The amount of outstanding 
credit is one of the variables they use for this purpose. The third reason is that many firms do not 
respond to this question meaning few observations for empirical analysis and a high possibility 
of selection bias.  
 
Explanatory Variables 
 
Collateral: The study has 2 measures of collateral. The first measure of collateral is the 
replacement value of machinery and equipment owned by the firm. The second measure is the 
replacement value of business premises owned by the firm. For both measures the value is for 
2002 in the case of Tanzania and Uganda, and for 2001 in the case of Kenya.  
 
Reputation and relationship lending: these are the main collateral substitutes in the model. An 
increase in the value of these variables is expected to reduce collateral requirements and improve 
the likelihood that a firm will secure a loan or overdraft. Reputation is measured by the age of 
the firm. Z statistics of 9.6 and 6.3 are found when comparing firm age in Kenya against firm age 
in Uganda and Tanzania respectively. This shows that Kenyan firms are significantly older than 
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Ugandan and Tanzanian firms as suggested by Table 1.7. Relationship lending is measured by 
the number of years that a firm has had an account with its main bank. Banks can observe cash 
flows through these accounts, giving an indication of the viability and spending behaviour of 
firms. Z statistics of 7.88 and 4.48 are found when comparing length of bank-firm relationship in 
Kenya against length of bank-firm relationship in Uganda and Tanzania respectively.  Thus, 
bank-firm relationships are significantly longer in Kenya.  
 
Firm size: is measured by the number of employees. This is standard practice in firm level 
studies on SSA. Size is expected to have a positive effect on access on bank finance. Z statistics 
of 2.35 and 3.25 are found when comparing firm size in Kenya against firm size in Uganda and 
Tanzania respectively. This confirms what was said in earlier chapters about Kenyan firms been 
substantially larger than firms in the other countries. Larger firms are perceived as safer 
borrowers than small firms and command greater influence in the market. Isaksson (2002b) 
states that firm size can also proxy for reputation because large firms have more at stake in the 
event that contractual agreements are breached compared to smaller firms.  
 
Financial Records: Keeping good quality financial records reduces the asymmetry of 
information between a firm and the bank. The impact of financial records is measured by 
whether or not a firm has its records audited by an outside agency. This indicator captures the 
role that financial information plays in allowing a bank to monitor a firm and assess its risk. 
Firms that have their records audited are more likely to secure bank finance.  
 
Type of Bank: Whether the bank is a local bank or a foreign bank can also affect access to bank 
finance. Foreign banks may be better capitalized than domestic banks. Alternatively, domestic 
banks may have a more borrower-friendly policy than their foreign counterparts. This variable 
takes a value of 1 if the firms main bank is a local bank and 0 if it is not.  
 
Ownership Structure: Whether the firm is locally-owned or foreign-owned can have a bearing on 
how easily firms can access bank finance. If foreign owned firms have stronger links to the 
financial institution (this may be the case if the main banks are foreign owned) then they may be 
able to secure bank finance more easily. There could also be differences in management 
capability, market power, and profitability between domestic and foreign firms.  The variable 
takes a value of 1 if the firm is locally-owned and 0 otherwise.  
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Ethnicity:  refers to whether the firm owner is African or not. Ethnicity can affect the likelihood 
that an entrepreneur obtains a bank loan or overdraft. Bigsten et al (2003) find evidence 
suggesting that African entrepreneurs have the weakest links with the financial sector.  
 
Education: This variable refers to whether or not the firms top manager has had post-secondary 
school education. Better educated managers are likely to have a more comprehensive 
understanding of how the banking system works and the benefits of external finance. They are 
also in a stronger position to present good cases for bank finance using business plans and by 
keeping financial records. Educational attainment is expected to have a positive impact on access 
to bank finance.  
 
Industry Differences: It is possible that market power, growth opportunities and profitability may 
vary across industries. These unobservable differences can affect a firms access to bank finance.  
Industry dummies are included to account for this.  
 
3.4.3  Presentation and Discussion of Estimation Results  
 
Based on the discussion in section 3.5.2, the author estimates the following equation giving the 
probability of a firm having a bank loan as a function of several variables: 
 
Pr(Loan) = F(RVA, A, L, E, AA, LB, LO, AFR, EDU, I)       (2) 
 
Where RVA, A, L, E, AA, LB, LO, AFR, EDU, I are the replacement value of assets owned by 
the firm (real estate and machinery and equipment), firm age, length of bank-firm relationship, 
employment, audited accounts, local bank, local ownership, African entrepreneur, education 
level, and industry dummies respectively. Table 3.6 shows the correlation between the two 
measures of collateral22. For all 3 countries the correlation is high. This is to be expected because 
firms with larger business premises are likely to be the firms with more machinery and 
equipment. This means that collinearity may be a problem in the model.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
22 Correlation matrices of variables used in chapters 3, 4 and 5 are presented in the appendices. 
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Table 3.6: Correlation between Measures of Collateral 
  Kenya Uganda Tanzania 
Correlation 0.64 0.76 0.72 
Source: Authors computations 
 
Given the problem of collinearity, separate equations are estimated for each measure of 
collateral. Using real estate yields very poor results. In the case of Uganda and Tanzania an 
insignificant positive effect is obtained. For Kenya the estimation gives a surprising significant 
negative effect. Real estate does not perform well as collateral in the EAC. This suggests that the 
legal framework around real estate is poor.  This is supportive of Nkurunziza (2005b) who 
argues that collateral is an ineffective contract enforcement mechanism in SSA.  
 
Machinery and equipment performs better as collateral in the EAC. The results in Table 3.7 
show that the effect of the replacement value of machinery and equipment on access to bank 
loans is positive and significant at the 1 percent level in Uganda, and the 5 percent level in 
Tanzania. Collateral in these countries plays a role in the transmission mechanism. However, the 
value of machinery and equipment is not a significant determinant of access to bank loans in 
Kenya. This is in contrast with Isaksson (2002a) who found a significant effect on access to bank 
finance in Kenya23. The finding here that collateral in the form of machinery and equipment is 
not important for access to bank credit in Kenya is reflective of the weakness in the legal system 
with respect to contract enforcement observed in chapter 2. On the other hand, the value of 
machinery and equipment positively affects loan access in Tanzania and Uganda which have 
more efficient contract enforcement relative to Kenya.  
 
The insignificant effect of collateral on access to bank finance can not be attributed to Kenyan 
firms as a whole having substantially greater collateralizable wealth. If Kenyan firms had 
significantly more collateral then differences in the value of machinery and equipment would be 
irrelevant in the banks decisions to extend loans. Notably, the means test showed no evidence 
that Kenyan firms have more collateral than firms in the other countries.  
 
It appears that the type of collateral is important. The results suggest that the legal framework is 
better suited to facilitate the transfer of machinery and equipment from defaulting borrowers to 
banks, compared to real estate. It also suggests that the secondary markets for machinery and 
                                                
23 However Isaksson (2002) used the ratio of fixed assets to total assets as a measure of tangibility. As discussed 
earlier we do not have data to calculate this measure. 
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equipment are fairly active with respect to machinery and equipment. Even if the private real estate 
markets in these countries are active, it appears that there is need to improve the functioning of the 
business real estate markets.  
 
Table 3.7: Effect of Machinery and Equipment on Loan Access in the EAC 
               Kenya     Uganda    Tanzania    
   
Log of Replacement Value of Machinery&Equip.  -0.062     0.258***    0.175**    
                   (-0.72)     (3.12)     (2.05) 
Log of Firm Age               -0.115     0.253     -0.329* 
               (-0.70)     (1.57)     (-1.64) 
Log of Length of Relationship       0.068         -0.275     -0.240 
               (0.45)     (-1.56)     (-1.20) 
Log of Employment          0.305**    0.207      0.180 
               (2.42)     (1.37)     (1.54) 
Audited Accounts          -0.087     -0.011     0.041 
               (-0.15)     (-0.03)     (0.07) 
Local Bank            -0.022         0.783***    -0.021 
               (-0.09)     (3.08)     (-0.07) 
Local Ownership           -0.113       -0.579*    0.483 
               (-0.39)     (-1.77)     (0.87) 
African Owner           0.237     0.313      -0.137 
               (0.74)     (1.08)      (-0.45) 
Education Level of Manager       0.224        0.039      0.248 
               (0.98)     (0.14)     (0.76) 
Agro                  -0.333     -0.433     0.438 
               (-1.01)     (-0.87)     (0.87) 
Metal                    0.263      -0.718      0.280 
               (0.73)     (-1.08)     (0.46) 
Furniture and Wood          0.068     0.056      0.422 
               (0.16)     (0.10)     (0.54) 
Chemicals             0.039     -1.511**     0.603 
               (0.07)     (-2.09)     (0.99) 
Construction Materials             -0.273     -1.506**    0.594 
               (-0.52)     (-2.34)     (0.77) 
Plastics                0.299     -0.111     0.368 
               (0.73)     (-0.16)     (0.47) 
Paper, Printing & Publishing       0.573     -0.623       0.440 
               (1.32)       (-1.08)     (0.76) 
Constant                   -0.224     -6.198***     -4.43*** 
               (-0.17)       (-4.24)     (-2.44) 
Number of Observations              149      205          143 
Log-Likelihood                     -93.65      -74.05              -51.66 
Wald  χ2               15.89           49.43***      33.37*** 
Pseudo R2                   0.08             0.29          0.25 
Dependent variable: Probability that the firm had a loan at the time of the survey in 2002/2003. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent respectively. Numbers in parentheses are z statistics. The 
reference industry is textiles.  
 
The literature review showed that collateral has an important role to play in alleviating the negative 
effects of information asymmetry, namely moral hazard and adverse selection. Thus, it will be more 
important in the countries where information asymmetry is more acute. It has been seen that 
information asymmetry is much more serious in Uganda and Tanzania. This is consistent with the 
 72
result that collateral significantly increases the likelihood of having bank loans in these countries, 
while it does not appear to affect access to loans in Kenya.   
 
It was earlier noted that contract enforcement in Uganda and Tanzania is substantially less costly 
than it is in Kenya. The finding that machinery and equipment has a significant effect on access 
to bank loans in Uganda and Tanzania is supportive of the argument that collateral is effective 
where legal contract enforcement is more efficient. Thus, in an environment where legal rights 
are relatively weak (Uganda and Tanzania) collateral can still have an important role to play 
provided enforcement costs are kept low. 
 
Based on the results, secondary markets for machinery and equipment in the EAC appear to 
perform an important function in facilitating the use of collateral as an enforcement mechanism 
for loan contracts. Interestingly, even though Kenya is a larger economy with a more developed 
financial sector, secondary markets appear more relevant in Uganda and Tanzania. While it is 
acknowledged that the costs associated with these markets are likely to be high, they still 
function well enough to ensure that collateral pledged by firms improves their chances of 
securing bank loans.  
 
Firm size appears to be an important factor determining loan access in Kenya. This is consistent with 
the arguments forwarded in chapters 1 and 2 about the important role played by non-legal factors as 
determinants of external finance in Kenya. This shows that reputation effects are important when 
different types of collateral are ineffective. Reputation effects are only important in Kenya where 
both real estate and machinery and equipment are ineffective as collateral. Small Kenyan firms are 
still at a disadvantage in the formal loan market despite financial reforms which were in part meant 
to improve access to credit by these firms. The results for Kenya show that when collateral is not 
effective as an enforcement mechanism reputation can play a significant role. In chapter 2 it was 
argued that where better information availability exists (Kenya), firms will work harder to protect 
their reputations because they can be easily sanctioned using mechanisms that do not rely on 
collateral.  
 
Notably, with the exception of reputation (firm size), none of the collateral substitutes have a 
meaningful effect on improving access to bank finance in any of the countries. Firm age has an 
insignificant negative and positive effect for Kenya and Uganda respectively. A significant negative 
effect obtains in Tanzania. Isaksson (2002a) also found that older firms in Kenya are less likely to 
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have access to bank loans. He states that it brings into question the usefulness of this variable as a 
proxy for repeated interaction. In the authors view it may be that older firms are able to rely more 
on internal sources of finance. It may also be that banks are relatively more accommodative of 
younger firms, and that younger firms present more profitable opportunities for banks.  
    
The length of the bank-firm relationship has a negative impact on loan access in Uganda and 
Tanzania, and a positive effect in Kenya. For all countries the impact of this variable is insignificant. 
Similar to Menkhoff et al (2004), one could argue that having a longer bank-firm relationship does 
not appear to address the problem of information asymmetry in the context of non-developed 
countries.  However, it is possible that the measure of relationship banking is inadequate. Using the 
length of firms credit history would be more appropriate than the period it has held an account with 
a bank. Unfortunately this study does not have access to such data. Interestingly, having audited 
financial records has an insignificant effect on access to bank loans in all countries. In the case of 
Kenya this is because nearly all firms have their accounts audited. However, for Uganda and 
Tanzania it suggests that the quality of these audited financial statements may not be of good enough 
quality to meaningfully affect the lending decisions of banks.  
 
In Kenya and Tanzania access to loans is not significantly affected by whether the bank making the 
lending decision is local or foreign.  This is in sharp contrast with Uganda for which the coefficient 
on local banks is positive and highly significant.  Local Ugandan banks appear to be less 
conservative than foreign banks. Whether the major owners of the firm are based locally does not 
have an important effect on access to bank loans in Kenya and Tanzania, while a significant negative 
effect is observed in Uganda. This suggests that local Ugandan banks are not necessarily lending 
more to domestic firms. African owners in Kenya and Uganda are more likely to have bank finance 
while they are less likely to obtain it in Tanzania.  For all countries ethnic origin is an insignificant 
determinant of access to bank loans. The educational level of the firms top manager has a positive 
insignificant effect on access to bank finance in all countries. There is no evidence to suggest that 
being in a particular industry has a meaningful effect on access to bank loans in all 3 countries.  
 
Probit coefficients can not be interpreted in the same way as coefficients in standard linear 
regression models. They do not equal the marginal impact of the explanatory variables. To gain 
further insight into the model the marginal probability elasticity technique is used. This gives the 
marginal impact on the explanatory variable of a unit change in one variable while holding the 
others constant at some value.  In the case of discrete variables one can obtain marginal effects 
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calculated as the finite changes in these variables as their values change from 0 to 1. The results 
are presented in Table 3.8 below.   
 
In examining the marginal probability elasticities and marginal effects it is instructive to focus on 
variables that were found to be significant in the probit analysis presented in Table 3.7. These are 
marked with an asterisk in Table 3.8. The most striking results are for Uganda. Being a local bank in 
Uganda increases the likelihood of firms having loans by 0.18 percent. In contrast the probability of 
having a loan declines by 0.14 percent as a result of being a locally owned firm. Furthermore, being 
in the chemicals and construction industries reduces the probability of having a loan by 0.14 percent 
and 0.15 percent respectively. Firm size in Kenya also has a notable effect. A 1 percent increase in 
size leads to a 0.12 percent increase in the probability of having a bank loan. Interestingly, the 
marginal effects of machinery and equipment in Uganda and Tanzania are relatively small. The 
results show that a 1 percent increase in the value of collateral increases the probability of having a 
bank loan by 0.05 percent and 0.03 percent in Uganda and Tanzania respectively. In Tanzania a 1 
percent increase in age reduces the probability of having a loan by 0.06 percent.  
  
Table 3.8: Marginal Probability Elasticities and Marginal Effects 
               Kenya     Uganda    Tanzania   
 
Marginal Probability Elasticity   
 
Log of Replacement Value of Machinery&Equip.  -0.024      0.053*     0.033*    
Log of Firm Age               -0.045      0.052              -0.063* 
Log of Length of Relationship        0.026        -0.056     -0.046 
Log of Employment           0.119*     0.042       0.034 
 
Marginal Effect 
 
Audited Accounts          -0.034         -0.002      0.008 
Local Bank            -0.008          0.182*        -0.004 
Local Ownership           -0.044       -0.143*     0.115 
African Owner            0.094      0.059          -0.026 
Education Level of Manager        0.087         0.008       0.047 
Agro                  -0.126     -0.086      0.094 
Metal                     0.104      -0.101       0.060 
Furniture and Wood           0.026      0.012       0.093 
Chemicals              0.015     -0.140*      0.148 
Construction Materials             -0.103     -0.153*     0.151 
Plastics                 0.118     -0.021      0.085 
Paper, Printing & Publishing        0.226     -0.093        0.101 
 
Marginal probability elasticity is the derivative of the dependent variable with respect to a continuous explanatory 
variable while holding the other variables constant. Marginal effect is the change in the dependent variable 
associated with a discrete change in a dummy variable from 0 to 1.    
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3.4.3.1 Robustness Checks 
 
In this section a number of tests to check the robustness of the results are conducted. The focus is 
on the model reported in Table 3.8 in which machinery and equipment is found to be an 
important form of collateral for Uganda and Tanzania. 
 
Model Specification 
 
An important limitation of probit estimation by maximum likelihood is that it requires a complete 
specification of the distribution of the observed random variable (Greene, 2003). In the event that the 
correct distribution differs from what is assumed, the likelihood function will be misspecified, and 
the estimator will be misleading. With cross-sectional data, problems such as heteroscedasticity can 
arise. To account for this the results are based on an estimator due to Huber (1967) and White (1980, 
1982) that is robust to several forms of misspecification error.  The literature commonly refers to this 
as the Huber-White sandwich estimator24.  
 
Some explanatory variables are dropped in the specifications estimated in this section. This is 
because of the problem of model underidentification, which occurs when one or more of the 
independent variables perfectly predict a particular outcome. For example, it could be that one of 
the industry dummies always takes a value of 1 when the dependant variable equals 0. In this 
case a model with finite coefficients cannot be fitted. The problem is solved in a step-by-step 
process. First, the variable causing the problem is removed. Second, the observations that led to 
the problem are taken out of the estimation. Finally the modified model using the remaining 
observations is fitted. This process is undertaken automatically by Stata/SE 8.2.   
 
Endogeneity 
 
Endogeneity arises because there are some loans dating back to the 1990s. This means that some 
of the collateral being used to explain loan access may not have been there prior to when firms 
obtained these loans. Rather, the early loans were used to obtain these assets. Based on the age 
structure of machinery and equipment (see Figure 3.2), it is not expected that endogeneity will be 
a serious problem (with the exception of Uganda). For all countries over 75 percent of loans 
                                                
24 The Huber-White estimator is used throughout this study.  
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were obtained between 2000 and 2003. Much of the machinery and equipment used to measure 
collateral was already in place at this time.  
 
However, the possibility of reverse causality implies that the results could be biased. One way of 
addressing this is to consider only those loans that were obtained after the firms assets were 
already in place. This is done by examining the effect of collateral on the probability that firms 
obtained loans in 2002 and 2003. Recall that for Tanzania and Uganda the replacement value 
figures are for 2002 and for Kenya these figures are for 2001. Thus, for Tanzania and Uganda 
new investment undertaken in 2002 is subtracted from the replacement value figures. The results 
are presented in Table 3.9. The model identification problem explained above leads to the 
dropping of some explanatory variables.  
 
The results in Table 3.9 are largely consistent with those in Table 3.7 with regard to the effect of 
collateral on access to bank loans. Kenyan firms with collateral were not likely to have obtained 
loans in 2002 and 2003. Having taken account of possible endogeneity, the results maintain that 
collateral has a significant positive effect on access to bank loans in Uganda and Tanzania, 
although this effect is weaker for Tanzania relative to what is observed in Table 3.7. Firm size 
remains the most important determinant of access to bank finance in Kenya. The results also 
show that local banks in Uganda are responsible for extending these recent loans. African 
entrepreneurs are also more likely to obtain credit in Uganda suggesting that policies aimed at 
improving access to bank finance to this group have had some success. This is also consistent 
with the lending behaviour of local banks that is observed.  
 
A longer bank-firm relationship in Uganda and Tanzania has a significant negative impact on 
loan access. This indicates that newer relationships are more likely to be based on demand for 
credit while older relationships may emphasise the keeping of an account. The type of 
relationship between banks and firms appears to have evolved over time in these 2 countries. 
Finally, one sees that educational attainment significantly affects loan access in Tanzania. This 
could be the result of improvements in the quality of management skills in recent years. 
Moreover, the weaker effect of collateral compared to Table 3.7 suggests that for loans obtained 
in Tanzania between 2002 and 2003, educational attainment was a useful collateral substitute to 
some extent.  
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Table 3.9: Explaining Loans Obtained in 2002 and 2003 
               Kenya     Uganda    Tanzania    
   
Log of Replacement Value of Machinery&Equip.  -0.119     0.283***    0.166*    
                   (-1.15)     (2.58)     (1.91) 
Log of Firm Age               0.088     0.225     -0.210 
               (0.45)     (1.01)     (-0.82) 
Log of Length of Relationship       -0.105         -0.349*    -0.489* 
               (-0.60)     (-1.65)     (-1.81) 
Log of Employment          0.358**    0.251      0.053 
               (2.19)     (1.32)     (0.42) 
Audited Accounts          -0.148     -0.073     -0.474 
               (-0.22)     (-0.20)     (-0.71) 
Local Bank            -0.458         1.025***    -0.331 
               (-1.56)     (3.49)     (-0.95) 
Local Ownership           0.133       -0.548      - 
               (0.39)     (-1.33)      - 
African Owner           0.142     0.624*      -0.178 
               (0.36)     (1.67)      (-0.50) 
Education Level of Manager       0.221        -0.070      0.726* 
               (0.80)     (-0.21)     (1.77) 
Agro                  -0.267     -0.470     0.621 
               (-0.66)     (-0.88)     (1.05) 
Metal                    0.314       -      0.020 
               (0.68)      -     (0.03) 
Furniture and Wood          0.209     0.183      0.482 
               (0.42)     (0.30)     (0.05) 
Chemicals             -0.380      -      0.641 
               (-0.56)      -     (0.93) 
Construction Materials             0.160     -1.168*          - 
               (0.25)     (-1.74)      - 
Plastics                0.363      -     0.672 
               (0.73)      -     (0.64) 
Paper, Printing & Publishing       1.094**    -0.323       0.009 
               (2.36)       (-0.48)     (0.01) 
Constant                   -0.095     -7.203***     -3.37** 
               (-0.06)       (-3.75)     (-1.79) 
Number of Observations              115      159          122 
Log-Likelihood                     -62.57      -48.72               -36.62 
Wald  χ2               14.28           33.28***      25.73*** 
Pseudo R2                   0.10             0.26          0.33 
Dependent variable: Probability that a firm obtained a loan in 2002/2003. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent respectively. Numbers in parentheses are z statistics. The 
reference industry is textiles.  In order for the model to be properly identified the metal, chemicals and plastics industry dummies are 
dropped for Uganda. In the case of Tanzania the local ownership variable and the construction dummy are dropped.  
 
Including Profitability as an Explanatory Variable 
 
An important factor determining whether or not firms are able to secure bank finance is 
profitability.  Profitability controls for the observable risk of the borrower that influences the 
ability to repay the loan. The effect of profitability is ambiguous. Banks would be more willing 
to lend to profitable firms than to unprofitable ones. On the other hand, the pecking order theory 
of capital structure (Myers, 1984) suggests that firms prefer to finance investment with internal 
sources. However, profitability has been excluded up to this point because its inclusion leads to 
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the loss of a large number of observations, as many firms do not provide the data required to 
calculate it. Nevertheless, the importance of this variable both theoretically and empirically 
requires that the study explores its impact on access to bank finance.  
 
The data allows us to measure profitability using the ratio of net income to replacement cost of 
fixed assets. For Kenya and Uganda the profitability figure is for 2001 and for Tanzania the 
figure is for 2002. Profitability is to a large extent a signaling variable. This means that the 
appropriate variable to use is expected profitability. Given that the data is cross sectional this 
variable is not available and the author makes do with current profitability. It is acknowledged 
that this is not a very good proxy for expected profitability. This is partly why we have included 
it as a robustness check rather than in the main regressions. However, it is anticipated that some 
insight into the impact that profitability has on access to bank finance will be obtained.  
 
Table 3.10 shows the estimation when profitability is included as an explanatory variable. The 
impact of collateral observed in Table 3.10 is similar to what one observes in Table 3.9 and 3.7. 
Moreover, the results show that profitability is not important for all three countries. This 
surprising finding could be the result of the data problems that have been highlighted.   
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Table 3.10: Including Profitability to Explain Loan Access in the EAC 
               Kenya     Uganda    Tanzania    
   
Log of Replacement Value of Machinery&Equip.  -0.057     0.221**    0.291***    
                   (-0.39)     (1.95)     (2.47) 
Log of Firm Age               -0.518     0.187     -0.238 
               (-0.23)     (0.73)     (-0.96) 
Log of Length of Relationship       -0.046         -0.295     -0.502** 
               (-0.23)     (-0.93)     (-2.24) 
Log Employment           0.255*     0.165      0.197 
               (1.81)     (0.73)     (1.20) 
Profitability            0.002     0.002     -0.090 
               (0.68)     (0.37)     (-0.53) 
Audited Accounts          -0.107     0.525      - 
               (-0.16)     (1.16)      - 
Local Bank            -0.034         0.754**    0.122 
               (-0.10)     (2.06)     (0.36) 
Local Ownership           0.065       -0.418     -0.157 
               (0.16)     (-0.91)     (-0.23) 
African Owner           0.189     0.541      -0.116 
               (0.44)     (1.30)      (-0.33) 
Education Level of Manager       0.248        0.083      0.079 
               (0.84)     (0.20)     (0.18) 
Agro                  -0.462     0.186     0.811 
               (-1.12)     (0.30)     (1.60) 
Metal                    0.303      -0.086      0.786 
               (0.70)     (-0.10)     (1.16) 
Furniture and Wood          0.537     0.680      1.305 
               (0.97)     (0.91)     (1.50) 
Chemicals             0.370     -0.953      1.388** 
               (0.47)     (-1.08)     (2.06) 
Construction Materials             -0.133      -          0.760 
               (-0.17)      -     (0.91) 
Plastics                -0.118      -     0.740 
               (-0.23)      -     (0.89) 
Paper, Printing & Publishing       0.632     -0.387       0.672 
               (1.22)       (-0.46)     (0.93) 
Constant                   1.129     -6.104***     -6.834*** 
               (0.45)       (-3.15)     (-3.05) 
Number of Observations             102       93             93 
Log-Likelihood                     -58.88      -38.97              -36.52 
Wald  χ2               24.07           37.74***      28.86** 
Pseudo R2                   0.16             0.28          0.26 
Dependent variable: Probability that the firm had a loan at the time of the survey in 2002/2003. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent respectively. Numbers in parentheses are z statistics. The 
reference industry is textiles.  In order for the model to be properly identified the construction and plastics industry dummies are 
dropped for Uganda. In the case of Tanzania the audited accounts variable is dropped.  
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Using an Alternative Measure of Collateral 
 
To test further the robustness of the results an alternative measure of collateral is used. This 
measure is the share of the firms machinery and equipment that is above ten years of age. 
Strictly speaking, this variable indicates a lack of collateral. Old machinery and equipment is 
harder to value and to sell in secondary markets. As a result, banks will be less willing to accept 
it as collateral. A larger share of old machinery and equipment will have a negative effect on 
access to bank finance. This alternative variable can address 2 problems associated with 
measuring collateral using replacement value. First, when the capital stock is very old as it is in 
Kenya and Tanzania, assigning a meaningful monetary value to these assets could be difficult. 
Second, firms can easily manipulate these figures to avoid tax obligations or to enjoy certain 
benefits put in place by government. Table 3.11 shows the results using the alternative measure 
of collateral. The profitability variable from the previous model is retained to see whether it will 
yield a different result in another model specification. 
 
The share of machinery and equipment older than ten years of age has a significant negative 
effect on access to bank loans in Uganda and Tanzania. This means that not having collateral 
substantially reduces the likelihood that firms can access bank finance. It is consistent with the 
results of the previous specifications which showed that collateral has a meaningful positive 
impact on loan access in these two countries. In Kenya this variable has an insignificant positive 
effect. This is also in line with the results thus far. The results have proved to be robust to 
different specifications and alternative measures of collateral. Notably, in this last model 
profitability has a significant negative effect on loan access in Uganda, supportive of the pecking 
order hypothesis. This is also the only model where the explanatory variables are jointly 
significant for Kenya.  
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Table 3.11: An Alternative Measure of Collateral to Explain Loan Access in the EAC 
               Kenya     Uganda    Tanzania    
   
Share of Capital more than 10 years old     0.005     -0.017**    -0.015*** 
               (1.41)     (-2.39)     (-2.78) 
Log Firm Age               -0.631***    0.551**    -0.013 
               (-3.08)     (2.05)     (-0.05) 
Log of Length of Relationship       -0.077         -0.358     -0.448** 
               (-0.38)     (-1.10)     (-2.25) 
Log Employment           0.270**    0.469***     0.469*** 
               (1.92)     (2.79)     (2.89) 
Profitability            0.002     -0.008**         -0.341 
               (0.99)     (-2.21)     (-1.50) 
Local Bank            -0.026         0.680*     0.170 
               (-0.07)     (1.76)     (0.49) 
Local Ownership           0.112       -0.143     0.059 
               (0.27)     (-0.30)     (0.09) 
African Owner           0.109     0.062      0.394 
               (0.26)     (0.14)      (1.00) 
Education Level of Manager       0.247        0.404      0.473 
               (0.83)     (0.97)     (1.13) 
Agro                  -0.576     0.129     0.199 
               (-1.35)     (0.19)     (0.31) 
Metal                    0.222      -0.592      0.800 
               (0.49)     (-0.73)     (1.07) 
Furniture and Wood          0.371     0.424      0.576 
               (0.68)     (0.55)     (0.72) 
Chemicals             0.531     -0.707      0.428 
               (0.67)     (-0.69)     (0.50) 
Construction Materials             -0.113      -     0.273 
               (0.02)      -     (0.35) 
Plastics                -0.166      -     0.111 
               (-0.32)      -     (0.12) 
Paper, Printing & Publishing       0.525     -0.031       0.561 
               (0.98)       (-0.04)     (0.67) 
Constant                   0.356     -3.051***     -2.231* 
               (0.31)       (-2.72)     (-2.14) 
Number of Observations              100       92           101 
Log-Likelihood                     -57.20      -37.74              -33.44 
Wald  χ2               25.48*          32.81***      25.61* 
Pseudo R2                   0.17             0.28          0.33 
Dependent variable: Probability that the firm had a loan at the time of the survey in 2002/2003. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent respectively. Numbers in parentheses are z statistics. In the 
case of Uganda the model is properly identified when the construction materials and plastics industry dummies are dropped. The 
reference industry is textiles.  
 
Possible Selection Bias 
 
Another problem that arises with cross-sectional data is selection bias (see Heckman, 1979). In 
the context of the problem one could argue that 2 decisions are taken, one by firms and the other 
by banks. First, firms must make a decision to apply for a bank loan. That is, firms decide 
whether they have demand for bank loans.  
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After firms decide to apply for credit, banks must decide whether or not to extend loans to these 
firms. In their decision to supply loans, banks will be interested in maximizing their expected 
profits. This means that in the event that firms default, banks can effectively use the collateral 
mechanism to recoup the loan. The ability of firms to pledge collateral is among the key 
determining factors in the banks decision.  
 
Similar to Bigsten et al (2003) the 2 decisions can be viewed as 2 stages of the loan market 
process. Selection bias could be present if one investigates the decision by banks to provide 
credit without first examining the decision by firms to apply for it.  This 2 stage process can be 
estimated using a bivariate probit model with sample selection, otherwise known as a Heckman 
probit. An equation for each stage is estimated. The model assumes that the errors from these 
two equations have a standardized bivariate normal distribution with correlation coefficient ρ, 
(for a detailed discussion see Dubin and Rivers, 1990).  
 
To explain the first stage, explanatory variables that are most useful in explaining loan demand 
are used. Firms decide based on the extent to which their own funds are unable to meet their 
working capital and investment requirements, and the availability of collateral and collateral 
substitutes.  Entrepreneurs may be more willing to apply for loans from locally owned banks if 
these banks are perceived as being less conservative than foreign banks. It is expected that 
demand for bank loans will be affected by ethnicity. African entrepreneurs are likely to have less 
access to internal sources of finance. Similarly, locally owned firms could have less access to 
internal sources compared to foreign firms. More highly educated entrepreneurs are in a better 
position to lodge successful loan applications. They can formulate better business plans and are 
less likely to be intimidated by the paper work associated with applying for a loan. Larger firms 
have greater market power and more reputation. Their demand for loans is expected to be higher 
than for small firms. Firm age will also affect loan demand. Older firms may have better access 
to retained earnings, thus have less demand for loans. Alternatively, older firms could have more 
reputation which increases loan demand. Industry specific characteristics could also explain the 
demand for loans.  
 
Collateral is expected to be the key factor in the second stage. Other factors that are crucial for 
the second stage include the length of the bank-firm relationship and whether or not the bank is 
locally owned.  The literature suggests that relationship banking explains bank lending behaviour 
more than it does firm loan demand. Locally owned banks may be less conservative in their 
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lending practices compared to traditionally conservative foreign banks. Furthermore, banks are 
more likely to provide loans to firms that keep audited accounts. Larger, older firms will be 
viewed as more credit worthy than smaller, younger ones.  Again, industry specific differences 
may be important for bank decision to provide credit.  
 
The results of the Heckman probit are given in Table 3.12 below. The replacement value of 
machinery and equipment is used to measure collateral. Convergence was obtained only for 
Uganda and Tanzania. This is not surprising given the poor explanatory power of the previous 
models for Kenya. Moreover, Uganda and Tanzania are the countries of interest given that 
collateral was found to be insignificant in Kenya.  Attempting to include the profit variable also 
led to non-convergence so it is excluded in the model reported in Table 3.12.  
 
The results suggest that there is no sample selection bias in either country. This is similar to the 
findings of Bigsten et al (2003). However, the sample selection model does provide some 
interesting results. It shows that in Uganda collateral is not significant for the decision made by 
banks, but is important for the decision made by firms. This suggests that the low cost of 
enforcement affects firm behaviour, but not bank behaviour. Collateral is not necessarily viewed 
as an effective enforcement mechanism by Ugandan banks. However, Ugandan firms seem to 
rely on collateral to signal their quality to banks. Firms without collateral are unable to send such 
a signal and thus are less likely to apply for loans.  
 
In contrast, collateral is unimportant for the decision to apply for loans in Tanzania, but is 
significant for the decision to supply credit. Thus, in Tanzania the legal environment affects bank 
behaviour more than it does the decisions taken by firms. This means that Tanzanian banks view 
collateral as an effective enforcement mechanism. This finding agrees with the substantially 
higher share of Tanzanian firms whose loan applications were rejected due to inadequate 
collateral observed in chapter 2. In Tanzania, banks clearly prefer to provide loans to firms with 
collateral. 
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Table 3.12: Sample Selection Model 
 
Applied for a Loan (Selection Equation)      
 Uganda  z-statistic  Tanzania  z-statistic    
Log of Replacement Value of Machinery&Equip  0.141***  2.43   0.030   0.47 
Local Bank            0.497**  2.30   -0.122   -0.47 
Log of Employment          0.097   0.122   0.219*   1.80 
Log of Firm Age           0.284**  2.12   -0.094   -0.77 
African Owner           0.361   1.42   0.710***  2.93 
Local Ownership           -0.513*  -1.73   0.531   1.02 
Education Level of Manager       -0.071   -0.30   0.207   0.77 
Agro              -0.432   -1.08   0.352   0.87 
Metal              -0.748   -1.48   0.373   0.74 
Furniture             -0.397   -0.90   -0.274   -0.54 
Chemicals             -0.398   -0.72   0.502   1.04 
Construction            -0.686   -1.44   0.625   0.90 
Plastics             5.902***  11.11   0.758   1.06 
Paper              -0.905*  -1.83   0.235   0.49 
 
               Obtained a Loan (2nd Stage Probit) 
Uganda  z-statistic   Tanzania  z-statistic  
Log of Replacement Value of Machinery&Equip  0.183   1.25    0.237**  2.12 
Log of Length of Relationship       -0.614**  -2.29    -0.080   -0.38  
Log of Employment          0.221   1.20    0.292   1.53 
Log of Firm Age           -0.151   -0.80    -0.518*  -1.74 
Audited Accounts          0.128   0.28    0.339   0.56 
Local Bank            0.343   0.85    -0.286   -0.62 
Agro              -0.468   -0.75    0.009   0.01 
Metal              -0.587   -0.66    0.473   0.60 
Furniture             -0.060   -0.09    1.168   1.02 
Chemicals             -1.661**  -1.93    0.240   0.27 
Construction            -2.045**  -2.22    0.241   0.23 
Plastics             -1.353*  -1.69    0.218   0.24 
Paper              0.150   0.20    0.071   0.09 
Constant             -2.062   -0.77    -5.50***  -2.65 
Number of Observations         205        145 
Log-Likelihood           -151.60       -109.41              
Wald  χ2             21.25*        29.81***        
Wald Test on Selection Term       1.48              0.33 
Dependent variables: In stage 1 is the probability that a firm applied for a loan. In stage 2 is the probability that the firm obtained the 
loan. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent respectively. The reference industry is textiles.  
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 It is worth noting that African entrepreneurs in Tanzania are more likely to apply for loans than 
entrepreneurs from other ethnic groups. This confirms the authors thoughts about African 
entrepreneurs having less access to internal sources of finance. The results also show that better 
access to loans from local banks in Uganda is a result of more applications being made to these 
banks, not necessarily because they banks are more likely to provide loans. In addition, although 
Ugandan firms in the plastics industry have by far the greatest demand for loans relative to firms 
in other industries, banks are less likely to provide credit to these firms. As in Table 3.8, the 
chemicals and construction materials industries in Uganda can be expected to receive less credit. 
 
3.5 Conclusions 
 
Existing literature suggests that given the poor state of the legal systems in SSA countries, collateral 
is ineffective as a mechanism of enforcing formal loan contracts. However, the empirical evidence 
on this issue is extremely limited. This chapter attempted to address this gap.  Given the argument 
that collateral may be unable to play its role adequately in SSA, this paper also investigated the role 
that collateral substitutes can play to improve access to bank finance. The main contribution of this 
paper in this regard was to examine the role, if any, of relationship banking.  
 
The chapter found that a very high proportion of loans are collateralised in the 3 EAC countries. 
Moreover, firms in all countries have assets that they are able to pledge as collateral. The results 
based on probit estimations showed that the replacement value of machinery and equipment has a 
significant effect on access to bank loans in Uganda and Tanzania, but not in Kenya. This finding is 
robust across several model specifications, and alternate measures of collateral. Collateral has a role 
to play in the transmission mechanism in Uganda and Tanzania. This is interpreted as evidence 
supporting the view that collateral is more relevant for debt contracts when the costs of enforcement 
are kept relatively low. The marginal probability elasticity of collateral was however found to be 
relatively small for both countries. Although collateral is important, it is not the most important 
determinant of access to bank loans. 
 
The analysis showed that collateral in the form of real estate does not have an effect on loan access 
in all 3 EAC countries. This suggests that the legal environment in these countries, particularly in 
Uganda and Tanzania, is better suited to support creditors trying to repossess machinery and 
equipment compared to creditors attempting to repossess real estate. The results show that in the 
context of SSA countries, it is not only whether firms have collateral that is important. Perhaps more 
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crucial in these countries where weaknesses in the legal systems exist, is the type of collateral that 
firms own.  
  
Collateral addresses information asymmetry problems that are abundant in Africa, and therefore 
should play some role in bank lending. In line with this view, the results showed that collateral has 
an important role to play where information asymmetry is more acute. Interestingly, having audited 
accounts does not significantly improve access to bank loans. Thus, the countries in the EAC 
(particularly Uganda and Tanzania) will benefit from improving the quality of their financial 
information.  
 
The most important collateral substitute in the EAC appears to be reputation. It is particularly 
important in Kenya where both real estate and machinery and equipment are found to be ineffective 
as contract enforcement mechanisms. Little evidence was found supporting the hypothesis that 
relationship lending can have a positive effect on access to bank finance. Evidence from Uganda and 
Tanzania indicates that the type of relationship between banks and firms has evolved over time. 
Recent relationships are more likely to be credit based than older ones. The evidence is to some 
extent consistent with the limited studies pertaining to other non-developed countries. It shows that 
there may be a need to improve on the quality of information available to banks in their lending 
relationships with firms, and that researchers need to explore innovative avenues of solving 
information asymmetry that are more relevant to SSA. However, the results may also point to the 
limitations the data impose on measuring relationship lending adequately.  
 
The sample selection model gave interesting insight into the role of collateral. According to this 
model, collateral is only important for the decision to apply for loans in Uganda, not for the 
decision to supply credit. This suggests that despite Uganda having the lowest enforcement costs 
in the EAC, banks in that country do not necessarily view collateral as an effective enforcement 
mechanism. Rather it is the firms that see a meaningful role for collateral. Ugandan firms appear 
to use collateral to signal their quality to banks. Firms without collateral are not in a position to 
send such a signal and thus are less likely to apply for bank finance. In contrast, Tanzanian banks 
supply credit based on collateral although firms do not consider collateral to be an important 
determinant in their decision to apply for credit. The sample selection results suggest that from 
the point of view of banks, secondary markets for machinery and equipment play more of a role 
for the functioning of the collateral mechanism in Tanzania compared to Uganda. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT AND NON-BANK FINANCE: TRADE 
CREDIT AND LEASING FINANCE 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Trade credit is a very important source of external finance for African manufacturing firms. For 
example, it is the most important source of finance for Zimbabwean firms accounting for up to a 
third of all outstanding balances across all size categories (Fafchamps et al, 1995). It is reported 
to be the most important source of non-bank credit for Kenyan firms (Fafchamps, 1994). Based 
on a sample of six countries, Bigsten et al (2003) report that for the majority of manufacturing 
firms trade credit is the most important source of finance for working capital needs. Trade credit 
was received by 62 percent of the sampled firms. Therefore, continued research into the nature of 
trade credit in Africa is a meaningful exercise that can provide useful insights on ways to 
improve credit access by manufacturing firms.  
 
A key contribution of this chapter is to empirically examine how collateral affects the likelihood 
that a firm uses trade credit. If trade credit is a viable substitute for bank finance then a negative 
relationship between collateral and trade credit is expected. This would indicate that trade credit 
is useful in an environment where firms do not have adequate collateral, or where weaknesses in 
the legal system make the collateral mechanism ineffective.  This chapter also examines how the 
legal environment affects the supply of trade credit. Trade credit has the potential to bypass some 
of the weaknesses that characterize legal systems in African countries because it does not depend 
directly on collateral. However, although trade credit is not collateralised, it still requires that 
those providing it use the court system to resolve disputes over payments.  
 
Another contribution of this chapter is to assess the role of formal mechanisms that are not based 
on the court system in settling disputes between firms. Specifically, the author examined whether 
membership to a business association can be beneficial in resolving disputes. Previous works 
have focused more on how informal mechanisms (for example networks based on ethnicity) 
affect trade credit. It is also important to examine whether formalized institutions can supplement 
the legal system, particularly because it may be easier to pursue policies that can enhance their 
effectiveness as compared to informal institutions.  
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Much less is known about the use of leasing finance in African manufacturing compared to bank 
finance and trade credit. This is partly attributed to the fact that leasing finance is generally still 
in its infancy in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (Kisaame, 2003). To the best knowledge of the 
author this chapter is the first attempt to examine the relationship between measures of the legal 
environment and leasing finance in African manufacturing.25 The legal environment is expected 
to be an important factor given that leasing is based on a formal contractual agreement between 
the lessor and lessee.  
 
4.2 Trade Credit 
 
4.2.1 Literature Review 
 
An examination of the literature motivating the use of trade credit is conducted in this section. 
Both theoretical and empirical literature is examined. Important gaps are identified that provide 
guidance in formulating meaningful hypotheses to be tested in the study.  
 
Supply Side Theories of Trade Credit 
 
The literature has several explanations for why firms extend trade credit. One of the oldest views 
explain trade credit to be a result of financial market imperfections. This is referred to as the 
financial or liquidity motive and arises mainly due to imperfections in credit markets. This 
motive stems from the fact that some firms have easier access to credit markets compared to their 
customers, providing them with an incentive to use their borrowing capacity to pass credit to 
these customers (Schwartz, 1974). It is argued by Emery (1984) that the existence of barriers to 
bank credit and the resulting non-competitive rents they generate presents an opportunity for 
non-financial firms to extend credit to excluded market participants.  
 
The imperfect financial markets view of trade credit leads to the argument that bank credit is 
redistributed to financially weaker firms by more financially sound firms in the form of trade 
credit. The redistribution hypothesis was first proposed by Meltzer (1960) and supported by 
among others Petersen and Rajan (1997) and Nilsen (2002). According to Love et al (2005), for 
redistribution to actually occur it must be the case that some firms are able to raise external 
                                                
25 We note that Kisaame (2003) and Mutesasira et al (2001) provide some discussion on the relationship between the 
legal environment and leasing finance in Uganda and Tanzania.  
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credit, which they then pass on to weaker firms. Related to the redistribution argument is the 
complementarity hypothesis of Demirguc-Kunt and Maskimovic (2001). The complementarity 
view argues that trade credit use is greater in countries with large and efficient financial 
intermediary sectors. Non-financial firms act as agents for financial intermediaries by lending to 
and borrowing from other firms when they have a comparative advantage in enforcing these 
credit contracts.  
 
The extent to which the intermediate goods supplied can serve as collateral also affects the 
willingness of suppliers to extend trade credit (Mian and Smith, 1992; Petersen and Rajan, 
1997). The more durable the goods supplied, the more valuable they are as collateral and hence 
the more credit the supplier can extend to buyers.  In addition, the longer the intermediate goods 
remain in their original state the more useful they are as collateral to the seller who can repossess 
them and sell them to another buyer. This means that the state and quantity of raw materials held 
in inventory by buyers has an impact on the decision of suppliers to provide trade credit. Frank 
and Maskimovic (2004) explain that inputs provide collateral supporting trade credit while 
finished goods do not. The proportion of the sale that is financed by trade credit increases with 
the value that can be recovered in the event of repossession.  
 
Asymmetric information can also be found in product markets. This implies that there will be 
uncertainty about the quality of goods delivered by suppliers. In this instance trade credit arises 
out of a verification motive. By providing trade credit, suppliers give buyers a period to verify 
the product prior to payment (Smith, 1987). Trade credit sends a positive signal about the quality 
of the product by affording the buyer an inspection period through deferred payment. This can 
give the supplier a distinct advantage over competing suppliers. 
 
Price discrimination can lead suppliers to extend credit to their buyers (Meltzer, 1960; Petersen 
and Rajan, 1997). Given that credit terms are on the whole uniform for buyers of varying credit 
quality, low quality buyers enjoy an effective reduction on the price of goods and services 
(Petersen and Rajan, 1994).  Low credit quality firms have relatively inelastic demand, allowing 
suppliers to exploit high profit margins. With respect to high quality borrowers the price of trade 
credit will be considered as too high, motivating them to make quick repayments. In contrast, 
risky buyers find the cost of trade credit lower than other sources such as bank credit. An 
alternative explanation for price discrimination is that the supplier has an interest in the long-
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term survival of the buyer. The supplier factors in the present value of profits on future sales in 
extending trade credit. Thus, the supplier is viewed as having a quasi equity stake in the firm.  
 
Trade credit terms can be used to strengthen the competitive position of suppliers. According to 
the sales promotion motive, trade credit terms are effective in increasing or maintaining market 
share, and in downloading excess inventory (Nadiri, 1969). Extending trade credit allows a 
supplier to gain an advantage over the competition because the buyer is continuously holding his 
products. At the same time, the seller transfers inventory costs (for example storage costs) to the 
buyer. Based on this argument the length of the credit terms will be positively related to the 
amount of time the goods are part of the buyers inventory. Trade credit is also used to establish 
long-term relationships with buyers in the expectation that they will provide a loyal clientele for 
the products of the seller. In this case trade credit is an investment used to maintain sales at a 
given threshold within a secure relationship between suppliers and buyers (Ziane, 2004).  
 
Demand Side Theories of Trade Credit 
 
Trade credit demand can also be motivated by the presence of financial and product market 
imperfections. The basis for these theories is the presence of information asymmetry between 
suppliers and their customers (see Ferris, 1981). With regard to financial markets the decision to 
take trade credit depends on the availability and relative prices of alternative sources of finance. 
Credit rationing as an equilibrium result in loan markets (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) implies that 
firms may demand trade credit at rates higher than those required by banks and other financial 
institutions. Given that credit rationing by banks is a function of risk, firms perceived to be high 
risk are likely to have a higher demand for trade credit.  
 
Related to the imperfect financial markets argument is the observation that trade credit demand 
arises because suppliers do not have the traditional collateral requirements of banks (see for 
example Fafchamps, 1997). The relationship between the supplier and the buyer generates 
information that improves the monitoring and enforcement of payments (Petersen and Rajan, 
1997). This implies that compared to bank credit, trade credit is less dependent on formal 
collateral as a means to signal the credit quality of the buyer. Cunat (2004) develops a model 
showing that the lower the level of collateralizable assets a firm has, the higher the expected 
demand for trade credit.  
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When information asymmetry is present in product markets, firms demand trade credit because it 
affords them a period to inspect the quality of the product prior to paying. Smith (1987) explains 
that this sends a signal about the quality of the product. Incomplete information about the quality 
of the goods or the characteristics of the seller may encourage buyers to use trade credit rather 
than pay cash. This provides them with some protection against opportunistic behaviour by the 
seller.  
  
Trade credit demand is also said to arise from a transactions cost motive. According to this view 
trade credit reduces transactions costs by promoting efficiency in cash management (Ferris, 
1981; Petersen and Rajan, 1997). Trade credit reduces the frequency with which payments must 
be made to suppliers, and the cost of holding cash balances. Even if capital markets were perfect, 
uncertainty about whether delivery and payments will be synchronized leads to costs associated 
with holding idle resources in the form of cash balances. By using trade credit firms can 
accumulate their payment obligations and pay them at regular intervals. This allows them to 
estimate their cash requirements with greater certainty and consequently to hold smaller cash 
balances. The implication of this is a lower opportunity cost of holding cash than would have 
been the case without trade credit.  
 
4.2.2 Empirical Evidence on Trade Credit 
 
African and International Evidence 
 
 Using RPED data, Fafchamps et al (1994) find that the use of trade credit in Kenya increases 
with firm size. Their evidence suggests that micro enterprises are rationed out of the trade credit 
market and that small firms in Kenya are not heavy users of trade credit. Ethnicity is also found 
to be an important factor, with Black-owned enterprises receiving the least trade credit. They 
also find that almost all firms that provide trade credit experience some problems with payment. 
58 percent of firms stated that legal action would be the most likely reaction to non-payment. 
However, given the size of transactions required to justify the costs associated with courts and 
lawyers, legal enforcement is used mainly by large firms.  
 
Bade and Chifamba (1994) find that in the case of Zimbabwe firms are more likely to secure 
trade credit if they purchase regularly in bulk, if they are more profitable, and if they have an 
overdraft facility. Fafchamps et al (1995) show that larger firms and non-Black owned firms are 
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more likely to receive trade credit in Zimbabwe. Discrimination against blacks exists regardless 
of firm size. They find that the initial response of firms to payment problems is direct 
negotiation. Should negotiations fail firms proceed to hire a lawyer and threaten to take legal 
action.  
 
In a later study on trade credit in Zimbabwe Fafchamps (1997) finds that Zimbabwean firms use 
a combination of formal screening, statistical discrimination, reputation and acquaintance in 
selecting recipients of trade credit. Large firms use credit application forms, and bank and trade 
references to screen firms applying for trade credit. Reputation and relationships are found to be 
important mechanisms for accessing trade credit and enforcing payment.  
 
Fafchamps (1999) finds that network effects (the impact of socialization and information 
sharing) are significant determinants of access to supplier credit by Black-owned and female 
headed enterprises in Kenya and Zimbabwe. He finds that ethnicity and gender have minimal 
effects on access to bank credit. However, these attributes have a strong negative impact on the 
ability of entrepreneurs to access trade credit. His results indicate that blacks and women are 
penalized for their lack of connections with the business community, and their inability to 
effectively signal their credit worthiness amongst a pool of inexperienced micro enterprises. 
 
Fisman and Raturi (2000) investigate the impact of competition on relationship development 
using trade credit data for 5 African countries. They show that competition among firms has a 
positive effect on incentives to establish long-term cooperative relationships. For an average firm 
the probability of obtaining trade credit increases from 40 percent to 60 percent after switching 
from a monopolistic market to a competitive supplier market. A high level of competition makes 
switching suppliers very costly and hence promotes lock-in between suppliers and buyers. 
Based on data for 5 African countries Fisman (2001) finds that supplier credit has a positive 
impact on capacity utilization. He argues that an increase in trade credit may have a significant 
positive effect on productivity. His results also suggest that supplier credit is particularly 
important for firms with high liquidity constraints.  
 
Using firm level data for a group of 6 emerging economies, Love et al (2005) investigate the 
effect of financial crises on trade credit use. They find that financially weaker firms are more 
likely to reduce the provision of trade credit to their customers in the event of a financial crisis. 
Their findings also indicate that firms with a higher dependence on short-term bank debt are the 
 93
main suppliers of trade credit during non-crisis periods. During times of crisis they observe a 
significant positive relationship between bank credit growth and the provision of trade credit. 
They conclude that their results are consistent with the redistribution hypothesis of trade credit 
provision. That is, firms successful in securing bank finance redistribute it to firms unable to do 
so in the form of trade credit.  
 
Cunat (2004) develops a model in which trade credit arises from the commercial and 
technological links between firms. Based on a sample of UK firms he finds that trade credit 
increases with firm age. This is taken as support for the hypothesis that trade credit is a result of 
specificity between a supplier and its customers. In addition, trade credit is used once other 
forms of credit have been fully utilized. He also finds that the share of trade credit relative to 
other forms of finance is significantly affected by collateral. Lower levels of collateral are 
associated with a higher proportion of trade credit. This is considered to be consistent with the 
view that firms exhaust other sources of credit before using trade credit.  
  
One of the most widely cited empirical works on trade credit is Petersen and Rajan (1997). The 
study is based on American small firms using data from the National Survey of Small Business 
Finances. They find that firms of higher credit quality (measured by size and profitability) 
receive more credit. Suppliers are found to have an advantage in information acquisition 
compared to financial institutions. For example, suppliers can visit buyers more often than banks 
can. The size and timing of the buyers orders also indicate the state of the buyers business. 
Their results also show that the higher the proportion of raw materials in inventory, the greater 
the amount of trade credit provided. Their conclusion is that suppliers have a financing 
advantage stemming from their low cost of information acquisition and their ability to efficiently 
liquidate assets.  
 
Wilson et al (1997) investigate the determinants of trade credit usage for a sample of small UK 
firms. Firms with a higher degree of financial risk (proxied by profitability and the debt ratio) 
have a greater demand for trade credit. Business risk (proxied by firm age) is positively related to 
trade credit demand. Firms with more concentrated ownership use relatively more trade credit. 
They argue that this suggests owner-managers take more risk than hired managers.  Using a 
sample of French SMEs, Ziane (2004) examines the determinants of trade credit use. He finds 
that a higher volume of transactions, and greater financial and business risk, are associated with a 
greater demand for trade credit. 
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4.2.3  Some Evidence on the Link between Trade Credit and the Legal Environment 
 
The empirical evidence surveyed thus far tests the standard theories of trade credit. Given that 
there is no clear theoretical basis for linking trade credit to the legal environment, empirical 
evidence on this relationship is limited. Nevertheless some studies do exist, and are reviewed in 
this section. 
 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001) find that the usage of trade credit compared to bank 
credit declines as the efficiency of the legal system increases. They obtain this result based on a 
sample of 39 developed and developing countries. They also find that trade credit is more 
prevalent in countries with better developed financial systems. This finding is particularly strong 
when the share of government ownership in the banking sector is low, implying greater 
efficiency in financial intermediation. Their evidence is supportive of the complementarity 
view of trade credit.  
 
Bigsten et al (2000) find that small manufacturing firms in Africa prefer direct negotiation to 
legal action when settling contractual disputes over late payments for trade credit and late 
delivery of inputs. Mainly large firms use lawyers and courts in the event that negotiations fail. 
They argue that this might reflect a cultural preference for non-confrontational methods of 
settling disputes. The length of the relationship between parties is found to reduce the probability 
of going to court. Their evidence suggests that countries with better legal institutions are also the 
countries where breach of contract and the use of lawyers are most prevalent. They interpret this 
observation to mean that firms operating under good legal institutions take more risk, which 
promotes trade and leads to more cases of contractual breach and consequently more usage of 
courts and lawyers. Their conclusion is that the African manufacturing sector operates in an 
environment where contractual disputes are frequent but are mainly dealt with through direct 
negotiation.  
 
McMillan and Woodruff (1999) explore how Vietnamese firms prevent disputes without the use 
of courts based on a survey of manufacturing firms. They find that firms cannot rely on courts, 
and thus use repeated game incentives in their contractual agreements. 90 percent of managers 
surveyed reported that courts are irrelevant in enforcing contracts or resolving disputes. In this 
context contracting is upheld by the threat of loss of future business. Firms also rely on 
additional mechanisms depending on the risk of business partners. Transactions involving greater 
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risk are characterized by more elaborate governance structures involving written contracts and 
advance payment. They also find that firms investigate potential trading partners prior to entering 
a relationship, in some cases relying on social networks for information.  
 
Using firm-level data Hendley et al (2000) investigate how Russian firms enforce agreements 
with trading partners. They find that Russian firms have a strong preference for using direct 
enterprise-to-enterprise negotiation to resolve contractual problems. Their results also suggest 
that firms prefer doing business with long term partners, an observation that is consistent with 
the difficulties of doing business in Russia. Furthermore, they find that many Russian firms use 
the courts to resolve disputes. During 1996 40 percent of surveyed firms had initiated 6 or more 
law suits. They conclude that after direct negotiation between firms, threatened or actual use of 
courts is the most important method of contract enforcement in Russia.  
 
According to Johnson et al (2002a) courts have a role to play even when they function 
inefficiently. They identify 2 roles for courts. First, they ensure that bills are paid. Second, they 
help to clarify the responsibilities of the contracting parties in the event of dispute, which 
facilitates their day-to-day interaction. Based on a group of 5 post-communist countries, they 
find that entrepreneurs who state that the courts work provide significantly more trade credit than 
entrepreneurs who state that courts do not work. They highlight that these countries all scored 
poorly in international comparisons measuring the fairness of the judiciary. They also find that 
functioning courts make it easier for new relationships to be established, implying that they act to 
stimulate business activity.  
 
Shvets (2006) empirically investigates how the predictability of court decisions affects the 
willingness of creditors to provide loans in Russia. She defines predictability as the ability of 
entrepreneurs to predict a court decision in a particular case based on information available to 
them. This information is based on what they know about the written law and what they have 
observed about enforcement through the courts in the past. Based on firm level data she finds 
that judicial predictability has no effect on the size of trade credit. However, it has a significant 
positive effect on both the likelihood and size of bank credit. She argues that her findings are 
consistent with the view that compared to banks, trade credit suppliers have opportunities for 
better monitoring of borrowers and alternative methods of contract enforcement which rely less 
on courts.  
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Based on a group of 5 transition economies Pyle (2005) examines whether membership to a 
business organization contributes to the level of inter-firm communication about disputes with 
trade partners. He assumes that access to the associations information network reduces the risk 
associated with providing trade credit by aiding relational contracting and reducing informational 
asymmetries. His evidence shows that some business associations significantly increase the flow 
of information relating to contractual disputes even after controlling for pre-existing informal 
communication. He also finds that if firms are skeptical about the ability of courts to protect 
them from opportunistic behaviour by trade partners, they may be more active in using the 
business association as a means of finding out information about their partners past behaviour.  
 
4.2.4  Summary of Literature Review on Trade Credit 
 
In the case of Africa, firm size and ethnicity are found to be important factors affecting access to 
trade credit by manufacturing firms. Interestingly, large firms providing trade credit in 
Zimbabwe use bank references as a basis for selecting recipients of trade credit. Firms with 
overdraft facilities are more likely to obtain trade credit. This implies that it is firms that are able 
to access bank credit that will be able to obtain trade credit. If this is the case trade credit will be 
complementary to bank credit rather than substitute for it.  
 
The literature review indicates that the empirical evidence on the relationship between the legal 
environment and trade credit is limited, particularly so for SSA. More research is required to 
obtain a better understanding of this relationship. Finally, to the best knowledge of the author 
there is no study that examines how membership in a business association affects dispute 
resolution among firms in SSA. This study aims to fill these gaps.   
 
4.3 Empirical Analysis of Trade Credit Use and Supply in the EAC 
 
In this section descriptive and parametric analyses of trade credit use and supply in the EAC are 
undertaken. The investigation is based on 4 hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The quality of the legal system affects the extent to which firms use courts to settle 
payment disputes. 
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Rationale: Firms operating in an environment where their rights as creditors are clearly defined will 
be more willing to use the courts to enforce these rights in the event of a dispute. In addition, lower 
enforcement costs will encourage firms to make greater use of courts.  
 
Hypothesis 1 is tested by examining how the extent to which the use of courts to settle disputes 
correlates with the legal indicators in chapter 2. The first observation is that the problem of overdue 
payments appears to be most serious in Tanzania, particularly with respect to government agencies. 
Notably, in Kenya, 28 percent of sales to private agents result in overdue payments. Overdue 
payments occur least in Uganda where on average 13 and 17 percent of private customers and 
government agencies pay late respectively.  
 
Figure 4.1: Average Share of Sales Resulting in Overdue Payments (%)
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  Source: World Bank (2002/03), Investment Climate Surveys  
  Kenya (n=223) Uganda (n=293) Tanzania (n=123) 
Based on Figure 4.1 one may expect that the use of courts would be greatest in Tanzania. However, 
Figure 4.2 shows that Tanzania has the least court usage. Kenyan firms are far more likely to use 
courts as a means of resolving disputes. It appears as though an environment of better legal 
protection is associated with more use of courts. Consistent with hypothesis 1, Kenya with 
significantly better creditor rights than the other two countries (see chapter 2), has a significantly 
greater share of firms using courts. It is likely that trade credit contracts in Kenya are more clearly 
covered in the written law compared to Uganda and Tanzania. In addition, although Kenya and 
Uganda have a smaller share of firms with overdue payments than Tanzania, they have a higher 
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share of firms using courts. Chapter 2 showed that Tanzania has the poorest quality written law 
which may explain why firms hardly use courts to resolve trade credit disputes. However, contrary 
to hypothesis 1, Figure 4.2 shows that enforcement does not matter much for the prevalence of court 
use. Kenya which has the most costly enforcement also has the highest use of the court system.  
 
Recall from chapter 2 that contract enforcement in Kenya is costlier than in Uganda and Tanzania.  
This is for both indicators, namely the number of days it takes to recover overdue debt and the 
percentage of debt paid. One may ask whether these indicators are appropriate as measures of 
enforcement. It is possible that there could be reverse causality between the cost of enforcement and 
demand for court services. For example, higher demand for court use in Kenya may lead to a 
backlog of cases resulting in long waiting periods before disputes are resolved. This demand for 
court services is not present in the other countries and may partly explain why the cost of 
enforcement measured in terms of days to recover overdue debts is higher than in the other 
countries.  
 
Figure 4.2: Share of Firms that use Courts (%)
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Looking at Figure 4.1 and 4.2, it is interesting to note that Tanzania which has the smallest share of 
firms using courts also has on average the largest share of sales resulting in overdue payments. This 
suggests that the alternative enforcement mechanisms being used in Tanzania are ineffective to some 
extent. An enforcement mechanism is effective not only because it efficiently and fairly resolves a 
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dispute, but also because it poses a credible threat to deter firms that have received trade credit from 
taking advantage of their suppliers. Kenya has the greatest share of private customers not honouring 
their payments in a timely manner. This opportunistic behaviour may reflect the high enforcement 
costs. That is, firms anticipate that court action is too costly for their suppliers and default as a result. 
In contrast, Uganda which has the lowest enforcement costs has on the whole the least problems 
with overdue payments. In particular, a substantially lower share of private customers in Uganda 
fails to pay on time. This suggests that the threat of court action in Uganda is a credible threat 
because the courts are relatively efficient. It may partly explain why there is a smaller share of 
Ugandan firms actually using the courts compared to Kenya.  
 
Therefore, the analysis suggests that courts are more important for resolving disputes in Kenya 
than in Uganda and Tanzania. However, courts appear to be more of a deterrent to opportunistic 
behaviour in Uganda relative to the other 2 countries. This is mainly a function of the more 
efficient enforcement that obtains in Uganda. Courts are least important in Tanzania where both 
legal rights and enforcement are relatively weak.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Membership in a business association is more useful for resolving disputes when 
courts are less efficient.   
 
Rationale: Business associations provide a channel through which firms can settle contractual 
disputes without having to incur the high costs associated with using courts. These associations 
can also enhance the flow of information between firms and therefore potentially reduce mistrust 
between firms.  
 
Hypothesis 2 is tested by examining the correlation between firm perceptions about how 
effective business associations are in settling disputes, and the measures of contract enforcement 
presented in chapter 2. Firms were asked to rate the services provided by their association is 
resolving disputes on a scale from 0 to 4, where 0 means the services have no value and 4 means 
they have critical value.  
 
Figure 4.3 shows that Kenya has the highest share of firms belonging to business associations 
while Tanzania has the least. This suggests that there may be more benefits from being a member 
of an association in Kenya compared to the other countries. For example, Kenyan associations 
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could provide better service in terms of lobbying government. More relevant to the study, it may 
be that Kenyan associations are better equipped to deal with disputes over trade credit payments. 
  
Figure 4.3: Share of Firms Belonging to a Business Association (%)
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Figure 4.4 shows that a larger share of firms in Kenya consider business associations to be useful in 
resolving disputes.  Associations carry out this role least in Uganda. This evidence supports the 
hypothesis: courts are least efficient in Kenya and most efficient in Uganda. It appears that 
associations can complement an inefficient court system as a mechanism for dispute resolution.    
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Figure 4.4: Share of Firms Rating Associations as Useful in Resolving 
Disputes(%)
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  Source: World Bank (2002/03), Investment Climate Surveys  
  Kenya (n=210) Uganda (n=141) Tanzania (n=123) 
Hypothesis 3: The availability of collateral has a negative effect on the likelihood that firms use 
trade credit.  
 
Hypothesis 3 is tested by estimating a probit model. The dependant variable is the probability 
that a firm uses trade credit. There is no data on the amount of trade credit. Moreover this 
indicator is likely to suffer from the same problems described for the amount of bank loan in 
chapter 2. Hence, the dependent variable is given by equation (1):  
 
Use Trade Credit    = 1            (1) 
Do Not Use Trade Credit = 0 
 
Table 4.1 shows that most firms in Kenya use trade credit. The use of trade credit is substantially 
less in Uganda and Tanzania.  
 
Table 4.1: Firms with Trade Credit 
  Kenya Uganda Tanzania 
Trade Credit 225 (91%) 178 (60%) 169 (62%) 
No Trade Credit 22 (9%) 121 (40%) 103 (38%) 
Total 247 299 272 
Source: World Bank (2002/03), Investment Climate Surveys 
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The explanatory variables are: 
 
Collateral ownership: Collateral can have a positive or negative impact on trade credit use. A 
negative impact can be registered if trade credit and bank finance are substitutes. In this case 
collateral allows firms better access to bank finance, which reduces their demand for trade credit. 
On the other hand if trade credit and bank finance are complements then collateral will have a 
positive impact on trade credit use. Firms with better access to bank finance through collateral 
will also make more use of trade credit. Collateral is measured using the replacement value of 
machinery and equipment. This is because unlike the replacement value of real estate, this 
variable was found to have a significant positive effect on access to bank loans for Uganda and 
Tanzania in chapter 3.  
 
Access to bank loans: Loans can serve as substitutes for trade credit with respect to the working 
capital needs of firms. At the same time, bank loans and trade credit can be complementary. 
Having a loan may signal to the suppliers of trade credit that the firm has a low credit risk. Also, 
if a credit history is required to obtain trade credit then firms with loans are in a better position. 
This means that the effect of having a bank loan is ambiguous.  
 
Firm age:  Older firms are assumed to have stronger links with their suppliers and to have 
greater reputation. This is expected to give them better access to trade credit. However, older 
firms may have better access to internal sources of finance and hence use trade credit less. Thus 
firm age also has an ambiguous effect.  
 
Firm size: Larger firms are likely to have more established links with suppliers and greater 
market power allowing them greater access to trade credit. On the other hand, like older firms, 
larger firms may also have better access to internal sources of finance. Moreover, chapter 3 
showed that larger firms have better access to bank finance. Size also carries an ambiguous 
effect.  
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Profitability: More profitable firms are in a better position to secure trade credit because the 
likelihood that they will repay is higher relative to less profitable firms. However, profitable 
firms are likely to have less need for trade credit. The effect of profitability is also ambiguous26.  
 
Local ownership: Locally owned firms may enjoy stronger network effects with their suppliers 
compared to foreign owned firms. These firms are expected to have greater usage of trade credit.  
 
Ethnicity:  Empirical evidence on Africa shows that Black entrepreneurs are less likely to secure 
trade credit relative to entrepreneurs from other race groups.  
 
Financial records: Whether or not firms have their financial records audited by an outside 
agency is expected to have a positive impact on access to trade credit by improving information 
available to the supplier.  
 
Education: It is expected that more educated entrepreneurs are in a better position to make a case 
for trade credit.  
 
Region: Regions with a higher level of business activity are likely to be characterized by greater 
use of trade credit. On the other hand firms in these regions are likely to have the greatest access 
to bank finance and may therefore require less trade credit. The main industrial regions in Kenya, 
Uganda and Tanzania are Nairobi, Central and Dar-es-Salaam, respectively. 
 
Industry Differences: Industry dummies are included to account for any unobservable differences 
across industries. For example network effects may be stronger in some sectors, while 
intermediate goods may serve better as collateral in others.  
 
Following from the discussion above, the author estimates equation (2): 
Pr(Use Trade Credit) = F(RVA, L, A, E, PROF, AA, LO, AFR, EDU, I)       (2) 
 
Where RVA, L, A, E, PROF, AA, P, LO, AFR, EDU, I are the replacement value of machinery 
and equipment, access to bank loans, firm age, employment, profitability, audited accounts, local 
ownership, African entrepreneur, education level, and industry dummies respectively.  
                                                
26 Although profitability was only included as a robustness check in chapter 3 due to data limitations, in this chapter 
we include it from the start. This is mainly because we have fewer explanatory variables in this chapter compared to 
chapter 3.   
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The probit estimation is done for only Uganda and Tanzania. There are several reasons for 
focusing on these two countries. The argument that trade credit can alleviate credit constraints 
caused by inadequate collateral requires that the discussion focuses attention on those countries 
where collateral constraints actually exist. Chapters 2 and 3 showed that collateral constraints are 
present in Uganda and Tanzania, but not in Kenya. Secondly, a very large proportion of Kenyan 
firms have access to trade credit. It is Uganda and Tanzania that would benefit from a significant 
increase in the availability of this source of finance.  
 
Thirdly, Uganda and Tanzania have far less access to short term bank finance (i.e. overdraft 
facilities) compared to Kenya. Better access to trade credit in these 2 countries can significantly 
improve the ability of firms to meet their working capital requirements. Fourthly, only in these 2 
countries was collateral important for access to bank finance. This implies that collateral will 
only be important in these 2 countries for the firms decision over whether to obtain bank finance 
or trade credit. Finally, given the large proportion of Kenyan firms that have access to trade 
credit the model is likely to have very low explanatory power for this country. The analysis 
shows that the estimation would be based on 89 nonzero outcomes and only 10 zero outcomes. 
More meaningful results would be obtainable if a larger sample size was available. The results of 
the estimation are given in Table 4.2 below. Like in chapter 3, the estimation obtains the Huber-
White robust estimator. 
 
The effect of collateral on access to trade credit differs strongly between the 2 countries. In 
Tanzania collateral has a negative significant effect. In contrast, collateral has a positive 
significant effect on access to trade credit in Uganda. This means that for Tanzanian firms trade 
credit does alleviate the problem of inadequate collateral for firms with demand for bank finance. 
Thus, trade credit can serve as a substitute for bank loans. However, for Ugandan firms collateral 
appears to enhance not only access to bank finance, but trade credit as well27. The high level of 
information asymmetry in Uganda (see chapter 2 and 3) may be part of the reason for this. Also 
recall from chapter 2 that Uganda was found to have the lowest enforcement costs for overdue 
debt. This would encourage the use of collateral in trade credit arrangements. It also suggests 
that trade credit and bank finance are complementary in Uganda.  
 
                                                
27 This is a surprising result because the literature has not shown that firms ask for collateral when they extend trade 
credit. 
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Table 4.2: Explaining Access to Trade Credit in Uganda and Tanzania. 
 
Uganda        Tanzania       
 
Log of Replacement Value of Assets         0.214*             -0.167*      
                   (1.88)         (-1.89)     
Bank Loan            0.783**        -0.288 
               (2.08)         (-0.71) 
Log Firm Age                 -0.180              -0.163      
               (-0.83)         (-1.03)           
Log Employment           0.146         0.508***       
               (0.67)         (3.20)     
Profitability            -0.011         -0.008 
               (-1.06)         (-0.66)  
Accounts Audited             0.241         0.256           
               (0.55)             (0.62)         
Local Ownership               -0.392           0.857     
               (-0.73)             (1.51)      
African Owner            0.362         -0.035     
               (0.76)             (-0.11)      
Education level of Manager        0.127            0.263      
               (0.33)             (0.77)      
Region             -0.544*        0.477 
               (-1.65)         (1.56) 
Agroindustry                 0.297          -0.298      
               (0.42)         (-0.66)      
Metal                    0.927          -0.209      
               (1.06)         (-0.40)      
Furniture and Wood          0.851           -0.236      
               (1.16)         (-0.46)       
Chemicals                 -0.069         0.723       
               (-0.08)             (1.08)       
Construction Materials              0.123         -0.041        
               (0.16)             (-0.06)          
Paper, Printing & Publishing       0.923         0.815       
               (1.07)             (1.01)       
Constant                 -3.828**        1.821     
               (-2.01)             (1.30)       
Number of Observations             112           118         
Log-Likelihood                   -55.84             -60.09           
Wald  χ2              45.13***         29.17***       
Pseudo R2                0.25                     0.21           
Dependent variable: Probability that a firm uses trade credit. 
** and *** indicate significance at 5 percent and 1 percent respectively. Numbers in parentheses are z statistics. For the 
model to be properly identified the plastics industry dummy is dropped for both countries.  The identification problem 
was explained in detail in chapter 3.  
 
Access to bank loans significantly increases the likelihood that firms use trade credit in Uganda. 
That is, trade credit and bank finance are strong complements (the complementarity is consistent 
with the positive impact of collateral on trade credit use). This implies that having bank finance 
sends a positive signal to the providers of trade credit. In an environment where information 
asymmetry is acute as is the case in Uganda, a credit history with banks appears to improve 
access to trade credit. In contrast, having a bank loan has a negative insignificant effect on trade 
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credit use in the case of Tanzania. This lends further support to the view that bank loans and 
trade credit are substitutes to some extent in Tanzania.  
 
Older firms in both countries are less likely to use trade credit. For both countries firm age has an 
insignificant effect. Larger firms are more likely to use trade credit. In Tanzania the effect of size 
is significant at the 1 percent level, while it is insignificant for Uganda. It may be that size 
proxies for reputation as argued by Isaksson (2002b). This implies that trade credit may not be a 
very effective solution to the financing needs of smaller firms, particularly in the case of 
Tanzania.  
 
Having audited financial accounts has a positive effect on trade credit access in both countries, 
although this effect is insignificant. In chapter 3 it was found that having audited accounts does 
not significantly affect access to bank finance. In order for financial information to have a 
meaningful effect on access to external finance, it may require an improvement in its quality.  
 
Whether the firm is locally owned has a positive insignificant effect on the probability that firms 
use trade credit in Tanzania. In Uganda being locally owned has a negative insignificant effect. 
Being African improves access to trade credit in Uganda, but has a negative impact for Tanzania. 
However for both countries the effect of this variable is insignificant. This means that network 
effects based on ownership structure and ethnicity are weak. The level of education attained by 
the firms manager has a positive insignificant effect in both countries. In the case of Uganda 
being in central region has a significant negative effect on trade credit use. This suggests that 
firms in this region may have better access to bank finance relative to firms in other regions. In 
contrast being in Dar-es-Salaam has a positive insignificant effect. There is no evidence to 
suggest that being in a particular industry is critically important for whether or not firms use 
trade credit.  
 
As in chapter 3, the discussion of marginal probability elasticities and marginal effects is based 
on variables found to be significant in the probit estimation. These are marked with an asterisk in 
Table 4.3. Uganda has 3 significant variables, namely collateral, access to bank loans and 
geographical region. Table 4.3 shows that a 1 percent increase in the value of collateral increases 
the probability of having trade credit by 0.08 percent. Having a bank loan increases the 
likelihood of using trade credit by a fairly large magnitude of 25 percent. Thus, the 
complementarity of bank finance and trade credit appears to be quite strong in Uganda. Being in 
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the central region has a large effect on reducing the probability of using trade credit. In Tanzania 
a 1 percent increase in the value of collateral reduces the probability of using trade credit by 0.06 
percent and a 1 percent increase in size raises the probability of using trade credit substantially, 
by 0.18 percent.  
 
Table 4.3: Marginal Probability Elasticities and Marginal Effects (Trade Credit Use). 
Uganda        Tanzania       
 
Marginal Probability Elasticity 
Log of Replacement Value of Assets         0.078*              -0.058*      
Log Firm Age               -0.065              -0.057           
Log Employment           0.053           0.177*       
Profitability               -0.004          -0.003 
 
Marginal Effect 
Bank Loan            0.250*          -0.105 
Accounts Audited             0.088           0.092                  
Local Ownership                  -0.134             0.229     
African Owner            0.135          -0.012     
Education level of Manager        0.046              0.092      
Region                -0.185*            0.158 
Agroindustry                 0.106          -0.106      
Metal                    0.258           -0.076      
Furniture and Wood          0.265            -0.085          
Chemicals                    -0.025           0.207       
Construction Materials              0.043          -0.014        
Paper, Printing & Publishing       0.256           0.225       
            
Marginal probability elasticity is the derivative of the dependent variable with respect to a continuous explanatory 
variable while holding the other variables constant. Marginal effect is the change in the dependent variable 
associated with a discrete change in a dummy variable from 0 to 1.    
 
Effect of the Legal Environment on Trade Credit Supply 
 
The willingness of firms to supply trade credit is expected to increase if they have a positive 
view about the quality of the legal system. They will be more likely to extend trade credit if they 
expect to recover overdue payments through the courts in an efficient manner. On the other hand, 
if firms feel they are unable to effectively recover overdue payments through the courts, they will 
provide less credit. This argument leads us to the next hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Trade credit supply increases with the efficiency of the court system. 
 
Hypothesis 4 is tested using a probit model. The dependant variable is whether or not the firm 
sells some of its goods on credit as given by equation (3). 
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Sell Goods on Credit   = 1            (3) 
Do Not Sell Goods on Credit = 0 
 
Firm perceptions about the judiciary are used to proxy for the quality of the legal environment. 
Firms were asked the extent to which they felt the judiciary would enforce their property rights 
in business related disputes. Responses ranged from 1 (fully disagree that judiciary will enforce) 
to 6 (fully agree that judiciary will enforce).  A binary variable that takes a value of 1 for firms 
that have confidence in the judiciary and 0 otherwise is constructed. The expectation is that firms 
which have greater confidence in the judiciary will supply more trade credit. With the exception 
of whether or not a firm has its accounts audited and profitability, all explanatory variables from 
the estimation presented in Table 4.2 are retained28.  
 
The rationale for the other explanatory variables included in the model is as follows: Firms with 
bank loans are in a better position to provide trade credit according to the redistribution view. 
Older firms have stronger networks and are thus better positioned to provide credit. Larger firms 
are likely to have more financial resources available for lending to other firms. Due to network 
effects locally owned firms may supply more trade credit. However, these firms may have fewer 
resources than foreign firms. Similarly, African owned firms may wish to provide trade credit 
due to network effects but may be constrained from doing so due to inadequate resources. The 
education level of management will impact a firms ability to assess the viability of a potential 
trade credit recipient. This variable refers to whether or not the firms top manager has had post-
secondary school education. Regions with a higher level of business activity are likely to be 
characterized by greater trade credit supply. Finally, firms in some industries may be better 
positioned to supply trade credit. The results are presented in Table 4.4.  
 
Confidence in the judiciary has a highly significant positive effect on trade credit supply in 
Uganda. This is similar to the findings of Johnson et al (2002a) and supportive of hypothesis 4. 
In chapter 2 it was found that Uganda has the least costly court enforcement. Ugandan firms can 
have confidence in the judiciary because in practice recovering overdue debt is less costly than in 
the other EAC countries. This provides an incentive to increase the supply of trade credit. 
However, for Tanzania one observes an unexpected negative (insignificant) effect. This is 
surprising, implying that firms that rely less on the court system are more likely to supply trade 
credit. It is nevertheless consistent with the relatively small share of Tanzanian firms that use 
                                                
28 Although profitability may affect a firms ability to supply trade credit it is excluded from the model because of the 
underidentification problem. 
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courts to resolve disputes observed in Figure 4.2.  Informal means of resolving disputes may be 
more effective in Tanzania. This result may also be due to data problems.  
 
Table 4.4: Explaining Trade Credit Supply in Uganda and Tanzania. 
 
Uganda        Tanzania       
 
Confidence in the Judiciary            0.601***        -0.326      
                   (2.91)         (-1.03)     
Bank Loan            0.017         0.684* 
               (0.07)         (1.67) 
Log Firm Age                 0.062              -0.008      
               (0.46)         (-0.06)           
Log Employment           0.094         0.174       
               (0.83)         (1.56)            
Local Ownership               -0.545*          0.383     
               (-1.68)             (0.76)      
African Owner            0.015         0.063     
               (0.05)             (0.23)      
Education level of Manager        0.420*            -0.072      
               (1.66)             (-0.26)      
Region             -0.057         -0.059 
               (-0.27)         (-0.24) 
Agroindustry                 -1.045**         0.274      
               (-2.23)         (0.65)      
Metal                    -0.329          0.862*      
               (-0.58)         (1.72)      
Furniture and Wood          -0.601            -0.236      
               (-1.24)         (-0.54)       
Chemicals                  -         0.233       
                -             (0.48)       
Construction Materials              -1.173**        0.126        
               (-2.24)             (0.19)          
Plastics             -0.248                               - 
               (0.32)         - 
Paper, Printing & Publishing       0.067          -       
               (0.11)                -       
Constant                 0.803         0.000     
               (1.16)             (0.00)       
Number of Observations             209           159         
Log-Likelihood                 -118.94             -78.91           
Wald  χ2              39.10***         19.98*       
Pseudo R2                0.14                     0.10           
Dependent variable: Probability that a firm supplies trade credit. 
** and *** indicate significance at 5 percent and 1 percent respectively. Numbers in parentheses are z statistics. For the 
model to be properly identified the chemicals industry dummy is dropped for Uganda, while the plastics and paper 
industry dummies are dropped for Tanzania.  
 
Firms with bank loans are more likely to extend trade credit in both countries. This effect is only 
significant in Tanzania, at the 10 percent level. It implies that the redistribution effect is present 
to some extent. If firms are redistributing bank finance as trade credit, then the benefits to 
improving the legal environment are enhanced. This is because a better legal system improves 
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the likelihood that firms unable to secure bank finance directly receive it indirectly as trade 
credit.  
 
Size and age are insignificant in both countries. Locally owned firms supply significantly less 
trade credit in Uganda. This is a surprising result which is contrary to the assertion of network 
effects.  Local ownership has a positive insignificant effect in Tanzania. In both countries being 
African does not have a meaningful effect on trade credit supply. This finding suggests that 
network effects based on ethnicity are weak in these 2 countries. Educational attainment of 
management has a positive significant effect in Uganda, but is insignificant in Tanzania. This 
suggests that educated managers in Uganda are better at identifying profitable opportunities in 
other firms.  Operating in the main business region has a negative insignificant effect on trade 
credit supply in both countries. Finally, being in the agro and construction industries in Uganda 
has a significant negative effect on whether or not a firm supplies trade credit, while being in the 
metal industry in Tanzania has a positive effect. 
 
Table 4.5 shows the marginal effects of the explanatory variables. As before, the focus of the 
discussion is on variables found to have a significant effect on the dependent variable. These are 
marked with an asterisk. 
 
Table 4.5: Marginal Effects (Trade Credit Supply). 
Uganda        Tanzania       
 
Marginal Effect 
Confidence in Judiciary         0.212*          -0.102 
Bank Loan            0.006            0.160* 
Local Ownership                    0.180*             0.096     
Education level of Manager        0.150*             -0.021      
Region                 -0.021          -0.017     
Agroindustry                     -0.382*            0.076      
Metal                        -0.127             0.184*      
Furniture                 -0.231           -0.071 
Chemicals              -       0.062 
Construction Materials                  -0.440*           0.035          
Plastics                 -0.095       - 
Paper                   0.025       - 
Marginal effect is the change in the dependent variable associated with a discrete change in a dummy variable from 
0 to 1.    
 
Ugandan firms that have confidence in the judiciary are 21 percent more likely to supply trade 
credit. This lends strong support to the view that an efficient court system enhances the availability 
of external finance. Locally owned firms are 18 percent less likely to extend trade credit and the 
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probability that managers with post-secondary education supply trade credit is 15 percent higher 
than for their counterparts. Industry effects are large: firms in the agro and construction industries 
are 38 percent and 44 percent less likely to provide trade credit respectively. In Tanzania firms with 
bank loans are 16 percent more likely to supply trade credit. The implication of this is that the 
redistribution effect is at work in Tanzania. Being in the metal industry is associated with an 18 
percent higher likelihood of providing trade credit.  
 
4.4 Leasing Finance 
 
In this section attention is turned to leasing finance. Because the data on leasing is very limited, 
simple tabular analysis forms the basis of the discussion. To begin, a review of the theoretical 
literature motivating the use of leasing finance and of relevant empirical works is done.  
 
4.4.1  Literature Review 
 
The use of leasing is motivated as a means of addressing high interest rates and collateral 
requirements of bank lending (Gallardo, 1999; El-Gamal et al, 2001; Balkenhol and Schutte, 
2001). In leasing arrangements the asset being leased serves as collateral because it remains in 
the ownership of the lessor for the duration of the lease term (Dossani and Kenney, 2002). Thus 
leasing addresses the problem of inadequate collateral faced by the firm and provides an 
effective security mechanism for the lessor. In a large number of developing countries where 
bank credit is not available to small firms, leasing may be the only form of long term financing 
available to these firms for fixed assets (Bass and Henderson, 2000). According to Havers 
(1999), leasing is likely to be of special interest to manufacturing firms which have a significant 
need for capital equipment.  
 
Leasing is based on the premise that profits are generated by asset use rather than asset 
ownership (Gallardo, 1999). That is, a firm with a positive NPV project should be able to 
undertake an investment on the strength of the expected cash flows, and should not be hindered 
by a lack of assets to pledge as collateral. Leasing is more focused on the lessee’s ability to 
generate cash flow from business operations to service lease payments, rather than the need for 
the lessee to pledge collateral because the lessor-financier retains ownership of the asset during 
the term of the lease. 
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According to Westley (2003), leasing alleviates the problem of contract enforcement associated 
with collateral by providing the lessor with a stronger legal position for equipment seizure and 
sale, compared to bank lending. This is because the lessor owns the leased equipment and as 
such no one else can have a legal claim to it. He argues that leasing eliminates the costs, time 
delays and risks associated with court involvement in enforcing the collateral clause. 
Furthermore, the owner has more flexibility over what to do with the leased asset once it has 
been seized because he owns it, in contrast to an asset that belongs to a defaulting borrower.  
 
Similarly, Balkenhol and Schütte (2001) state that because the leased equipment remains the 
property of the lessor, there are no costs involved in verifying property rights. They also explain 
that in the event that the lessee is negligent, enforcement and repossession are automatic and do 
not require court action. This benefit leads Eisfeldt and Rampini (2005) to suggest that leasing 
may be particularly important in environments where legal enforcement is weak.  
El-Gamal et al (2000) argue that leasing reduces the agency problems associated with moral 
hazard because the cost associated with inspecting the leased object are significantly lower than 
the cost of monitoring the agents activities. However, Eisfeldt and Rampini (2005) explain that 
the separation of ownership and control over the leased equipment can lead to a significant 
agency problem with respect to its care and handling. This cost needs to be weighed against the 
benefit of leasing with regard to repossession of the leased item.  
 
Although repossession is straight forward under leasing, Westley (2003) and Bass and 
Henderson (2000) argue that the legal framework is still important for the effectiveness of 
leasing contracts. A conducive legal environment can be created through specific leasing laws 
that define and recognize the rights and obligations of each party in the leasing contract. 
According to Miceli et al (2001), the agency problems that arise from separating ownership and 
control of the leased item suggest that an efficiently designed lease contract will include aspects 
of property law, contract law, or both.  
 
4.4.2  Empirical Evidence on Leasing Finance 
 
Ang and Peterson (1984) empirically investigate the extent to which leasing is a substitute for 
debt based on a sample of approximately 600 firms. Although theory suggests that leases and 
debt are substitutes, their evidence indicates that leases and debt are complements. Greater use of 
debt is associated with greater use of leasing for each year from 1976 to 1981.  
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Based on a survey of 25 Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs) in Latin America, Westley (2003) 
find that equipment loans and leases account for on average 20.8 percent of overall loan and 
lease portfolios. He finds that although equipment lending is well established in Latin America, 
leasing is still in the early stages of development. Of the 25 MFIs only three were found to have 
leasing programmes in place. 
 
An appraisal of the Grameen Banks leasing operations in Bangladesh is presented by Gallardo 
(1999). The bank leases a wide range of equipment ranging from battery chargers, power looms, 
sugarcane grinders, and mini transport. The default rate is found to be low; 7.12 percent in terms 
of number and 1.47 percent in terms of value of lease contracts. In addition there is a high rate of 
progression from leasing into ownership of equipment.  
 
Havers (1999) presents evidence on equipment leasing by small firms in Pakistan and Tanzania. 
In both countries leasing is found to have the potential to play an important role in assisting 
MSEs to purchase equipment that is ordinarily unaffordable. He finds that in Pakistan the 
Network Leasing Corporation (NLC) has a portfolio of over 1,000 leases having attained 94 
percent financial self sufficiency. NLC has greatly benefited from financial support given by 
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. In Tanzania, a leasing company for womens 
small businesses called SELFINA grew its portfolio to about 850 leases in a period of 3 years. 
However, at the time of Havers survey financial sustainability appeared to be a major concern 
for SELFINA. 
 
In the United Kingdom companies that use leasing are more likely to have tax losses, high debt-
to-equity ratios, and to be relatively large companies (Lasfer and Levis, 1998). Their results also 
show that on the whole companies that use leasing are likely to have high fixed capital 
investment and to be more profitable. Among small firms the decision to lease is determined 
mainly by growth opportunities. Using data from Compustat, Eisfeldt and Rampini (2005) find 
that firms in the smallest decile lease over 46 percent of their capital. In contrast, among firms in 
the largest decile only about 11 percent of equipment is leased. They conclude that leased 
equipment is particularly significant for small firms.  
 
Kisaame (2003) presents the results of a case study of DFCU Leasing Company in Uganda. He 
explains that the leasing market in Uganda, of which DFCU leasing controls over 85 percent is 
still in the embryonic stages. Leasing represents approximately 5 percent of total private sector 
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credit in Uganda as compared to an average of 14 percent in emerging markets. DFCU Leasing 
is mainly involved in providing finance lease products to SMEs between the value of US$25,000 
and US$250,000. Among the key challenges to the leasing market in Uganda is the absence of a 
Leasing Act that specifies the rights and obligations of lessors and lessees. Kisaame also argues 
that improvements to enforcement through the court system would reduce the time and costs 
associated with legal disputes over leased equipment. In addition there is also need to increase 
awareness in the market about the benefits of leasing.  
 
Mutesasira et al (2001) find that there is a large unmet demand for leasing among MSEs in 
Uganda and Tanzania requiring medium term finance in the range of US$1,500 to US$100, 000. 
Given the preference that banks give to larger corporate clients and the MFI focus on the 
economically active poor, MSEs find themselves in what is termed the missing middle.  Their 
evidence suggests that MSEs prefer to lease equipment with the ultimate goal of ownership. The 
transport industry is found to dominate the leasing sector in both countries. They explain this 
observation on the basis of the cross-cutting nature of the transport sector, and the fact that it is 
easier to prove ownership of vehicles which have registration books compared to other assets.  
They also find that due to poor credit history information on entrepreneurs in the MSE sector, 
leasing institutions tend to demand high deposits and collateral requirements as a means of 
mitigating risk. Lessors require deposits of up to 30 percent of the cost of the asset in addition to 
collateral such as real estate and land titles.  
 
4.4.3  Summary of Literature Review on Leasing Finance 
 
According to the theoretical literature leasing finance is able to address the problem of 
inadequate collateral because the leased item serves as collateral. Leasing also mitigates the 
problem of contract enforcement because the lessor retains ownership. However in practice 
information asymmetry can lead to substantial collateral as is the case in Uganda and Tanzania. 
Furthermore, inadequate legal frameworks characterized by an absence of proper leasing laws 
and inefficient courts can make the recovery of a leased item very costly for the lessor.  
 
Although some discussion on how the legal environment affects leasing finance in East Africa is 
presented by Kisaame (2003) and Mutesasira (2001) this is done without reference to any 
particular indicators of the legal system. In order to deduce more clearly how the legal system 
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affects leasing finance it is necessary to assess the use of leasing as it relates to particular 
indicators of the legal system.  
 
4.4.4 Analysis of Leasing Finance 
 
The analysis is based on three hypotheses. The limited data implies that the discussion is very 
tentative. Accordingly, findings or inferences drawn here should be considered preliminary.  
 
Hypothesis 5: More leasing takes place in an environment where the lessors rights are better 
defined. 
 
Rationale: Given that the leased item serves as collateral in a leasing agreement, more clearly 
defined lessor rights make repossession in the event of non-payment easier. Chapter 2 showed 
using graphical and tabular presentations, that the correlation between the written law and access 
to credit appears stronger than the correlation between enforcement costs and access to credit. 
Thus, hypothesis 5 focuses on the written law rather than enforcement.  
 
Hypothesis 6:  Assets that are less specialized are more likely to be leased.  
 
Rationale: It is easier to sell assets that are not specialized in the event of default. It is likely that 
the factors adversely affecting the performance of a firm in a particular industry are also at work 
in other firms in the same industry. Shocks are often industry-wide in nature. This means that 
firms with specialized machinery may not be able to depend on their competitors to provide a 
secondary market for their goods. At the same time, selling equipment to firms in other 
industries will involve a large discount because these firms are unable to value the assets 
accurately and need compensation for the learning costs required for them to be able to utilize 
the machinery.   
 
Table 4.3 shows the number of firms that undertake leasing in the 3 countries. One observes that 
leasing is used much less than bank finance.  In particular, there is very little leasing of 
machinery and equipment. One would have expected more leasing of machinery and equipment 
in Tanzania and Uganda where collateral constraints limit access to bank finance. However, as 
Mutesasira (2001) points out, leasing in East Africa relies heavily on collateral, thus reducing the 
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ability of firms to substitute it for bank finance.  Leasing of land and buildings is more common, 
and is significantly higher is Kenya compared to Uganda and Tanzania.  
 
Table 4.3: Number of Firms Leasing Machinery & Equipment and Land & Buildings  
  Kenya  Uganda Tanzania 
Machinery & 
Equipment  5  6  5 
Land & Buildings   40  18  24 
Source: World Bank (2002/03), Investment Climate Surveys  
Kenya (n=248) Uganda (n=289) Tanzania (n=261) 
As already stated, the limited data imply that only make tentative statements about hypothesis 4 
can be made. Given that the most leasing takes place in Kenya, it appears that better defined 
lessor rights may promote greater use of leasing finance. This is shown in Figure 4.5.  
 
Figure 4.5: Leasing of Land & Buildings versus Legal Content
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Source: World Bank (2002/03), Investment Climate Surveys and World Bank (2005),  
Doing Business in 2005 Database 
Kenya (n=248) Uganda (n=289) Tanzania (n=261) 
The amount of leasing has no meaningful correlation with enforcement costs. As Figure 4.6 
shows, Kenya has the highest enforcement costs but the most leasing. On the other hand Uganda 
has the lowest enforcement costs but the least leasing activity. Factors raised in chapters 1 and 2 
 the relative size of the Kenyan economy, the higher level of development of the Kenyan 
financial system and the presence of larger firms in Kenya  are likely to explain this 
observation.  
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Figure 4.6: Leasing of Land & Buildings versus Cost of Enforcement
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Hypothesis 6 has some support from Table 4.3. More firms lease land and buildings in all 3 
countries. These assets are not specialized like machinery and equipment. Furthermore land and 
buildings tend to appreciate in value over time, whereas machinery and equipment depreciate 
rapidly in SSA partly because of the thinness of secondary markets.  
 
Hypothesis 7: Better defined legal content will be associated with leasing contracts of longer 
duration.  
 
Rationale: Leasing firms will be more willing to allow firms to use leased equipment for longer 
periods in an environment where the rights of lessors are well defined.  Better defined lessor 
rights reduce uncertainty over the leased asset.  
 
Table 4.4 shows that the duration of leasing contracts varies greatly across the 3 countries. 
Leasing contracts for both land and buildings are longer in Kenya compared to Uganda and 
Tanzania. In Kenya and Uganda the leasing period for land is much longer than it is for 
buildings. However in Tanzania the duration is fairly similar for both assets. Overall the duration 
of leasing contracts is by far shorter in Tanzania than in the other 2 countries.  
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Table 4.4: Duration of Lease (years) 
  Kenya  Uganda Tanzania 
Land  48 25 1.71 
Buildings 7.29 2.33 1.3 
Source: World Bank (2002/03), Investment Climate Surveys  
Kenya (n=248) Uganda (n=289) Tanzania (n=261) 
There may be other factors driving what is observed in Table 4.4. For example, it may be the 
case that the longer duration of leasing contracts in Kenya is a reflection of the market power 
that the relatively larger firms in that country command.  Nevertheless, Table 4.4 does support 
the hypothesis that better quality legal content is associated with leasing contracts of longer 
duration. Based on the evidence in chapter 2 about the superior legal content found in Kenya, it 
is plausible to assume that the legal rights over land and buildings are more clearly defined in 
Kenya compared to Uganda and Tanzania. Leases of longer duration may give firms a greater 
sense of security and therefore have a positive impact on productivity. It is also possible that 
firms in Uganda and Tanzania are likely to have greater transactions costs associated with more 
frequent renewal of current leases or signing new ones. This could discourage leasing by firms in 
these countries.  
 
4.5 Conclusions 
 
Although trade credit does not depend on the collateral mechanism, courts are important in 
resolving payment disputes between buyers and their suppliers. Where court enforcement is 
costly business associations can be useful in settling these disputes. Furthermore, non-bank 
sources of finance are expected to meet the financing needs of firms that are unable to meet the 
collateral requirements of banks. In a weak legal environment the collateral mechanism becomes 
more costly and thus non-bank sources of finance have a potentially critical role to play. This 
chapter attempted to empirically analyze the relationship between the legal system on one hand, 
and trade credit and leasing finance on the other. To the best knowledge of the author this is the 
first attempt to do so at the micro level for a group of SSA countries.  
 
It was found that high enforcement costs do not deter the use of courts to settle disputes 
associated with trade credit. Rather, the demand for court services to settle disputes increases 
with the quality of the written law. The observation that courts in Kenya take a significantly 
longer period to settle disputes may be a result of this higher demand compared to Uganda and 
Tanzania. Faster resolution of disputes in Uganda and Tanzania may mask the fact that there is 
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significantly less to enforce in these countries. Furthermore, courts are likely to be a more 
effective deterrent to opportunistic behaviour relative to non-court mechanisms. Tanzania which 
has the least use of courts was also found to have the greatest share of sales resulting in overdue 
payments. In contrast, Uganda which has the most efficient court system among the 3 countries 
has the least problems with overdue payments. Thus, courts appear to be an effective deterrent to 
opportunistic behaviour when they function efficiently. The analysis also showed that business 
associations can play a role in resolving disputes over trade credit. These associations are of 
greater value when the court mechanism is more costly. The strengthening of business 
associations as a complementary mechanism through which disputes are resolved can have a 
positive effect on the availability of trade credit.  
 
The chapter investigated the impact of collateral on trade credit use in Uganda and Tanzania with 
a probit model. The results indicate that having collateral has a significant positive effect on the 
use of trade credit in Uganda. This implies that trade credit may not be a meaningful substitute 
for bank finance in the case of firms with inadequate collateral in Uganda. This is in contrast 
with the arguments of among others, Fafchamps (1997) and Gallardo (1997), who argue that 
trade credit alleviates the problem of inadequate collateral. Rather, it appears that trade credit and 
bank finance in Uganda are complements as it was found that firms with bank loans are more 
likely to use trade credit. However, in Tanzania firms with collateral are less likely to use trade 
credit. This significant negative effect of collateral on trade credit use implies that trade credit 
has the potential to serve as a meaningful substitute for bank finance.  
 
The results showed that perceived efficiency of the courts has a significant effect on the supply 
of trade credit in Uganda. Firms that have confidence in the judiciary to enforce their property 
rights are more likely to provide trade credit. The marginal effect of this confidence was found to 
be fairly large. It appears that the relatively low enforcement costs in Uganda can act as an 
incentive for firms to extend trade credit. In contrast, confidence in the judiciary is negatively 
related to trade credit supply in Tanzania. This surprising finding is consistent with the low share 
of Tanzanian firms who make use of the courts. The supply of trade credit also appears to be 
positively affected by access to bank finance, particularly in Tanzania. This supports the 
redistribution view, and shows that strengthening the legal environment can allow firms unable 
to access bank finance directly, to do so indirectly through trade credit.  
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This chapter also sought to shed light on how the legal environment affects the use of leasing 
finance. It was found that the use of leasing finance in the EAC is minimal. Similar to Kisaame 
(2003), the conclusion of this chapter is that leasing is still in the embryonic stage in the EAC. 
The limited evidence showed that more leasing takes place in an environment where the rights of 
lessors are better defined. In addition, there is more leasing of assets that are not industry 
specific. This is partly because of the difficulties associated with selling specialised equipment, 
particularly in thin secondary markets. It was found that better quality legal content is associated 
with leasing contracts of longer duration. These longer contracts may positively affect 
productivity and could have lower transactions costs relative to shorter ones.  
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CHAPTER 5: PROPERTY RIGHTS, FINANCE CHANNELS AND INVESTMENT 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In the context of SSA, little is known at the micro level about how the legal environment affects 
the use of financial resources. This is an important gap in the literature given that economic 
growth is dependant not only on whether firms have access to financial resources, but also on the 
extent to which firms undertake productive investment opportunities. Chapter 1 highlighted a 2 
part transmission mechanism through which the legal system operates. In the first part a good 
quality legal system improves access to external finance. In the second part the legal 
environment affects the decision to use financial resources for investment, whether those 
financial resources are externally or internally generated. This chapter analyzes the second part 
of the transmission mechanism. That is, this chapter investigates how the property rights 
environment affects fixed investment.  
 
Available empirical evidence suggests that the rights of firms over the investments they 
undertake are of significant importance for investment and economic growth (Johnson et al, 
2002b; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). When property rights are weak, the likelihood that 
government officials and other powerful groups will expropriate productive assets increases. The 
same holds for the returns generated by these assets. Less investment will take place when firms 
are uncertain about their claim to their investment and the returns they generate. Knight (1971: 
319) sums up this idea with the following words,  
 
The social justification of private ownership is that the coupling of control of resources with 
enjoyment of the fruits of their use is supposed to give an incentive to use the goods effectively in 
production. 
 
Internal finance is critical for investment. Although the first part of the transmission mechanism 
focuses solely on how the legal system affects access to external finance, empirical evidence 
indicates that investment in both developed and developing countries is financed mainly through 
internal sources (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). This means that the property rights environment 
affects investment not only through the external finance channel, but also by influencing 
decisions that firms make over internally generated funds.  Arguably, the property rights 
environment may influence the use of internally generated funds more than the use of loans: 
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given moral hazard firms are likely to be more concerned about recovering their own money that 
repaying a loan.  
 
The arguments forwarded by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) suggest that the effectiveness of the 
legal system in protecting the property rights of private agents is compromised by corruption. 
Similarly, Acemoglu and Verdier (1998) argue that enforcing property rights is only possible 
when some fraction of public officials do not accept bribes. This indicates that more corruption 
may lead to weaker property rights. According to Aidt (2003) corruption will be found where the 
incentives in political, legal and administrative institutions lead to the exploitation of 
discretionary power for the extraction of rents. Thus, the incidence of corruption is an indicator 
of the property rights environment. When the incidence of corruption is so high as to 
significantly affect the governments ability to enforce contracts, investment is likely to be 
affected. In the context of SSA corruption has been found to be a significant deterrent to 
investment (Gyimah-Brempong, 2002). 
 
Micro level literature on the relationship between property rights and investment in the context 
of SSA is limited. It is the aim of this chapter to improve the understanding of this relationship 
using micro data from the EAC.  To the best knowledge of the author this chapter is the first 
detailed investigation into how property rights affect investment by manufacturing firms in SSA. 
Compared with other regions SSA has a poor legal environment characterized by high levels of 
corruption, a weak judiciary and inadequately defined property rights. Although work has been 
done demonstrating that weak institutions adversely affect investment in Africa (Collier and 
Gunning, 1999; Mlambo and Oshikoya, 2001), not much is known about the role of specific 
institutions.  
 
According to Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) much more work is needed to understand how 
property rights institutions affect investment and economic growth at both the micro and macro 
level. Furthermore, previous micro level studies that have examined the importance of external 
finance for investment have not placed much emphasis on the role of the institutional 
environment. The analysis in this chapter falls under the investment climate approach (see for 
example Dollar et al, 2005). This approach uses micro level data to investigate the institutional 
determinants of firm growth, investment, and productivity in developing countries. It is expected 
that this chapter will add to the growing literature in this emerging area.  
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5.2 Literature Review 
 
This chapter draws on literature in two main areas. First, investment is motivated on the basis of 
several theories. These include neoclassical theory, financial explanations which encompass the 
role of asymmetric information, and the option value approach. The investment climate approach 
is not a theory in itself, but it does place strong emphasis on institutional issues such as property 
rights and corruption. Second, the chapter draws on literature that examines the effect of 
corruption on investment. This is important given the close relationship between corruption and 
property rights. However, before considering how corruption affects investment, it is useful to 
also explore what leads to corruption.  
 
5.2.1 Theories of Investment 
 
Neoclassical Determinants of Investment 
 
Neoclassical investment theory assumes that expected demand for real output has a positive 
effect on investment. Higher investment in response to expectations about future demand is 
referred to as the accelerator effect. Neoclassical theory also focuses on the cost of capital as a 
key determinant of investment (Jorgenson, 1963). A firms desired capital stock is found by 
equating the marginal product and user cost. Investment is expected to decline in a high interest 
rate environment. Another variant of neoclassical theory due to Tobin (1969) assumes that the 
adjustment costs of changing the capital stock are convex. This approach focuses on the ratio of 
the market value of a unit of capital to its replacement cost, known as Tobins q. 
 
Financial Determinants of Investment 
 
In a neoclassical framework firms and investors have symmetric information about projects and 
financial markets function efficiently. In reality however, firms are better informed about the 
quality of their projects. Investors will not fund every positive NPV project because of the 
unequal spread of information. Some firms will be unable to pursue productive investment 
opportunities because of inadequate finance. Financial intermediaries play a unique role of 
reducing information asymmetry and channeling financial resources to groups without access to 
internal finance (Diamond, 1984, 1991; Boyd and Prescott, 1986). Furthermore, financial 
intermediaries direct financial resources to high return projects (Levine and Zervos, 1998; 
Levine et al, 2000). In the context of developing countries where information problems are acute, 
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improved financial information can have a meaningful impact on investment. As a result of their 
specialized role, financial intermediaries (banks in particular) supply the bulk of external finance 
that firms use for investment (Gorton and Winton, 2003).  
 
Although financial intermediaries are able to alleviate information asymmetry, in reality the bulk 
of finance for investment is generated internally (see for example Mayer, 1990). The large costs 
associated with alleviating adverse selection and moral hazard can be avoided by relying on 
retained earnings to finance investment. To this end, Myers and Majluf (1984) show that firms 
have a pecking order of financing whereby internal sources are the most preferred source of 
finance, followed by debt, and finally when a firm exhausts its debt capacity it resorts to equity.  
In their model investors in stocks are unable to distinguish between good and bad opportunities. 
This implies that investors will discount the price they are willing to pay for good shares. As a 
result companies with good prospects do not issue shares, as it implies settling for an 
undervaluation of their stock. Other authors who have used the asymmetric information 
framework to show the relevance of internal finance for fixed investments include Bernanke and 
Gertler (1990), and Calomiris and Hubbard (1990). The implication of asymmetric information is 
that firms with greater cash flow will be better positioned to pursue investment.  
 
Policy Determinants of Investment 
 
Government policies can have a positive or negative effect on investment. Crowding out of 
domestic investment occurs when increased government consumption raises interest rates, which 
reduces the pool of profitable projects (Keynes, 1937). Higher government spending financed by 
borrowing from the domestic financial sector also reduces the amount of funds available for 
lending to the private sector. Governments in developing countries have a record of imposing 
strong regulations on the financial sector. This is partly a way of ensuring financial institutions 
give the public sector preference over private agents with respect to borrowing of funds. On the 
other hand, government spending can crowd in private investment (see Blejer and Khan, 1984) if 
it improves infrastructure or stimulates demand. In developing countries where infrastructure is 
relatively poor, the crowding in effect can have a significant role to play in stimulating economic 
activity.    
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Option Value Approach to Investment 
 
In the last two decades an alternative view of investment called the option value approach has 
emerged. A comprehensive discussion of this approach is provided by Dixit and Pindyk (1994) 
and Abel et al (1996). The option value approach emphasizes three key features that were not 
explored in previous literature. First, investment in fixed capital is partly or completely 
irreversible. The initial cost of investment is to some degree sunk because it cannot be fully 
recovered by selling the capital in secondary markets. Second, there is uncertainty about the 
future returns of investment decisions. Investors can at best attach probabilities to output and 
capital prices, and future interest rates. Finally, the decision to invest can be delayed giving the 
firm an opportunity to acquire more information about uncertain variables. The optimal 
investment decision balances the value of exercising the option to wait for new information with 
the cost of postponing investment measured in terms of foregone returns.  
 
The Investment Climate Approach 
 
According to Smith and Hallward-Driemeier (2005) one of the new frontiers of economics is the 
analysis of growth from a microeconomic standpoint. This places firms as the engine of growth 
rather than the aggregate measures of macroeconomics. Dollar et al (2005) define the investment 
climate as the institutional, policy, and regulatory environment in which firms operate. It is the 
factors that determine how much reaping will follow the sowing process. They explain that the 
idea of the investment climate has a strong link to what the macroeconomic literature refers to as 
high quality institutions.  
 
The investment climate also includes the physical infrastructure, geographic features, and human 
resources which influence the efficiency of firms (Eifert et al, 2005).  Similarly, Phillips (2006) 
states that the investment climate has two components. These are governance and infrastructure. 
Governance refers to characteristics such as corruption and the quality of the judicial system. 
Infrastructure refers to hard infrastructure (for example roads and bridges) and soft infrastructure 
(for example telephone and internet facilities).  
 
A key contribution of this approach is the evidence it provides on how institutions actually 
influence firm behaviour. The investment climate approach is not a theory in itself, but rather 
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provides a useful tool for directly testing the key determinants of firm performance at the micro 
level.  
 
5.2.2  Causes of Corruption 
 
The definition of corruption in chapter 1 shows that the prevalence of corrupt practices hinges 
strongly on the opportunistic behaviour of public officials. Why do these officials choose to 
misuse their positions for private gain? In this section some of the theoretical reasons behind 
corruption are reviewed. This gives context to the measures of corruption that will be used in the 
empirical analysis. These measures are based on the individual experience of firms with corrupt 
public officials. Furthermore, because corruption directly affects the quality of property rights, 
an examination of its causes is beneficial to the study.  
 
The Institutional Environment  It was stated in the introduction that corruption is to a large 
extent a result of the poor quality of institutions that facilitate economic activity. For example, 
Treisman (2000) explains that corruption will be more prevalent in countries with weak legal 
systems. He states that the probability that public officials will be caught and punished increases 
with the quality of the legal system. Where strong protection and opportunities for recourse are 
offered to private agents affected by corrupt acts, less corruption will take place.  Another aspect 
of the institutional environment mentioned by Bardhan (1997) is the design of the permit and 
license system. The more elaborate this system is, the more opportunities public officials have to 
abuse their positions for personal benefit.  
 
Enhancement of Efficiency  This view is closely related to the institutional motivation for 
corruption. If the institutional framework is poor, corruption is viewed by some as a means of 
enhancing efficiency (Leff, 1964; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). According to this view corruption 
allows private agents to bypass poorly designed government policies and red tape. It is 
considered to be a rational response to government failures. These arguments are presented 
formally in the queue model of Lui (1985). In this model a bureaucrat is responsible for 
allocating licenses to individuals that queue to obtain them. The individuals have an aversion to 
queuing. This aversion varies across individuals but is unobserved by the bureaucrat. Licenses 
are allocated on the principle that those who are willing and able to pay a high bribe are served 
first. Bribes show the value individuals place on not queuing, and the bureaucrat gives preference 
to those who desire to have fast service.  
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However, According to Aidt (2003) several factors make efficient corruption an unsatisfactory 
framework for analysis. It is difficult to justify that corruption actually enhances efficiency. 
Corrupt transactions are secret and thus have no characteristics of a competitive bid. Moreover, 
efficiency is unlikely to be attained given the use to which revenues obtained through corruption 
are put to. Revenues end up in the pockets of public officials rather than being used or the 
provision of public services or to address distortionary taxes. While the arguments of Aidt are 
valid, corruption as analyzed by Liu can potentially enhance the speed of doing business and 
consequently the ability of firms to undertake profitable investment opportunities.  
 
Poor Remuneration  It has also been argued that corruption is a result of low salaries earned by 
public officials. This rationale for corruption is based on the role of efficiency wages as a 
punishment or enforcement mechanism (Becker, 1968; Becker and Stigler, 1974). Relative to 
wages earned by workers in the private sector public officials are poorly compensated. 
Rijckeghem and Weder (1997) explain that low salaries force public officials to engage in 
corrupt practices as a means of supplementing their income. On the other hand, higher salaries 
can deter corruption because getting caught and punished implies substantial loss. Part of the 
challenge of addressing corruption in this context is that corruption may be viewed as a 
sustainable income source, and hence its root cause (low salaries), remain unchanged.  
 
Acemoglu and Verdier (1998) develop a model explaining the inter-relationship between 
property right enforcement and corruption. In their model contracts are incomplete and thus 
government must actively undertake enforcement if private agents are to confidently pursue 
investments based on contractual agreements.  Government employees are paid efficiency wages 
to reduce the incentive for them to engage in corrupt practices. However, such high wages are 
costly. They find that too much corruption tends to destroy property rights incentives, but 
preventing all corruption is likely to be too costly. Moreover, public sector workers tend to be 
misallocated talent because the rents they seek attract agents with no comparative advantage in 
the sector. In their analysis it may be optimal to allow some corruption and not enforce property 
rights fully.  
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5.2.3  Empirical Evidence on Investment, Corruption and Property Rights 
 
Macro Evidence  
 
Earlier empirical studies on SSA examined investment from a macroeconomic perspective. They 
were conducted mainly in the form of single country time series studies. For example Ghura 
(1999) finds that in Cameroon the effect of private investment on economic growth for the 
period 1963-96 was highly significant. In the case of Zimbabwe, Jenkins (1998) finds that 
investment is significantly constrained by inadequate finance and external debt.  Macroeconomic 
data has also been used to undertake cross country studies (for example Kumar and Mlambo, 
1995; Hadjimichael and Ghura, 1995; Mlambo and Oshikoya, 2001). These studies indicate 
macroeconomic factors such as inflation, fiscal policy, the exchange rate, and uncertainty about 
the policy environment significantly affect aggregate investment levels in SSA.  
 
Ndikumana (2000) builds on the time series and cross sectional studies by analyzing a panel of 
30 SSA countries for the period 1970-95. He examines the relationship between four indicators 
of financial development and private investment. His results show that financial development has 
a significant positive effect on private investment. Growth in per capita GDP also has a positive 
effect on investment in accordance with the accelerator effect. He also finds that the debt stock, 
the black market premium, and inflation have a negative impact on investment. Using a similar 
approach for a sample of 99 developed and developing countries Ndikumana (2005) also finds 
that financial development positively affects domestic investment. The accelerator effect is again 
found to be present for this larger group of countries. Although panel estimation is a notable 
improvement over cross sectional and time series studies, Ndikumana concedes that it still leaves 
questions that cannot be answered with aggregate data. For example, it may be interesting to 
examine how investment behaviour differs between small and large firms, or across different 
sectors.  
 
Gyimah-Brempong and Traynor (1999) examine how political instability affects growth and 
investment for a group of 39 African countries. They define political instability as situations, 
activities or patterns of political behaviour that threaten to change or actually change the political 
system in a non-constitutional way. Their results show that political instability has a significant 
negative effect on economic growth and capital accumulation. The negative effect on investment 
holds for the current period and inter-temporally.  
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Attempts to empirically measure the effects of corruption on investment have largely been in the 
form of cross-country studies. Mauro (1995) presents the first examination of how corruption 
impacts investment using a sample of 67 countries. He utilizes a corruption index provided by 
Business International (BI) and finds that corruption has a significant negative effect on the ratio 
of private investment to GDP. Keefer and Knack (1995) find concurring results when they 
include corruption with other explanatory variables to form a single index of institutional quality. 
With an expanded sample of 94 countries and using a newer corruption measure provided by the 
Political Risk Service (PRS), Mauro (1997) provides further support to his earlier results. 
Similarly Brunetti, Kisunko and Weder (1997) also present cross-country evidence showing that 
corruption negatively affects the ratio of investment to GDP. 
 
Using panel data on a group of African countries Gyimah-Brempong (2002) investigates the 
effects of corruption on economic growth. His results show that corruption has a direct and 
indirect significant negative impact on economic growth in Africa. He finds that a 1 percentage 
point increase in corruption decreases the growth rate of GDP by between 0.75 and 0.90 
percentage points per year and per capita income by between 0.39 and 0.41 percentage points. 
Results of his accelerator model show that corruption indirectly affects economic growth by 
significantly reducing investment in physical capital.  
 
The effects of instability and uncertainty on investment in Africa are examined by Serven 
(1997). He explains that in the context of Africa, uncertainty to a large extent refers to imperfect 
credibility of policy reforms. A lack of confidence in the policy environment can be seen in a 
weak and delayed investment response because investors are not confident that reforms will be 
sustained. Macroeconomic indicators of uncertainty include high inflation rates, large public 
deficits, and exchange rate overvaluation. Instability refers more to the effects of an 
unpredictable political climate. Factors affecting the degree of political instability include 
property rights, ethnic fractionalization, and income inequality. Using cross country data Serven 
(1997) finds that high inflation and weak property rights are negatively related to aggregate 
investment in Africa. He concludes that the correction of macroeconomic imbalances and 
institutional reforms can play an important role in stimulating investment.  
 
Macroeconomic studies have also shown that public sector investment has an important role to 
play for growth and investment in developing countries. This means that the crowding-in effect 
is present in these countries. Based on pooled data for a group of 24 developing countries, Blejer 
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and Khan (1984) find that the trend component of real public sector investment has a positive 
effect on private investment. They state that this is consistent with the argument that 
infrastructural investment complements private investment. These authors also find that the 
accelerator effect is present in the group of countries they examined.  
 
More recently, Erden and Holcombe (2005) have found evidence showing that public investment 
complements private investment in a panel of developing countries. They find that on average a 
10 percent increase in public investment is associated with a 2 percent increase in private 
investment. In contrast, their results also show that in developed countries public investment 
crowds out private investment. Luintel and Mavrotas (2005) examine the determinants of 
investment for a group of 24 low-income and middle-income countries. They find that countries 
with higher real income per capita experience more crowding out than countries with lower real 
per capita income.  
 
With regard to SSA, infrastructure is significantly less than in other developing regions (Collier 
and Gunning, 1999). They also state that the quality of infrastructure is lower although its price 
is significantly higher. These views are reiterated by Hernandez-Cata (2000). He states that the 
cost of private investment in Africa is increased by the poor quality of infrastructure, particularly 
communications and electric power. He argues that inadequate investment in infrastructure is a 
result of insufficient budget allocations, fraudulent diversion of public funds, and corrupt 
management.  
 
Micro Evidence 
 
There is a growing literature using microeconomic data to explain investment in SSA. The 
earlier firm level studies emphasized the impact of profitability on a firms investment decision. 
Bigsten et al (1999) examine manufacturing investment in four African countries. They find that 
profitability has a significant positive effect on firm investment. Their findings show that 
although profit rates in African manufacturing are high, investment rates are extremely low (with 
a median of close to zero). They attribute the low investment primarily to high capital costs. 
They also state that the high profit rates are consistent with the argument that investment in SSA 
is constrained by macroeconomic instability. Gunning and Mengistae (2001) also find that 
profitability is an important determinant of investment in African manufacturing. They argue that 
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the high rate of return is a result of the risk faced by firms. However their data gave no direct 
measure of risk that could be used to test this view.  
 
In more recent times the analysis of firm behaviour has been conducted in the framework of what 
is called the investment climate. Although the Investment Climate Assessment (ICA) surveys 
have been done for several developing and transition economies, academic research using this 
framework is still limited. Johnson et al (2002b) examine how property rights affect the share of 
profits reinvested by a group of 5 Eastern European countries. They measure property rights 
based on responses to questions about whether firms make unofficial payments for government 
services, licenses, and specific services such as renewing of business registration and tax 
inspection. Firms also indicate whether or not courts can enforce contracts. They find that weak 
property rights discourage investment even when firms have access to bank loans. That is, when 
property rights are taken into account they find no evidence showing that access to bank finance 
leads to a higher reinvestment rate. Their results show that entrepreneurs with the most secure 
property rights invest almost 40 percent more than those with the least secure property rights.  
 
Claessens and Laeven (2003) examine how property rights affect the allocation of investable 
resources. Their study is based on industry specific data for a group of 44 developed and 
developing countries. They define property rights as the degree of protection given to the return 
of assets against powerful competitors. This definition is in contrast to the focus placed on the 
behaviour of public officials commonly found in the literature. Nevertheless, they find that 
insecure property rights leads to suboptimal asset allocation and lower growth, particularly in 
new firms. Their results suggest that this effect is economically as significant as the impact of 
inadequate finance. 
  
Based on firm level data for a group of 27 African countries McArthur and Teal (2002) 
empirically examine the impact of corruption on firm performance. They find that corruption has 
a significant negative effect on firm productivity. They also find that firms operating in 
economies where bribes are prevalent are on average only a third as productive as firms 
operating in bribe-free economies.   Dollar et al (2005) investigate how the investment climate 
affects firm performance in Bangladesh, China, Ethiopia and Pakistan. They find that proximity 
to major markets and access to overdraft facilities have a positive effect on the growth rate of 
fixed assets. On the other hand, the number of times the business operation is inspected by 
government departments has a negative effect on the growth rate of fixed assets.  
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One aspect of investment that has received little attention in the context of SSA is the role of 
internal finance. This may be as a result of inadequate data. However, empirical studies from 
based on developed countries have shown that cash flow is an important determinant of 
investment. These include the pioneering work of Fazzari et al (1988) and Hubbard et al (1993). 
The findings of these authors suggest that cash flow is more important for firms that are likely to 
face capital market imperfections. Carpenter and Petersen (2002) and Caggese (2005) show that 
internal finance is a more serious constraint for small firms. Given the thinness of equity 
markets, the large share of small firms, and the acuteness of asymmetric information that 
characterizes countries in SSA, cash flow is likely to be important for investment.  
   
5.2.4  Summary of Literature Review 
 
Macroeconomic stability and access to finance are critical for investment in SSA. Expectations 
about growth in demand are also important for investment. Macro evidence has also shown that 
weak institutions and poor infrastructure negatively affect investment. Furthermore, the macro 
evidence shows that corruption negatively impacts on investment. However, analyzing 
investment at the aggregate level does not adequately explain the incentives that will lead to 
higher investment rates. Firm level data makes it possible to examine the micro underpinnings of 
investment in SSA. Earlier micro literature revealed that although profitability in African 
manufacturing is very high, investment rates are extremely low. Macroeconomic instability and 
high risk have been forwarded as explanations for this observation. Firm level evidence from 
developed countries has shown that cash flow is strongly correlated with investment. Due to data 
limitations such empirical evidence is lacking for SSA. However, the characteristics of firms and 
financial markets in SSA countries suggest that cash flow will be a significant determinant of 
whether or not firms can pursue investment opportunities. 
 
More recently the focus at the micro level has turned to the importance of institutional factors for 
investment and firm performance. Empirical evidence shows that secure property rights have a 
significant impact on investment in Eastern Europe, and that corruption has a negative effect on 
productivity in Africa. However, the empirical evidence on Africa based on the investment 
climate approach is still limited. In particular, given the relative weakness of legal institutions in 
SSA, examining how property rights affect investment is an important exercise.  
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5.3 The Transmission Mechanism 
 
Figure 5.1 shows the key relationships that constitute the transmission mechanism in the study. 
The legal environment can affect firms ability to invest at 2 stages. First, a better quality legal 
environment can positively affect the availability of external finance. This dissertation has 
argued that access to credit is improved under a good quality legal environment as a result of the 
protection and enforcement of creditor rights. Some supporting evidence was obtained in 
chapters 2, 3 and 4.  
 
Figure 5.1: Some Key Relationships  
 
                        
 
Direct Effect 
 
                        Conditional Effect 
 
 
At the second stage of the transmission mechanism the legal environment has a conditional effect 
on investment. Firms have greater confidence to channel both internally and externally generated 
funds into investments if their property rights are better protected29.Access to external finance 
                                                
29 Note that for the transmission mechanism indicators of conditional effect via internal finance, the broken 
arrows flow from the legal environment through internal finance to investment. This is so because, unlike 
external finance, which is largely dependent on creditors rights (a legal environment factor), internal finance 
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and the availability of internal finance also have a direct effect on investment. Irrespective of the 
legal environment, it is anticipated that firms which have access to bank loans and those that 
have a larger pool of internally generated funds will invest more.  
 
5.4 Measuring Property Rights  
 
The ICA data gives indicators of the property rights environment in the EAC. Firms were asked 
the extent to which they felt the judiciary would enforce their property rights in business related 
disputes. Responses ranged from 1 (fully disagree that judiciary will enforce) to 6 (fully agree 
that judiciary will enforce). Table 5.1 shows that Uganda has the highest share of firms who have 
confidence in the judiciary to enforce their property rights. Tanzania has by far the lowest share. 
This is consistent with the finding in chapter 2 that Tanzania has the weakest legal content. This 
low confidence in the judiciary may reflect the fact that the property rights being enforced are 
poorly defined to begin with. The socialist history of Tanzania is likely to be a determining 
factor with regard to how the law treats ownership of property.  
 
Table 5.1: Property Rights in the EAC 
  Kenya  Uganda Tanzania 
Feel judiciary will enforce property rights (%) 22.7 35.5 17.7 
Feel corruption is serious obstacle (%) 70.9 35.7 50.0 
Make unofficial payments (%) 57.7 66.3 51.1 
Share of contract value paid to officials (%) 7.48 3.56 3.86 
Source: World Bank (2002/03), Investment Climate Surveys  
Kenya (n=269) Uganda (n=282) Tanzania (n=265) 
This measure of property rights needs to be interpreted with caution. For example, it may be that 
there is a higher level of ignorance about the judiciary in Tanzania, or that there is a stronger 
cultural preference to use informal mechanisms such as direct negotiation. Another factor to 
consider is that perceptions across countries are not always easy to compare. Firms can have very 
different benchmarks about what is acceptable for a particular issue (Hallward-Driemeier and 
Stewart, 2004).  
 
Firms were also asked whether they make unofficial payments to government officials with 
regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, and services. This indicates the incidence of 
                                                                                                                                                       
is largely a function of firms operating performance. Thus, it is unaffected by the first phase of the 
transmission path. 
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expropriation (and thus the incidence of corruption) by government officials in the three 
countries. Table 5.1 shows that Uganda has the highest share of firms that make unofficial 
payments, followed by Kenya.  
 
Corruption is more likely to be perceived as an obstacle to doing business when the payments 
firms make to government officials are high. In contrast, firms will not consider corruption to be 
a major problem if it does not significantly diminish the amount of profit they keep from an 
investment project. Thus, corruption is more likely to be perceived as a problem if firms lose a 
significant part of their return in the form of bribes to government officials. Table 5.1 shows the 
share of firms that feel corruption is a major obstacle to the running of their business. One 
observes that Kenya has by far the largest share of firms negatively affected by corruption. 
Uganda clearly has the smallest share.  The amount firms pay to government officials in Kenya 
is expected to be significantly higher than in Uganda and Tanzania. This implies that bribes may 
have a larger effect on investment in Kenya than in Uganda, although the prevalence of 
unofficial payments is higher in the latter.  
 
Table 5.1 supports the argument that the amount Kenyan firms pay as bribes is higher than in the 
other countries. Firms were asked to indicate what share of the contract value is paid as 
unofficial payments when they do business with government and the local council. Table 5.1 
shows that Kenyan firms pay a significantly higher share than Ugandan and Tanzanian firms. In 
absolute terms, the amount that Kenyan firms are paying is also likely to be higher given that 
these firms are larger than their counterparts in the other 2 countries. This is consistent with the 
larger share of firms in Kenya who feel corruption is an obstacle.  
 
One can argue that overall Uganda has a better property rights environment compared to Kenya 
and Tanzania. According to Table 5.1 Uganda has the best score on 3 out of the 4 measures. 
Table 5.1 also shows that all countries have weaknesses, but that priority for policy may differ. 
For example, Tanzania may need to place greater emphasis on strengthening rights as defined in 
the written law compared to the other countries.  
 
Correlations amongst the different property rights indicators are shown in Table 5.2. There are 2 
consistent results for all 3 countries. First, the negative correlation between the share of firms 
that feel corruption is serious and the share that have confidence in the judiciary. This correlation 
is highest for Kenya. This suggests that firms which have lost confidence in the judiciary are 
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those that have actually been subject to serious corrupt practices. The second correlation that 
holds in all countries is the positive one between the share that feel corruption is a serious 
problem and the share of contract value paid to government officials. The highest value for this 
correlation is found in Tanzania. As was argued earlier, the implication of this is that firms who 
pay more in bribes feel most affected by corruption.  
 
Interestingly, there is an inverse correlation between the share of Ugandan firms that make 
unofficial payments, and the share that feels corruption is a serious obstacle. It appears that 
unofficial payments in Uganda actually enhance business rather than deter it. This may be linked 
to the fact that such payments are relatively small as shown by the share of contract value paid to 
officials. In contrast, the correlation between unofficial payments and the perception of 
corruption is high for Tanzanian firms. The highest correlation is between the share of Tanzanian 
firms that make unofficial payments and the share of contract value paid to government officials.  
 
Table 5.2: Correlations among Property Rights Indicators 
 
 
Feel judiciary  
will enforce  
property rights (%)
 
 
Make unofficial 
payments (%) 
 
Feel corruption 
is a serious  
obstacle (%) 
Kenya    
Make unofficial payments (%) -0.16 (0.01)   
Feel corruption is serious obstacle (%) -0.22 (0.00)  0.08 (0.18)  
Share of contract value paid to officials (%) -0.12 (0.14)  0.17 (0.05) 0.12 (0.18) 
 
Uganda   
 
 
Make unofficial payments (%)  0.04 (0.52)   
Feel corruption is serious obstacle (%) -0.15 (0.01) -0.15 (0.01)  
Share of contract value paid to officials (%)  0.01 (0.87)  0.01 (0.88) 0.14 (0.10) 
 
Tanzania    
Make unofficial payments (%) -0.11 (0.07)   
Feel corruption is serious obstacle (%) -0.08 (0.15)  0.29 (0.00)  
Share of contract value paid to officials (%)  0.04 (0.57)  0.38 (0.00) 0.18 (0.01) 
Note: Significance levels are indicated in parentheses.  
Source: Authors Computations  
 
5.5 Infrastructure in the EAC  
 
The literature showed that infrastructure is critical for private investment. Table 5.3 gives an 
indication of the state of infrastructure provision in the EAC. It shows the average number of 
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days that firms experienced interruptions in the provision of electricity, water, fixed telephones, 
and transport. Kenyan firms experienced the most electricity problems. Tanzanian firms had the 
most interruptions with respect to water, telephones and transport. Overall, Ugandan firms 
appear to be least affected by poor infrastructure.  
 
Table 5.3: Number of Days Firms Experience Interruptions in Infrastructure Facilities 
 Electricity Water Fixed 
Telephone 
Transport 
Kenya 83.8 85.2 35.8 18.2 
Uganda 55.2 6.1 17.8 14.9 
Tanzania 67.2 105.0 49.6 24.6 
Source: World Bank (2002/03), Investment Climate Surveys  
Kenya (n=248) Uganda (n=289) Tanzania (n=261) 
The most serious constraints are inadequate electricity and water, at least in the case of Kenya 
and Tanzania. This is likely to lead firms to invest in providing these facilities for themselves. 
Ugandan firms on the other hand will be better catered for by public infrastructure. Consistent 
with this argument, Table 5.4 shows that a substantially smaller share of Ugandan firms has 
generators and boreholes. This suggests that the cost of doing business in Kenya and Tanzania 
will be increased by the need to provide infrastructure privately. 
 
Table 5.4: Share of Firms with a Generator and a Borehole (%) 
  Kenya Uganda Tanzania 
Share with generator (%) 69.9 35.3 54.3 
Share with borehole (%) 0.34 0.13 0.35 
Source: World Bank (2002/03), Investment Climate Surveys  
Kenya (n=278) Uganda (n=300) Tanzania (n=271) 
5.6    Investment in the EAC  
 
Table 5.5 shows the share of firms that invested in machinery and equipment for the period 
2000-2002. For each year Kenya had the largest share of firms investing. This is reflective of the 
finding in chapter 3 that Kenya has the oldest machinery and equipment. Relative to firms in the 
other countries, Kenyan firms are more likely to have an obsolete capital stock. Another possible 
reason for this is the difference in size structure. If larger firms are more likely to invest than 
smaller ones, then investment will be higher in Kenya.  
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There are several factors that may lead to more investment by large firms. These include their 
greater market access (including opportunities in export markets) and their better access to 
finance. It is also interesting to note that although Kenyan firms face the most corrupt 
environment, a greater share of firms invest in Kenya compared to Uganda and Tanzania. This 
suggests that firms in Kenya may have adapted to doing business in an environment where 
property rights violations are prevalent.  
 
Moreover, chapter 1 showed that Kenya is a larger economy relative to Uganda and Tanzania. 
Chapter 1 also showed that Kenya has a more developed financial sector. As a result of these 
macroeconomic factors, Kenyan firms may face greater investment opportunities and be better 
positioned to pursue them.  
 
Table 5.5: Share of Firms Investing in Machinery and Equipment (%) 
  Kenya Uganda Tanzania 
2000 66.0 42.3 21.4 
2001 66.3 44.0 28.6 
2002 73.9 46.3 33.3 
Source: World Bank (2002/03), Investment Climate Surveys  
Kenya (n=282) Uganda (n=300) Tanzania (n=276) 
Uganda has the smallest percentage increase of firms undertaking investment in machinery and 
equipment. This is supportive of the fact that Uganda has the youngest capital stock as was seen 
in chapter 3. Ugandan firms are least likely to have obsolete machinery and equipment. Tanzania 
which has the smallest share of firms with confidence in the judiciary to enforce their property 
rights, also has by far the smallest share of firms investing in each year. This suggests that 
property rights do have an effect on the investment decisions of firms.  
 
Figure 5.2 shows the relative use of retained earnings and bank loans in financing new 
investment. Kenyan firms depend less on retained earnings and also make greater use of bank 
loans compared to Ugandan and Tanzanian firms. This is consistent with the results in chapter 2 
which showed that Kenyan firms have substantially greater access to external finance. The high 
dependence on retained earnings in Uganda and Tanzania partly explains why the number of 
firms undertaking investment in these countries is significantly lower than those investing in 
Kenya.  
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Figure 5.2: Retained Earnings and Bank Loans as a Share of New 
Investment (%)
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  Source: World Bank (2002/03), Investment Climate Surveys  
  Kenya (n=172) Uganda (n=204) Tanzania (n=166) 
5.7 Estimation of Investment Equation 
 
This section empirically investigates the effect of the property rights environment on investment. 
It also examines the role that internal finance and access to bank loans has on the investment 
decision taken by firms. Based on the transmission mechanism, once the legal environment has 
improved access to external financing, firms use these funds in addition to internally generated 
funds to undertake productive investment. Access to bank loans and greater availability of 
internal finance are expected to have a positive effect on investment.  
 
The investment equations are estimated followed by a discussion of the results. The dependent 
variable is the probability that the firm invested in machinery and equipment in 2002. Given the 
large number of firms that do not invest, the estimation is done using a probit model allowing us 
to have the maximum possible number of firms. This is similar to Bigsten et al (1999) who use a 
logit specification. The dependent variable is given by equation (1): 
 
Invested in 2002    = 1                (1) 
Did not invest in 2002  = 0 
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Explanatory Variables 
 
Property Rights: Property rights are measured using the first and third indicators in Table 5.1. 
The first variable takes a value of 1 if a firm has confidence in the judiciary and 0 otherwise30.  
This variable is expected to have a positive effect on investment. The second variable takes a 
value of 1 if firms make unofficial payments and 0 otherwise. Unofficial payments give an 
indication of how corruption by government officials affects the investment decision taken by 
firms. The variable is in line with the definition of corruption in chapter 1. McArthur and Teal 
(2002) and Johnson et al (2002b) also use this variable in their estimations. The literature 
suggests that the effect of this variable is ambiguous. On the one hand these payments diminish 
the return from investment accruing to the firm. This reduces the incentive to invest. On the other 
hand, unofficial payments may be necessary to secure business licenses and building permits, 
and to obtain access to basic services. In this case the efficient corruption hypothesis argues that 
unofficial payments actually make it possible for the firm to better position itself with regard to 
pursuing investment opportunities.  
 
The share of firms that feel corruption is a serious problem is not used because this measure is 
highly subjective. For example tolerance for corruption may differ across firm size, ethnicity, 
and education level. Notably, the problem of subjectivity can not be ignored for the indicator 
based on perceptions about confidence in the judiciary. However, the perception of corruption 
also has the potential problem of endogeneity as several authors have argued (see Acemoglu and 
Verdier, 1998; Ehrlich and Lui, 1999). Excluding this variable does not eliminate the possibility 
of endogeneity completely, but it does help to reduce its presence in the model. The issue of 
endogeneity will be considered in more detail later in this section. The share of contract value is 
not used because of its correlation with the share of firms that make unofficial payments. 
Moreover, this variable is specific to government contracts. Using it would imply that all 
investment decisions are driven by government projects, which is not true.  
 
Access to bank loans: Firms with access to bank loans are in a better position to undertake 
investment compared to firms without bank loans (they are less credit constrained). Having a 
bank loan allows firms to pursue investment opportunities that could not be financed by internal 
sources alone. The variable takes a value of 1 if firms obtained a loan in 2001/2002 and 0 
                                                
30 This is the same variable we used to measure the effect of the legal system on trade credit supply in chapter 4.  
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otherwise. Examining the effect of bank loans provides a link between the first and second stages 
of the transmission mechanism.  
 
Growth in Sales:  The accelerator effect implies that firms experiencing a higher growth rate in 
their sales would invest more. The average annual growth rate of sales between 2000 and 2002 is 
used to capture this effect. An increase in sales implies that firms will anticipate a rise in demand 
for their products, which in turn will encourage investment. Growth in sales is also a proxy for 
internally generated funds. As sales grow one can expect firms to have more retained earnings at 
their disposal. Both the demand effect and the internal funds effect are expected to have a 
positive effect on investment31.  
 
Infrastructure: Poor access to infrastructure is expected to have a negative effect on the decision 
to invest. Erratic electricity and water supply adversely affect a firms operations, as do poor 
telecommunications and transport networks. Important to note though is that firms may decide to 
invest in providing their own infrastructure in the event that public provision is insufficient. This 
will tend to increase the cost of production. A binary indicator based on the measures in Table 
5.3 is constructed to measure the effect of infrastructure. First, an additive index is obtained by 
summing up all the 4 measures. The larger this index the more inadequate infrastructure is a 
problem for firms. Firms with a value above the median value of this index are categorised as 
severely constrained by inadequate infrastructure. The binary variable takes a value of 1 if the 
index is above the median value and 0 otherwise.  
 
Firm age: Older firms may need to replace old machinery and equipment and to purchase more 
real estate for expansion purposes. At the same time, younger firms require machinery and 
equipment in order to position themselves as viable producers in their market. These firms may 
also have greater need for real estate than older firms. The impact of this variable is ambiguous.  
 
Firm size: Larger firms may need to invest in order to satisfy their share of the market. However, 
in order for small firms to compete with larger firms, they need to acquire capital. This variable 
also has an ambiguous effect. 
 
                                                
31The literature has shown that profitability is a key incentive to invest. We also expect more profitable firms to be 
in a better position to finance investment internally. However, we explained in chapter 3 that our profitability 
variable has limitations. Growth in sales compensates to some extent for the lack of an adequate profitability 
measure.  
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Local ownership: Locally-owned firms may have better information about investment 
opportunities compared to foreign-owned firms. However, foreign-owned firms may have more 
resources to invest than locally-owned firms as well as access to larger markets. Again, the effect 
of this variable is ambiguous. 
 
Exporting: Firms that export could have access to greater market opportunities than non-
exporting firms. In addition, returns from export markets could exceed returns from local 
markets. It is expected that being an exporting firm will have a positive effect on investment.  
 
Expectations about inflation: Firms were asked whether or not an increase in inflation was likely 
or not in the next three years. Higher inflation is associated with greater uncertainty about the 
macroeconomic environment and can therefore have a negative effect on investment.  On the 
other hand, firms may decide to invest now in order to avoid the higher cost of capital in the 
future and to take advantage of higher profits resulting from price increases. This variable also 
has an ambiguous effect.  
 
Industry differences: There may be investment opportunities that are industry specific. Some 
industries may have better growth prospects than others.  
 
The investment equation is therefore given by: 
 
Pr(Invest in 2002) = F(C, UP, AL, GIS, I, A, E, LO, EX, EXI, I)     (2) 
 
Where C, UP, AL, GIS, I, A, E, LO, EX, EXI, I are confidence in the judiciary, unofficial 
payments, access to loans, growth in sales, infrastructure deficiency, firm age, employment, local 
ownership, exporting firm, expectations about inflation, and industry dummies respectively.  
 
To begin, the relative effects of property rights, access to external finance and availability of 
internal finance on the decision to invest are examined. These are the key channels of the 
transmission mechanism. Industry effects are taken into consideration. Like in chapters 3 and 4, 
the estimation obtains the Huber-White robust estimator. The results are presented in Table 5.6 
below.  
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Table 5.6: The Effect of Property Rights and Finance on Investment in the EAC 
             Kenya    Uganda     Tanzania 
Confidence in Judiciary       0.504    0.638**         -0.810** 
             (1.37)    (2.14)      (-2.34) 
Unofficial Payments        0.384    0.206      0.355 
             (1.30)    (0.75)      (1.56) 
Loan            0.634*    1.005***     1.122*** 
             (1.90)    (2.71)      (3.77) 
Growth in Sales         5.22***   0.524      0.250** 
             (4.81)    (1.48)      (2.34) 
Agroindustry          0.609    0.676      0.379 
             (1.35)    (0.94)      (1.01) 
Metal            -0.395    0.747      0.258 
             (-0.94)    (0.91)      (0.55) 
Furniture and Wood        0.827    0.513      -0.086 
             (1.28)    (0.67)      (-0.21) 
Chemicals           0.558    1.615*      0.512 
             (0.78)    (1.67)      (1.16) 
Construction Materials       -1.713**      0.425      0.455 
             (2.68)         (0.56)      (0.78) 
Plastics           -0.310         -      1.428* 
             (-0.58)                    -      (1.82)  
Paper, Printing & Publishing     0.060         0.701      0.482 
             (0.12)    (0.76)      (1.00) 
Constant            0.030           -1.391*     -1.021*** 
             (0.08)         (-1.91)      (-3.00) 
Number of Observations           132                120           159 
Log-Likelihood         -51.77                   -67.57       -83.10 
Wald  χ2                 32.59***               16.86*                             31.54*** 
Pseudo R2                   0.28                      0.15          0.17  
Dependent variable: Probability that the firm invested in machinery and equipment in 2002. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent respectively. Numbers in parentheses are z 
statistics. For the model to be properly identified, the plastics industry dummy is dropped for Uganda. The identification 
problem was explained in detail in chapter 3.  
 
Confidence in the judiciary has a significant positive effect on investment in Uganda. This is 
consistent with the hypothesis that secure property rights promote investment. It shows that the 
second part of the transmission mechanism from finance to growth holds to some extent.  Recall 
from Table 5.2 and 5.3 that corruption is much less an obstacle to doing business in Uganda 
relative to the other 2 countries. This indicates that enforcement of property rights by the 
judiciary has a more meaningful effect on investment where the severity of corruption is 
relatively low. Furthermore, recall that chapter 2 showed enforcement costs were lowest in 
Uganda relative to the other 2 countries (Figures 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4). Therefore, greater efficiency 
of the judiciary enhances the transmission mechanism.  
 
The results for Tanzania are surprising: confidence in the judiciary has a negative insignificant 
effect. This is hard to explain and contrary to expectations. It implies that firms which take the 
law into their own hands rather than depend on the court mechanism are more likely to invest. 
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For example, firms that prefer to bribe public officials to expedite payments for work undertaken 
for government are more likely to invest than firms that rely on the court system to resolve 
potential disputes arising over these payments. Thus, the court system is unable to enforce 
property rights in a manner that promotes investor confidence. This is consistent with the fact 
that compared to Kenya and Uganda, a significantly smaller share of Tanzanian firms express 
confidence in the judiciary.  
 
For all countries unofficial payments have a positive, though insignificant effect on investment 
decisions. This lends some support to the view that corruption can enhance business by helping 
firms to bypass bureaucratic red tape. Access to bank loans impacts investment positively across 
the 3 countries. This effect is highly significant in the case of Uganda and Tanzania, which is 
consistent with the findings in chapter 2 showing that firms in these countries are more credit 
constrained than Kenyan firms. The implication is that the transmission mechanism from finance 
to investment through the legal environment is important for growth. The result shows that 
improvements to the legal system meant to enhance bank lending will have a meaningful effect 
on the ability of EAC firms to undertake investment.  
 
Growth in sales positively affects the decision to invest in all countries, exerting a significant 
impact in Kenya and Tanzania. Thus, internal finance (and expected demand) is important for 
investment decisions. Firms in the chemicals and plastics industries are more likely to invest in 
Uganda and Tanzania respectively. Kenyan firms in the construction industry have a lower 
probability of investing.  
 
Figure 5.1 alludes to some interactions amongst the main explanatory variables. There are 2 
indirect effects that were mentioned: (a) legal environment enhances the use of external finance 
(b) the legal environment enhances the use of internal finance. Another possible interaction is 
between the 2 different sources of finance. One would expect that the 2 sources work together to 
enhance a firms ability to invest. Therefore, it is useful to investigate whether these interactions 
are important for the decision to invest.  
 
Before proceeding it is important to note that interaction effects in non-linear models can not be 
correctly obtained using the procedures used for linear models. According to Ai and Norton 
(2003) and Norton et al (2004) the magnitude of interaction effects in nonlinear models do not 
equal the marginal effects of interaction terms, can be of opposite sign, and are not computable 
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using standard software. They show that whereas the interaction effect of two variables in a 
linear model can be measured using the parameter estimate, this does not hold for nonlinear 
models.  Rather, for nonlinear models the magnitude of the interaction effect depends on the 
cross derivatives with respect to the dependent variable. These authors propose a procedure that 
can be implemented using Stata to obtain correct marginal effects and standard errors32. This 
procedure involves estimating a probit/logit model including the interaction term. This is 
immediately followed by the inteff command option in Stata.   
 
Tables 5.7, 5.8, and 5.9 show the interaction between (a) having confidence in the judiciary and 
access to bank loans, (b) having confidence in the judiciary and internal finance and (c) having 
internal finance and external finance respectively. Table 5.7 does not report any results for 
Kenya because interaction 1 is dropped for Kenya. This is a result of underidentification, which 
occurs when one or more of the independent variables perfectly predict a particular outcome33.  
 
The interaction effects carry a positive effect for Tanzania in Tables 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9 and for 
Kenya in Tables 5.8 and 5.9. This is in line with the argument that these variables work together 
to enhance a firms decision to invest. However, a negative sign is observed in the case of Uganda 
for all 3 interaction effects. The Ugandan result appears counterintuitive given that all the 
variables exert a positive effect in Table 5.6. Given Ai and Norton (2003) and Norton et als 
(2004) observations about signs of interaction effects in nonlinear models, it is not possible to 
infer directional impacts of the interaction parameters. However, the legal environment affects 
firms decisions to use externally generated funds for investment, in addition to independently 
impacting firms investment decisions (for Uganda, interaction 1 has a Z-stat of -1.86, significant 
at 10 percent).  
 
                                                
32 Results of this procedure are presented and briefly discussed in the Appendix. The procedure did not resolve the 
sign problem.  
33 Underidentification was discussed in detail in chapter 3.  
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Table 5.7: Interaction between Confidence in Judiciary and Access to Loans 
               Uganda     Tanzania 
Confidence in Judiciary         0.887***         -0.823* 
               (2.82)      (-1.91) 
Unofficial Payments          0.264      0.355 
               (0.95)      (1.56) 
Loan              1.475***     1.115*** 
               (3.57)      (3.24) 
Growth in Sales           0.727**     0.251** 
               (2.14)      (2.33) 
Interaction 1            -1.391*      0.032 
               (-1.86)      (0.04) 
Agroindustry            0.587      0.382 
               (0.83)      (1.00) 
Metal              0.783      0.260 
               (0.96)      (0.55) 
Furniture and Wood          0.539      -0.084 
               (0.71)      (-0.21) 
Chemicals             1.588      0.515 
               (1.58)      (1.14) 
Construction Materials          0.416      0.456 
                    (0.56)      (0.78) 
Plastics                  -      1.430* 
                               -      (1.82)  
Paper, Printing & Publishing            0.708      0.484 
               (0.76)      (1.02) 
Constant                   -1.495*     -1.022*** 
                    (-2.07)      (-3.00) 
Number of Observations                     120           159 
Log-Likelihood           -67.27        -84.84 
Wald  χ2                            24.84***       31.78*** 
Pseudo R2                        0.17                           0.17        
Dependent variable: Probability that the firm invested in machinery and equipment in 2002. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent respectively. Numbers in parentheses are z 
statistics. For the model to be properly identified, the plastics industry dummy is dropped for Uganda. The identification 
problem was explained in detail in chapter 3.  
 
Table 5.8 shows that the legal environment affects firms decision to use internally generated 
funds for investment purposes, in addition to the individual direct effects of property rights and 
internal finance on the investment decision (for Uganda, interaction 2 has a Z-stat of -2.10, and 
for Tanzania it has 4.12, which are significant at 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively).  
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Table 5.8: Interaction between Confidence in Judiciary and Internal Finance 
             Kenya    Uganda     Tanzania 
Confidence in Judiciary       0.494    0.957***         -2.325*** 
             (1.31)    (2.88)      (-2.96) 
Unofficial Payments        0.384    0.239      0.331 
             (1.30)    (0.83)      (1.44) 
Loan            0.632*    1.246***     1.083*** 
             (1.90)    (3.08)      (3.49) 
Growth in Sales         5.172***   1.807**     0.194* 
             (4.44)    (2.25)      (1.86) 
Interaction 2          0.404    -2.101**     4.118*** 
             (0.15)    (-2.31)      (2.81) 
Agroindustry          0.609    0.570      0.403 
             (1.35)    (0.89)      (1.06) 
Metal            -0.394    0.803      0.303 
             (-0.94)    (1.10)      (0.63) 
Furniture and Wood        0.820    0.496      -0.065 
             (1.28)    (0.72)      (-0.16) 
Chemicals           0.550    1.636*      0.505 
             (0.78)    (1.75)      (1.14) 
Construction Materials       -1.727**      0.370      0.473 
             (2.69)         (0.55)      (0.81) 
Plastics           -0.311         -      1.436* 
             (-0.58)                    -      (1.84)  
Paper, Printing & Publishing     0.057         0.703      0.578 
             (0.12)    (0.81)      (1.18) 
Constant            0.034           -1.570**     -1.012*** 
             (0.09)         (-2.40)      (-2.91) 
Number of Observations           132                120           159 
Log-Likelihood         -51.76                   -65.96       -82.32 
Wald  χ2                 32.91***               22.29**                           29.91*** 
Pseudo R2                   0.28                      0.19          0.20  
Dependent variable: Probability that the firm invested in machinery and equipment in 2002. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent respectively. Numbers in parentheses are z 
statistics. For the model to be properly identified, the plastics industry dummy is dropped for Uganda. The identification 
problem was explained in detail in chapter 3.  
 
In Table 5.9 there is evidence that firms access to external finance even when such firms have 
internally generated funds further impacts the firms investment decisions (for Uganda, 
interaction 3 has a Z-stat of -1.76 and for Tanzania it has 2.22, both of which are significant at 
the 10 percent and 5 percent  levels, respectively). 
 
 148
Table 5.9: Interaction between Internal Finance and Access to Loans 
             Kenya    Uganda     Tanzania 
Confidence in Judiciary       0.519    0.734***         -1.038** 
             (1.40)    (2.45)      (-2.59) 
Unofficial Payments        0.360    0.226      0.288 
             (1.23)    (0.79)      (1.23) 
Loan            0.674**   1.224***     0.674* 
             (2.11)    (3.11)      (1.88) 
Growth in Sales         6.480***   1.104**     0.243*** 
             (4.02)    (2.00)      (2.49) 
Interaction 3          -2.494    -1.004*     2.374** 
             (-1.28)    (-1.76)      (2.22) 
Agroindustry          0.655    0.622      0.414 
             (1.47)    (0.92)      (1.07) 
Metal            -0.363    0.825      0.231 
             (-0.88)    (1.05)      (0.47) 
Furniture and Wood        0.881    0.481      -0.019 
             (1.40)    (0.66)      (-0.05) 
Chemicals           0.614    1.645*      0.571 
             (0.82)    (1.75)      (1.26) 
Construction Materials       -1.714**      0.400      0.445 
             (2.71)         (0.57)      (0.75) 
Plastics           -0.220         -      1.389* 
             (-0.41)                    -      (1.70)  
Paper, Printing & Publishing     0.098         0.692      0.548 
             (0.20)    (0.77)      (1.12) 
Constant            -0.029           -1.473*     -1.007*** 
             (-0.08)         (-2.15)      (-2.87) 
Number of Observations           132                120           159 
Log-Likelihood         -51.20                   -67.57       -83.10 
Wald  χ2                 36.00***               25.77***                         28.95*** 
Pseudo R2                   0.28                      0.17          0.19  
Dependent variable: Probability that the firm invested in machinery and equipment in 2002. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent respectively. Numbers in parentheses are z 
statistics. For the model to be properly identified, the plastics industry dummy is dropped for Uganda. The identification 
problem was explained in detail in chapter 3.  
 
An alternative technique to ascertaining interaction effects of the transmission channels is now 
considered34. This is done by using a matrix of firms showing the proportion of firms that both 
meet an interaction condition (have the two interaction variables) and invest in fixed capital, 
relative to the average proportion of country firms that invested in fixed capital. If the proportion 
(percent) per each interaction is greater than the average country proportion of investing firms, it 
is inferred that the said interaction positively enhances the decision to invest, and vice-versa. As 
is clear from Table 5.10, interactions 1 and 3 are effective in fostering the transmission 
mechanism in Kenya (83 percent and 79 percent, respectively, relative to 74 percent, which is the 
average proportion of the countrys investing firms).  
                                                
34 The procedure proposed by Ai and Norton (2003) and Norton et al (2004) discussed in the Appendix did not 
resolve the sign problem.  
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Table 5.10: A Matrix of Interaction Terms Relative to Fixed Investment Decisions 
   
Kenya 
   
Uganda 
   
Tanzania 
 
 Int 1  Int 2  Int 3  Int 1  Int 2  Int 3  Int 1  Int 2  Int 3 
(1) Firms with 
both  variables 
 
 
 
12 
 
 
 
46 
 
 
 
33 
 
 
 
14 
 
 
 
83 
 
 
 
34 
 
 
 
10 
 
 
 
39 
 
 
 
32 
(2) Proportion of 
firms in (1) that 
 invested  
 
 
 
10 
(83%) 
 
 
 
34 
(74%) 
 
 
 
26 
(79%) 
 
 
 
8  
(57%) 
 
 
 
44  
(53%) 
 
 
 
25 
(74%) 
 
 
 
5 
(50%) 
 
 
 
13  
(33%) 
 
 
 
23  
(72%) 
(3) Percent of 
investing firms 
per country 
sample  
 
 
 
74% 
 
 
 
74% 
 
 
 
74% 
 
 
 
46% 
 
 
 
46% 
 
 
 
46% 
 
 
 
33% 
 
 
 
33% 
 
 
 
33% 
(4) Total firms in 
country sample 
 
 
284 
 
 
284 
 
 
284 
 
 
300 
 
 
300 
 
 
300 
 
 
276 
 
 
276 
 
 
276 
Note: Interaction 1(Int 1) = confidence in judiciary*loans, interaction 2 (Int 2) = confidence in 
judiciary*growth of sales, and interaction 3 (Int 3) = loans*growth in sales. Further, note that the (%) in 
parentheses in row (2) is the share of firms among firms that have both characteristics of the interaction 
term. 
 
Interestingly, Uganda for which the traditional technique indicates negative signs for all the interaction 
terms now shows all interactions to be effective in fostering the transmission mechanism (57 percent, 
53 percent and 74 percent for interactions 1, 2 and 3, relative to the countrys average proportion of 
sample firms that invested of 46 percent). Tanzania exhibits outcomes similar to Kenyas, wherein 
interactions 1 and 3 appear effective in enhancing the transmission flow. In other words, the author can 
infer that the property rights environment in these two countries seems not to strengthen the decision 
to make fixed investments by firms that possess internal finance as well. This result is reflective of the 
fact that these 2 countries indicate a weaker property rights environment than Uganda. 
 
The results of the full model given by equation (2) are presented in Table 5.11 below. The impact of 
confidence in the judiciary to enforce property rights is similar to what was observed in the previous 
tables. It has a positive, though insignificant effect on investment in Kenya. In Uganda confidence in 
the judiciary has a significant positive effect. This robust result for Uganda lends further support to 
the earlier argument that the judiciary is more likely to have a meaningful effect on economic 
activity when the severity of corruption is minimized. In the case of Tanzania confidence in the 
judiciary to enforce property rights maintains a negative significant effect on the decision to invest. 
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This variable also gave an unexpected result for Tanzania in chapter 4. As argued there, the 
possibility of data problems can not be ruled out.  
 
Table 5.11: Explaining Investment in Machinery and Equipment in the EAC  
               Kenya     Uganda         Tanzania 
 
Confidence in Judiciary             0.715     0.724**     -1.600*** 
                   (1.56)             (2.01)         (-3.53) 
Unofficial payments             0.729**    0.084          0.328 
               (2.03)         (0.27)         (1.18) 
Loan                          0.650*     0.655      1.209*** 
               (1.79)         (1.51)           (2.46) 
Growth in Sales           4.68***    0.694*      0.206* 
               (4.04)     (1.70)      (1.73) 
Infrastructure            0.208     -0.750      -0.358 
               (0.46)     (-1.17)      (-0.47) 
Log Firm Age               0.055     0.273        -0.110 
               (0.25)         (1.24)         (-0.62)    
Log Employment           0.551***    0.136            0.258** 
               (3.12)         (0.96)         (2.26)   
Local Ownership           0.131       0.187        -0.064 
               (0.35)         (0.41)           (-0.14) 
Exporter             0.708**    0.975**     0.687** 
               (2.07)         (2.06)           (2.12) 
Inflation expectations                -0.383     0.423           -0.100 
                   (-1.08)     (1.46)           (-0.36) 
Agroindustry                     0.349     0.749        0.303 
                   (0.76)        (0.95)           (0.69) 
Metal                        -0.346            0.895       0.971* 
                   (-0.71)     (1.01)           (1.86) 
Furniture and Wood              1.232*       0.963        0.269 
                   (1.72)        (1.13)           (0.57) 
Chemicals             0.436     1.135        0.534 
                  (0.51)       (1.16)           (1.06) 
Construction Materials                -1.821**       0.257        0.753   
                   (-2.34)          (0.31)           (1.10)  
Plastics                -0.545      -          0.409 
                   (-0.93)      -      (0.55) 
Paper, Printing & Publishing           0.186     0.649             0.662 
                   (0.37)       (0.70)           (1.23) 
Constant                     -2.885***    -2.301*           -1.490 
                   (-2.73)       (-1.74)           (-1.30) 
Number of Observations                131         119              135 
Log-Likelihood                   -41.93        -59.24     -62.14 
Wald  χ2                     45.66***     32.51***          39.62*** 
Pseudo R2                   0.41        0.26              0.28 
Dependent variable: Probability that the firm invested in machinery and equipment in 2002. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent respectively. Numbers in parentheses are z 
statistics. For the model to be properly identified, the plastics industry dummy is dropped for Uganda. The identification 
problem was explained in detail in chapter 3.  
 
For all countries unofficial payments have a positive effect on investment decisions. Note that 
this effect is now significant in the case of Kenya. It indicates that corruption in Kenya actually 
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has a meaningful role in improving the ability of firms to conduct business35. This is consistent 
with the argument that corruption allows firms to bypass bureaucratic red tape and get on with 
doing business. It is also in line with Acemoglu and Verdier (1998) who argue that allowing 
some corruption may be optimal, rather than fully enforce property rights. This result suggests 
that firms that are willing to make unofficial payments will be more successful in their 
applications for business licenses and other important requirements for the running of their firms.  
 
Although this result for Kenya agrees with the theoretical argument that corruption removes 
bureaucratic obstacles to doing business, it is in contrast with existing empirical evidence which 
shows that corruption negatively affects investment. This can be attributed to 2 main factors. 
First, the majority of evidence is based on macro level studies which do not capture the firm 
level characteristics contained in this study. Second, previous studies have examined the effect of 
corruption on the amount of investment, not on the decision to invest. Specifically, these studies 
have examined the effect of corruption on the investment to GDP ratio (in the case of macro 
studies) and on the reinvestment rate (in the case of micro studies). The limitations of the data do 
not allow the study to pursue this type of analysis.  
 
Access to bank loans maintains a positive effect on investment decisions in all countries. This 
effect is significant for Kenya at 10 percent and for Tanzania at 1 percent. Thus, bank finance is 
important for economic activity in the EAC countries. Growth in sales continues to exert a 
positive significant effect. This suggests that firms with more internal sources of finance are in a 
better position to pursue investment opportunities. It also indicates that anticipation of increased 
demand stimulates investment as hypothesized by the accelerator theory. The implication of this 
is that macroeconomic policies to stimulate demand can have a positive effect on manufacturing 
activity. The results also show that firms with more internal sources of finance are in a better 
position to pursue investment opportunities.  
 
Inadequate infrastructure has a negative impact on investment in Uganda and Tanzania. In 
Kenya, poor infrastructure exerts a positive impact on the decision to invest. This is in line with 
Table 5.4 which showed that a large share of Kenyan firms purchase boreholes and generators. 
The effect of infrastructure is however insignificant for all the countries36.  
                                                
35 It also shows how difficult it is to accurately interpret perceptions about corruption can be.  In Table 5.1 we 
observe that Kenya has the highest share of firms negatively affected by corruption.  
36 Macro level studies have found infrastructure to be important for investment. Our insignificant results may reflect 
the difficulty of capturing the infrastructure effect using micro data, particularly when the data are cross sectional.  
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Older firms are more likely to invest in Kenya and Uganda. This implies that firms with outdated 
machinery and equipment are replacing it. On the other hand, older firms in Tanzania invest less. 
This suggests that more of the investment in Tanzania is being undertaken by new firms. It 
indicates that economic reform has encouraged the entry of new firms into the manufacturing 
sector. However, for all three countries firm age has an insignificant effect on investment.  
 
Firm size has a positive effect on investment in all three countries. This effect is significant at 1 
percent and 5 percent for Kenya and Tanzania respectively, but insignificant for Uganda. 
Investment is being undertaken predominantly by large firms reflecting the larger market 
opportunity and better access to finance that these firms enjoy. It is a fairly important result 
because it implies that SMEs in the EAC are not providing the growth impetus that they are 
expected to. The business environment is tipped in favour of large firms, suggesting that policies 
to enhance the growth of SMEs have not been very successful in the case of the manufacturing 
sector.  
 
Locally owned firms are more likely to invest in Kenya and Uganda, but less likely to do so in 
Tanzania. Although the effect of local ownership is insignificant across the 3 countries, it does 
suggest that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is important for manufacturing activity in 
Tanzania. Being an exporter has a positive significant effect on investment in all countries. 
Export markets stimulate an increase in demand for EAC products, which in turn will lead to 
greater investment by manufacturing firms in these economies. The results indicate that export 
led manufacturing has the potential to be an economically significant characteristic of the EAC.  
 
Expectations about higher inflation have a negative effect on investment in Kenya and Tanzania.  
In Uganda inflation expectations have a surprising positive effect on investment. It may be the 
case that Ugandan firms decide to invest now in order to avoid higher costs of machinery and 
equipment in the future. It may also be the case that they invest in anticipation of higher profits 
due to rising prices. Nevertheless, for all countries the impact of inflation expectations is 
insignificant. The results indicate that Kenyan firms in the furniture industry are more likely to 
invest while firms in the construction industry are less likely to invest. Being in the metal 
industry in Tanzania increases the likelihood that a firm will invest. No significant industry 
differences are present in Uganda.   
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Given that probit coefficients can not be interpreted in the same way as linear coefficients, it is 
instructive to compute the marginal probability elasticities and marginal effects as was done in 
chapters 3 and 4. These are presented in Table 5.12 below and discussed with reference to 
variables found to be significant (marked with an asterisk).   
 
Table 5.12: Marginal Probability Elasticities and Marginal Effects  
               Kenya     Uganda         Tanzania 
 
Marginal Probability Elasticity  
Growth in Sales           0.647*     0.273*      0.071* 
Log Firm Age               0.008     0.108         -0.038   
Log Employment           0.076*     0.053            0.089* 
 
Marginal Effect 
Confidence in Judiciary             0.077     0.283*     -0.349* 
Unofficial payments             0.107*     0.033          0.115 
Loan                          0.081*     0.256      0.452* 
Local Ownership           0.019       0.073         -0.022 
Exporter             0.098*     0.370*      0.252* 
Infrastructure            0.032        -0.287     -0.133 
Inflation expectations               -0.055     0.162         -0.034 
Agroindustry                      0.043     0.291        0.108 
Metal                         0.057            0.339       0.368* 
Furniture and Wood               0.079*      0.367        0.096 
Chemicals             0.046     0.405        0.200 
Construction Materials                -0.538*    0.102        0.288   
Plastics                 -0.102      -          0.152 
Paper, Printing & Publishing            0.023     0.253             0.251 
Marginal probability elasticity is the derivative of the dependent variable with respect to a continuous explanatory 
variable while holding the other variables constant. Marginal effect is the change in the dependent variable 
associated with a discrete change in a dummy variable from 0 to 1.    
 
Confidence in the judiciary has a large effect in both Uganda and Tanzania. In Uganda firms that 
are confident that the judiciary will enforce their property rights are 28 percent more likely to 
invest. On the contrary, Tanzanian firms that rely on the judiciary are 35 percent less likely to 
invest. Clearly, the judicial process in Uganda is more efficient than in the other countries. The 
results also show that Kenyan firms that make unofficial payments are 11 percent more likely to 
invest, giving further indication of how corruption can reduce the bureaucratic obstacles to doing 
business. 
 
Growth in sales exerts a positive significant effect across all countries. It has a large marginal 
probability elasticity in the case of Kenya and Uganda. A 1 percent rise in the growth rate of 
sales leads to a 0.65 percent and 0.27 percent increase in the likelihood that Kenyan and 
Ugandan firms will invest respectively. This shows that the availability of internal finance and 
the accelerator effects are critical for investment. Being an exporter is also significant for all 
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countries. Table 5.12 shows that the impact of this variable is largest in Uganda and Tanzania 
where it is associated with a 37 percent and 25 percent greater likelihood of investment 
respectively. Firm size and access to bank loans are significant in Kenya and Tanzania. The 
marginal probability elasticity of size is below 10 percent for each country. However, having a 
bank loan exerts a large effect in Tanzania. Firms with loans are 45 percent more likely to invest 
than firms that do not have loans. This lends further support to the view that Tanzanian firms are 
constrained by a lack of external finance.  
 
Endogeneity 
 
Several authors have argued that corruption is endogenous (see for example Acemoglu and 
Verdier, 1998; Ehrlich and Lui, 1999; Blackburn et al, 2004; Gyimah-Brempong, 2002; and 
Mauro, 2004). In this section a test for the endogeneity of the unofficial payments indicator is 
performed. Once firms decide to invest they may have to pay unofficial payments to public 
officials in order to ensure that they have the necessary permits and licenses needed to 
implement their investment decisions. This means that causality would run from investment 
decision to unofficial payments. The implication is that the significant result for Kenya may not 
be reliable.  
 
A two-stage Durbin-Wu-Watson (DWH) test, following Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) is used to 
test for endogeneity. The test is also used by McArthur and Teal (2002) who employ firm level 
indicators of corruption similar to what is found in this study. The focus is on Kenya because it is the 
only country where unofficial payments were found to be significant.  The results of the test are 
reported in Table 5.13.  
 
In the first stage of the DWH test a probit is estimated where the unofficial payments indicator is the 
dependent variable. The exogenous variables enter in the right hand side of the equation. In the 
second stage the residuals from the first stage regression are included in the original investment 
equation. If the residuals are found to be significant endogeneity cannot be rejected. Unofficial 
payments remain significant in explaining the investment decision in Kenya. The results show that 
the residuals variable is insignificant. This means that the DWH test rejects endogeneity of unofficial 
payments in Kenya37. Therefore the probit results are appropriate for measuring the effect of 
unofficial payments on investment decisions taken by firms.  
                                                
37 McArthur and Teal (2002) also found no evidence of endogeneity. 
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Table 5.13: Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test for Endogeneity of Unofficial Payments in Kenya 
               First Stage     Second Stage 
               
Confidence in Judiciary             -0.488*      2.356         
                   (-1.78)               (1.37)          
Unofficial payments                     0.748**           
                           (2.09)          
Loan                          -0.038       0.825**      
               (-0.15)           (2.02)           
Growth in Sales           -0.448       6.169*** 
               (-1.37)       (3.37) 
Infrastructure            0.093       -0.193 
               (0.26)       (-0.36) 
Log Firm Age               -0.146       0.515       
               (-0.83)           (1.08)            
Log Employment           -0.026       0.641***            
               (-0.27)           (3.18)              
Local Ownership           0.096         -0.198        
               (0.35)           (-0.42)           
Exporter             -0.342       1.797      
               (-1.38)           (1.52)           
Inflation expectations                 0.363       -1.560           
                    (1.46)       (-1.25)           
Residual                     8.496      
                       (0.98)      
Agroindustry                      -0.375       1.600        
                    (-1.04)         (1.19)           
Metal                         0.069              -0.596       
                    (0.17)       (-1.04)           
Furniture and Wood               -0.220         1.938**        
                    (-0.43)         (1.98)           
Chemicals             0.571       -1.232          
                   (1.05)         (-0.69)           
Construction Materials                 0.132          -2.257***          
                    (0.25)            (-2.54)            
Plastics                  0.791       -2.869          
                    (1.56)       (-1.16)      
Paper, Printing & Publishing            -0.343       1.326           
                    (-0.79)        (1.06)           
Constant                      0.723       -9.628              
                    (0.90)         (-1.38)           
Number of Observations                131            131            
Log-Likelihood                  -80.13               -41.61            
Wald  χ2                     21.21            46.35***       
Pseudo R2                   0.11          0.42            
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent respectively. Numbers in parentheses are z 
statistics. For the model to be properly identified, the plastics industry dummy is dropped for Uganda. The identification 
problem was explained in detail in chapter 3.  
 
5.8 Conclusions 
 
Opportunistic behaviour by public officials can affect the investment decisions taken by firms. In 
this chapter the author examined how the property rights environment affects investment by 
manufacturing firms in the EAC. To the best knowledge of the author this chapter is the first 
effort to empirically investigate how property rights affect investment in the African 
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manufacturing sector. It was found that firms who expect the judiciary to enforce their property 
rights are more likely to invest in machinery and equipment in Kenya and Uganda. This effect 
while insignificant for Kenya, is statistically meaningful in Uganda. It was observed that 
compared to Kenya and Tanzania, corruption is less serious as an obstacle to doing business in 
Uganda. This implies that the protection of property rights has a more important effect on 
investment in an environment where the costs of corruption are minimized. In addition, recall 
that chapter 2 showed enforcement costs were lowest in Uganda relative to the other 2 countries 
Therefore, greater efficiency of the judiciary enhances the transmission mechanism.  
 
The transmission mechanism can also be negatively affected by a less efficient judiciary. 
Notably, Tanzania which has the smallest share of firms expecting the judiciary to enforce their 
property rights also has the smallest share of firms undertaking investment. Furthermore, it was 
found that Tanzanian firms who rely on the judiciary are less likely to invest in machinery and 
equipment. Although this is contrary to the expectations, it is consistent with the relatively high 
prevalence of corruption and the smaller share of firms who have confidence in the judicial 
process. The result could also be driven by poor data quality.  
 
The results also showed that unofficial payments have a meaningful positive effect on the 
decision to investment in machinery and equipment in Kenya. This supports the view that 
corruption can enhance business activity. It is also consistent with Acemoglu and Verdier (1998) 
who argue that given the high costs of preventing corruption, it may be optimal not to fully 
enforce property rights. The effect of unofficial payments on the investment decision is positive 
though insignificant in the other 2 countries.  
 
Access to bank loans is important for whether or not firms invest. The results suggest that a 
sound legal environment that encourages bank lending by protecting and enforcing creditor 
rights over collateral and financial information is crucial for investment in the EAC countries. 
The results also showed that growth in sales exerts a significant positive effect on the decision to 
invest. This means that anticipated increases in demand stimulate investment as predicted by the 
accelerator theory. It implies that macroeconomic policies aimed at stimulating demand can have 
a positive effect on manufacturing activity in the EAC. It also indicates that firms with more 
internal finance are better positioned to undertake investment opportunities.  
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The transmission mechanism from the legal environment to investment via financial variables 
(namely internal finance and access to bank loans) suggests that interactions between the key 
variables could be important for firms decisions to pursue investment. This assertion does 
appear to hold in the context of the EAC. Using an innovative technique to correctly measure 
interaction effects in the case of nonlinear models, evidence showing a meaningful economic 
impact of these effects was found. This is particularly the case in Uganda where the property 
rights environment is superior to that of Kenya and Tanzania.  
 
The results showed that export led manufacturing has the potential to be an economically 
significant characteristic of the EAC.  It was found that the probability of larger firms investing 
in machinery and equipment is higher than the corresponding probability for small firms in all 
EAC countries.  It appears that policies meant to stimulate investment by SMEs have not been 
very successful in the manufacturing sector. The business environment in the EAC continues to 
favour large firms.  
 
Finally, it was observed that a substantially larger share of Kenyan firms invests in machinery 
and equipment relative to Ugandan and Tanzanian firms. This occurs although Kenya does not 
have a better property rights environment. This is partly explained by the fact that Kenya is a 
larger economy and has a higher level of financial development. Therefore, macroeconomic 
factors are also important in explaining investment.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This dissertation has investigated how the legal environment affects access to external finance 
and investment in the three countries making up the East African Community (EAC), namely 
Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. The dissertation has argued that the legal environment provides a 
transmission mechanism from finance, to investment and economic growth. First, the legal 
system is meant to provide strong protection and efficient enforcement of creditor rights. This 
leads to greater access to external finance by firms. Second, the legal system should clearly 
define and adequately protect the rights of firms over their investments, and the returns that are 
generated by these investments. This creates an environment that is conducive for investment by 
firms with both internal and external sources of finance.  
 
The dissertation focused on 4 main issues. First, it examined how the quality of the legal system 
relates to access to external finance and the terms of this finance. Second, it examined how 
collateral and collateral substitutes affect access to bank finance. Third, it investigated how the 
legal environment affects access to non-bank finance. The study considered trade credit and 
leasing finance. Finally, it examined how the property rights environment affects investment. To 
the best knowledge of the author each of these issues has either been explored in a very limited 
manner or not examined at all at the firm level in the context of SSA.   
 
In this chapter a summary of the key findings pertaining to each of these issues is provided. This 
chapter explains what the key findings collectively imply for the relationship between the legal 
environment on one hand, and access to credit and investment on the other. It also considers the 
policy implications of the findings and make suggestions for further research.  
 
6.2 The Relationship Between the Legal Environment and Access to External Finance 
 
Indicators of the quality of the legal system were presented in chapter 2. These indicators 
measured two aspects of the legal system with respect to credit markets, namely legal content 
and legal formalism (cost of enforcement). These indicators were compared against measures of 
access to bank finance and trade credit. Kenya was found to lead in terms of legal content, but to 
have by far the highest enforcement costs. Legal content was found to be poorest in Tanzania, 
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while enforcement costs were lowest in Uganda. The analysis showed that better access to 
finance is more closely correlated with high quality written law than with efficient enforcement. 
Kenyan firms have greater access to bank finance and trade credit than Ugandan and Tanzanian 
firms. This is true across firm size. Well defined creditor rights are of critical importance for the 
flow of funds from banks, and from firms extending trade credit. This is an important finding 
given that much of the micro literature has focused more on the role of enforcement costs.  
 
Acute information asymmetries are a significant contributor to poor access to external finance in 
developing countries. The superior creditor rights found in Kenya appear to affect access to 
external finance via the information channel, rather than through the collateral (court) 
mechanism. The analysis showed that information asymmetry in financial markets is less where 
the legal content is strong. It was found that the availability of reliable financial information is 
significantly less in Tanzania and Uganda compared to Kenya. Thus, stronger protection of 
creditors leads to better financial information, which in turn has a positive effect on access to 
external finance.  
 
The chapter also examined how the legal environment relates to the terms of credit faced by 
firms. In particular, the analysis focused on collateral requirements and the maturity of bank 
loans and trade credit. It was found that higher enforcement costs are strongly correlated with 
higher collateral requirements. However, even though banks in Kenya demand such high 
collateral requirements, Kenyan firms are not constrained from securing loans by this. Ugandan 
and Tanzanian firms face greater collateral constraints. Chapter 3 provided evidence suggesting 
that the high enforcement costs actually make collateral irrelevant for access to bank loans in 
Kenya. There was no evidence to suggest that better legal content allows firms to enjoy longer 
maturity on their loans. Furthermore, the analysis provided no evidence supporting the argument 
that bank finance maturity has an impact on trade credit maturity. Network effects and 
opportunistic behaviour in an environment of weak enforcement may explain trade credit 
maturity.  
 
The results of chapter 2 are taken with caution for several reasons, 2 of which are repeated here. 
First, the study did not control for other factors that impact access to external finance. Haas 
(2004) argues that this is a major weakness of the law and finance literature. Factors such as 
bank supervision, the level of financial development, the level of economic development, 
political stability, natural endowments and social capital are critically important. These factors 
 160
are likely to explain the interesting observation that although contract enforcement costs are 
highest in Kenya, Kenyan firms still have the most access to external finance. For example, 
because Kenya has historically enjoyed a higher level of economic development than Uganda 
and Tanzania, access to external finance will be more favourable for Kenyan firms even if legal 
enforcement in Kenya is of poor quality. Second, the analysis can not claim that causality runs 
from legal environment to external finance. It is possible that the superior creditor rights in 
Kenya are a response to the expansion of the formal credit market, rather than a cause of this 
expansion.  
 
6.3 The Effect of Collateral and Collateral Substitutes on Access to Bank Finance 
 
Chapter 3 focused specifically on access to bank finance. It investigated how collateral and 
collateral substitutes affect the likelihood of firms securing loans.  It was found that a very high 
proportion of loans in all the EAC countries are collateralized. The results showed that collateral 
in the form of machinery and equipment has a significant effect on access to bank loans in 
Uganda and Tanzania, but not in Kenya. This means that collateral has a role to play in the 
transmission mechanism in Uganda and Tanzania. In light of the findings in chapter 2, this 
supports the view that collateral can be effective as a contracting mechanism when enforcement 
costs are relatively low. It also indicates that secondary markets for machinery and equipment 
are playing a role in facilitating the role played by collateral. On the other hand, where 
enforcement costs are very high as is the case in Kenya, collateral appears to be irrelevant. 
 
Notably, the results suggest that in Uganda collateral is more important for the firm decision to 
apply for loans than for the bank decision to approve these applications. Ugandan firms may be 
relying on collateral to signal their quality to banks. Firms without collateral are unable to send 
such a signal and thus are less likely to apply. On the other hand, in Tanzania collateral is key to 
the banks decision about whether or not to extend a loan. Tanzanian banks appear to view 
collateral as a means of addressing information asymmetry.   
 
The results also showed that collateral in the form of real estate does not improve access to bank 
loans in all 3 countries. This suggests that the legal systems in the EAC countries (and 
particularly in Uganda and Tanzania) are better suited to transfer machinery and equipment from 
defaulting borrowers to creditors than they are suited to transferring real estate. It appears that in 
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the context of SSA, having collateral alone is not enough. The type of collateral is also 
important.  
 
The most important collateral substitute in the EAC appears to be reputation. It is particularly 
important in Kenya where both real estate and machinery and equipment are found to be ineffective 
as contract enforcement mechanisms. Furthermore, the analysis showed limited evidence supporting 
the hypothesis that relationship lending can have a positive effect on access to bank finance. 
However, it does appear that bank-firm relationships have evolved over time. Firms pursue 
relationships with banks for credit more than in the past. The weak support for relationship banking 
is consistent with the very limited studies that have been conducted on other developing countries. It 
indicates that the quality of information available to banks for their lending decisions needs to be 
enhanced, and that emphasis should be placed on pursuing other avenues of solving information 
asymmetry that are more relevant to SSA. Nevertheless, it may also point to the limitations the data 
impose on measuring relationship lending adequately.  
 
6.4 The Legal Environment and Non-Bank Finance: Trade Credit and Leasing Finance 
 
The analysis in chapter 4 was based on the relationship between the legal environment and two 
sources of external finance that do not depend directly on the collateral mechanism. These are 
trade credit and leasing finance. The investigation differed from previous works in that it 
empirically examined how the availability of collateral affects the likelihood that a firm uses 
trade credit. Although trade credit is not collateralized, it still requires the use of the court system 
to resolve disputes over payments. Thus, the chapter also examined the extent to which firms use 
courts to resolve disputes. An environment in which firms are confident that courts will settle 
disputes effectively is likely to be characterised by a greater supply of trade credit. This chapter 
investigated whether this is the case.  
 
It was found that high enforcement costs do not deter the use of courts to settle payment disputes 
associated with trade credit. As was noted in this chapter and in chapter 2, the high enforcement 
costs observed in Kenya could be the result of the significantly higher trade credit availability 
relative to Uganda and Tanzania. More trade credit implies more conflicts ending up in court, 
which places pressure on the judiciary. The use of courts appears to have a positive correlation 
with the quality of creditor rights. Furthermore, courts are likely to be a more effective deterrent 
to opportunistic behaviour relative to non-court mechanisms. Tanzania which has the least use of 
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courts was also found to have the greatest share of sales resulting in overdue payments. In 
contrast, Uganda which has the most efficient court system among the 3 countries has the least 
problems with overdue payments. Thus, courts appear to be an effective deterrent to 
opportunistic behaviour when they function efficiently.  
 
Another contribution of this chapter was to assess the role of business associations in settling 
trade credit disputes between firms. Previous works have focused more on how informal 
mechanisms affect trade credit. The analysis showed that business associations can play an 
important part in resolving disputes over trade credit. Overall, associations are used more than 
courts to resolve disputes. These associations are of more value when enforcement costs 
associated with courts are higher.  
 
In the empirical estimation on the impact of collateral on trade credit focus was placed only on 
Uganda and Tanzania. Some of the reasons for this are repeated here. First, the argument that 
trade credit reduces credit constraints caused by inadequate collateral led us to focus on these 
countries where collateral constraints actually exist. Second, a very large proportion of Kenyan 
firms have access to trade credit. It is Uganda and Tanzania that would benefit from an increase 
in the availability of this source of finance. Thirdly, Uganda and Tanzania have far less access to 
short term bank finance (i.e., overdraft facilities) compared to Kenya.  
 
The results showed that collateral has a significant positive effect on the use of trade credit in 
Uganda. This has the important implication that trade credit is not an effective substitute for bank 
finance for firms with inadequate collateral. It supports the argument that trade credit and bank 
finance are complements. It also suggests that collateral may play a role in trade credit 
arrangements when legal enforcement costs are relatively low. On the other hand, in Tanzania 
collateral exerts a significant negative effect on trade credit use, implying that trade credit can be 
a meaningful substitute for bank finance. 
 
 The results also showed that Ugandan firms that have confidence in the judiciary supply 
substantially more trade credit than those that lack such confidence. Ugandan firms can have 
confidence in the judiciary because in practice recovering overdue debt is less costly than in the 
other EAC countries. The supply of trade credit also appears to be positively affected by access 
to bank finance, particularly in the case of Tanzania. This lends support to the redistribution 
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view, and shows that strengthening the legal environment can increase the likelihood that firms 
unable to access bank finance directly do so indirectly through trade credit.  
 
Much less is known about the use of leasing finance in African manufacturing compared to bank 
finance and trade credit. To the best knowledge of the author chapter 4 provided the first attempt 
to examine the relationship between specific measures of the legal environment and leasing 
finance in the context of African manufacturing firms. The analysis showed that the use of 
leasing finance in the EAC is minimal. Similar to other studies, the conclusion of this chapter is 
that leasing is still in its infancy in the EAC. The limited evidence showed that an environment 
where the rights of lessors are better defined is associated with more leasing. Furthermore, there 
is more leasing of assets that are not industry specific partly because of the difficulties associated 
with selling specialized equipment, particularly in thin secondary markets. It was also found that 
better quality legal content is associated with leasing contracts of longer duration. 
 
6.5 Property Rights, Finance Channels and Investment 
 
Chapter 5 analysed the second part of the transmission mechanism from finance to investment 
and growth, provided by the legal system. The chapter examined how the legal environment 
affects the use of financial resources for investment purposes. It focused specifically on the role 
of property rights. The analysis in this chapter falls under what is referred to in the literature as 
the investment climate approach. This is an emerging area that uses micro level data to 
investigate the institutional determinants of firm growth, investment, and productivity in 
developing countries.  
 
The measures of property rights used in this chapter are the level of confidence that firms have in 
the judiciary to enforce their property rights in business related disputes, and whether or not 
firms make unofficial payments to government officials for services required for their operations. 
The indicators showed that the highest share of firms having confidence in the judiciary is found 
in Uganda and the lowest in Tanzania. On the other hand Uganda has the highest share of firms 
that make unofficial payments.  
 
It was argued that the property rights environment needs to be examined in the context of the 
level of corruption. This is because corruption has a direct bearing on the level of expropriation 
that government officials can undertake. The analysis showed that corruption is a much more 
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serious constraint to doing business in Kenya than in Uganda and Tanzania. Uganda has the 
smallest share of firms who consider corruption to be a significant hindrance to doing business. 
This finding is supported by the significantly larger share of contract value that Kenyan firms 
pay as unofficial payments to government officials relative to the other countries. Ugandan firms 
pay the smallest share of contract value to government officials, meaning that although 
corruption is highly prevalent its economic magnitude is relatively small.   
 
It was found that firms who have confidence in the judiciary to enforce their property rights are 
more likely to invest in machinery and equipment in Kenya and Uganda. This effect is 
statistically significant in Uganda, where as was mentioned, corruption is least serious as an 
obstacle to conducting business. Thus, the protection of property rights has an important effect 
on investment in an environment where the costs of corruption are lower. In addition, recall that 
chapter 2 showed enforcement costs were lowest in Uganda relative to the other 2 countries 
Therefore, greater efficiency of the judiciary enhances the transmission mechanism. 
Surprisingly, it was also found that firms who have confidence in the judiciary are less likely to 
invest in machinery and equipment in Tanzania. While this is contrary to the expectations in this 
chapter, it is consistent with the relatively high prevalence of corruption in Tanzania and the 
considerably smaller share of firms who have confidence in the judicial process. The result also 
suggests the possibility of data problems.  
 
The results also showed that unofficial payments positively affect the likelihood that firms invest 
in machinery and equipment in all 3 countries, and that this effect is significant for Kenya. This 
is consistent with the view that corruption can aid firms in bypassing the red tape that slows 
down business, and agrees with Acemoglu and Verdier (1998) who argue that it may be optimal 
to allow some corruption rather than stringently enforce property rights. In addition, the results 
showed how difficult it is to make accurate inferences using perceptions about corruption: 
Kenyan firms appear to benefit from corruption although a large share of them stated that 
corruption is an obstacle to doing business.  
 
It was found that access to bank finance significantly increases the likelihood of investment in 
machinery and equipment in all countries. This shows that a legal environment that improves the 
flow of funds from banks to firms can have a meaningful impact on economic growth. It also 
indicates that the credit constraints in Uganda and Tanzania represent a real inability to pursue 
profitable investment opportunities. Furthermore, the results showed that growth in sales exerts a 
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significant positive effect on the decision to invest. This means that anticipated increases in 
demand stimulate investment as predicted by the accelerator theory. It also suggests that firms 
with more internal finance are better positioned to undertake investment opportunities.  
 
Finally, it was found that larger firms and exporting firms are more likely to invest in machinery 
and equipment compared to small firms.  This indicates that policies aimed at encouraging 
investment by SMEs in the EAC have not been very successful in the manufacturing sector. The 
business environment in the EAC continues to favour large firms. The results also suggest that 
export-led manufacturing has the potential to boost economic growth in these countries.   
 
6.6 Tabular Summary of Key Contributions  
 
This section highlights the key contributions of each analytical chapter in a tabular form. Taken 
together, these contributions are considered to be an important addition to the existing body of 
knowledge pertaining to the relationship between legal institutions and finance in the EAC in 
particular, and SSA in general.  
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Table 6.1: Key Contributions of Analytical Chapters 
Chapter Key Contributions 
Chapter 2 ! Provided a comprehensive discussion of the legal environment in the EAC using quantitative indicators. 
! Showed that a negative correlation holds between information asymmetry and the quality of creditor rights in 
EAC countries.  
Chapter 3 ! Provided empirical evidence showing that collateral is more effective when legal enforcement is more 
efficient.  
! Demonstrated empirically that reputation is an effective collateral substitute.  
! Provided empirical evidence suggesting that the legal environment in the EAC does not adequately facilitate 
the use of real estate as collateral.  
Chapter 4 ! Demonstrated empirically that firms may use collateral to access trade credit when information asymmetry is 
high and enforcement costs are low. 
! Provided empirical evidence showing that firms that have more confidence in the judiciary to enforce their 
property rights provide more trade credit. This positive effect holds where legal enforcement is efficient.  
! Provided some tentative evidence on the relationship between leasing and indicators of the legal 
environment. 
Chapter 5 ! Demonstrated empirically that more secure property rights increases the likelihood that firms will invest. 
This positive effect holds where legal enforcement is efficient. 
! Provided empirical evidence showing that corruption can enhance a firms ability to conduct business by 
reducing bureaucratic obstacles. This effect only holds where the magnitude of bribes is generally large 
(Kenya).  
! Showed that generally, the key determinants of investment decisions in the EAC are property rights, internal 
and external finance, size, export status, and demand.  
 
6.7 Policy Recommendations and Areas for Further Research 
 
The results of this dissertation have several important implications for policymaking in the EAC. 
Reforms to improve the effectiveness of the legal system can have a positive effect on access to 
external finance and on the level of investment. The reforms required are not uniform, though a 
regional effort to tackle common problems can be effective. Given that the study is based on the 
institutional environment in the EAC, for policy reforms to succeed, a high level of political will 
is required. In making the policy recommendations, the experience of other countries that have 
successfully implemented similar reforms is considered.  
 
A significant finding of this dissertation is that legal content is more highly associated with 
access to external finance than legal formalism. The implication of this is that policymakers in 
the EAC in particular, and SSA in general, should place strong emphasis on improving the laws 
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protecting the rights of creditors. This is especially the case for Tanzania and Uganda where it 
was found that the protection of creditors is relatively poor. Critical to this process is translating 
improved creditor rights into better financial information. The nature of interventions used to 
strengthen creditor rights should focus on improving the quality of information that debtors are 
obligated to provide to creditors. Furthermore, these countries need to strengthen laws related to 
the taking of property assigned to another party and selling it in order to pay for financial 
obligations such as bank loans. This will make collateral even more effective than it currently is.  
 
The cost of enforcement is also important for the functioning of credit markets as it significantly 
affects the terms of credit. High enforcement costs will not only raise the cost of credit, but also 
reduce the willingness of creditors to lend. Kenya which has the highest level of legal formalism 
also has substantially higher collateral requirements being imposed on firms. Finding ways of 
reducing these costs can have a substantial impact on reducing the cost of credit. Clearly, a 
starting point is to improve the efficiency of the judiciary. According to the World Bank (2004a), 
the Kenyan government is currently addressing these issues through the Governance, Justice, 
Law & Order Sector Programme, which is supported by a large number of donor agencies. In 
addition, the Doing Business (2005) Report states that out of court measures can be undertaken 
to reduce enforcement costs in credit markets. These include notarial execution which allows 
debtors and creditors to agree on enforcement methods as used in Spain, and Debt Recovery 
Tribunals as used in India. They find that out of court enforcement mechanisms can reduce 
enforcement time by an average of three-quarters. 
 
It was found that collateral in the form of machinery and equipment has a significant positive 
effect on access to bank finance in Uganda and Tanzania.  Strengthening the collateral 
mechanism can lead to greater access to bank finance. This may require that property rights over 
assets are more clearly defined. The evidence from this study indicates that real estate is one asset 
where creditor rights need strengthening. Furthermore, if firms are pledging real estate where 
their ownership is difficult to verify, banks will be less willing to lend. Thus, in addition to 
strengthening creditor rights over real estate, debtor rights over assets in this category should also 
be strengthened.  
 
The scope of assets legally recognised as collateral can be enhanced. Specifically, debtors should 
be allowed to make greater use of movable assets. For example, the Doing Business Report (2005) 
explains that as a part of its collateral law reform undertaken in 2002, Slovakia allowed debtors to 
use all movable assets (present and future, tangible and intangible) as collateral. Since then more 
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than 70 percent of all new business credit is secured by movables and receivables, and credit to 
the private sector has increased by 10 percent.  
 
The results showed that better quality legal protection is associated not only with greater access 
to bank finance, but also more use of trade credit and leasing finance. At least in the case of trade 
credit, this is a result in part of bank finance being redistributed to lower quality firms. The 
implication of this is that specific laws and incentives targeted at stimulating trade credit and 
leasing finance can be useful in improving access to external finance, particularly in Uganda and 
Tanzania where firms have less access to bank loans. Factors to consider include laws defining 
trade credit and leasing finance, the legal protection that the providers of these sources of finance 
enjoy, and the rights and obligations of creditors and debtors. Policymakers should also take 
responsibility for setting tax incentives for the suppliers of trade credit and leasing finance, and 
for raising awareness about the benefits of these sources of finance.  
 
In order for financial resources (whether they are internal or external) to affect economic growth, 
firms must use these resources to undertake productive investment. More secure property rights 
are essential for this to happen. Even if non-court enforcement measures are being developed, 
courts still maintain a critical role. The finding that confidence in the judiciary has a greater 
impact on investment where the costs of corruption are lower and the courts are more efficient 
has important policy implications. It suggests that institutional reform meant to stimulate 
investment must take serious consideration of corruption and the overall efficiency of the judicial 
system. An efficient judiciary can play an integral part in stimulating business confidence.  
 
It was also found that unofficial payments to government officials are a key part of doing 
business in the EAC. In the case of Tanzania, weak property rights are also a result of the poor 
legal content. Consequently, Tanzanian firms have very little confidence in the judiciary to 
uphold their property rights in the event of business related disputes. This implies that the rights 
of firms over their investments in machinery, equipment and real estate need to be strengthened. 
In addition, strong political will is required to reduce corruption by government officials 
requiring payments to secure contracts and provide services. Such practices are a form of 
expropriation, reducing the returns accruing to firms from their investments. However, the 
results and the theoretical arguments in the literature review suggest that completely eliminating 
corruption may be neither possible nor optimal.  
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Cost is a critical factor when undertaking reform, especially for countries with limited resources 
such as those in SSA. An important finding of the Doing Business Report (2005) is that reforms 
can be undertaken in a cost effective manner with large benefits for economic development. It is 
suggested that countries in SSA make an effort to learn from other countries which have 
successfully undertaken similar reforms. This will reduce the chances of failure and accelerate 
the learning process. With strong political will, useful reforms can be adapted from other regions 
without having to incur high costs.  
 
Future research can shed more light on collateral by investigating the role it plays as an 
enforcement mechanism from the perspective of banks. This would include finding out how 
important banks view collateral to be for their lending, and what types of collateral are most 
effective. It would also be useful to ascertain the precise factors making real estate less effective 
as a form of collateral than machinery and equipment.   
 
Furthermore, determining which legal codes are most effective in reducing information 
asymmetry and how these codes can be implemented across countries can have a meaningful 
effect on improving access to bank finance.  Where data permits, a micro-level comparison 
between countries of British and non-British origin would provide enlightening evidence on the 
relationships investigated in this dissertation.  
 
It is interesting that collateral in Uganda positively affects trade credit use. One possible 
explanation for this is that contrary to what is widely believed, trade credit may actually be 
collateralised. Future research can focus on investigating this issue in greater detail.  
 
Finally, some of the results may have been compromised by the quality of the data. Gathering 
additional data and improving the methods of doing so, will provide greater clarity as to whether 
the manufacturing sector in the EAC is consistent with theory, or whether puzzles requiring 
deeper investigation exist.  
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Appendix 4: Alternative Interaction Effects of Transmission Mechanism Discussed in Chapter 5 
 
The author calculated the alternative interaction effects which Ai and Norton (2003) and Norton et al (2004) say mitigate 
the sign problem. The results are reported in Table A4 below with the corresponding z-statistics reported in parentheses. 
The minimum and maximum values of the interaction effects are also given. The sign on the average effects are generally 
not different from what obtains in Tables 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9. In the case of Uganda, the Z-statistics are fairly similar. In the 
case of Tanzania, the Z-statistics for interactions 2 and 3 are different. Interaction 2s effect in the case of Kenya 
illustrates some points about the sign problem, which this alternative methodology is meant to address. Whereas the 
conventional approach gives a positive sign, a negative sign in Table A4 for Kenya is observed. 
      
Table A4: Alternative Interaction Effects 
Interaction 1  Min   Max  Interaction 2  Min   Max  Interaction 3   Min   Max 
Kenya    -         -0.252   -0.709 0.773   -0.791  -1.794 0.780   
               (-0.593)          (-1.23) 
 
Uganda   -0.476  -0.506 0   -0.621   -0.838 -0.046  0.323   -0.424 0.011 
     (-1.79)        (-2.07)          (-1.626) 
 
Tanzania   -0.082  -0.182 0.197  0.336    -0.077 1.667   0.661   -0.096 1.014 
     (-0.360)        (0.160)          (1.634) 
 
 
It is interesting to note that the minimum and maximum values of the interaction effects can exhibit a fairly wide range of 
positive and negative values depending on the predicted probability that a firm invests. For example, interaction 1 values 
range from -0.182 to 0.197 in the case of Tanzania, while interaction 3 values range from -1.79 to 0.78 in the case of 
Kenya. Notably, for Uganda the maximum effect is not significantly different from 0 in all cases, strengthening findings 
that the interaction effects for this country come out negative. 
 
Using the alternative interaction terms estimation method proposed by Ai and Norton (2003) and Norton et al (2004) has 
not provided better directional support for the assertion that the variables in the transmission mechanism interact to 
improve the likelihood that firms will invest. Generally, the interaction terms have taken on positive as well as negative 
values as these authors showed. The persistent negative sign for the first two interaction terms in the case of Uganda is not 
in accord with the hypothesized expectations and none of its interaction values has a positive sign38.  Thus,  the technique 
presented in Table 5.10 is considered as more informative for the analysis; it yields results consistent with the 
relationships found in the transmission mechanism. 
 
                                                
38 Ai and Norton (2003, pp. 126-128) show that though an interaction term (mean interaction effects) may be negative, for instance, 
the interaction effects usually vary from negatives to positives across observations. Moreover, they show that as functions of predicted 
probability, few positive (or negative) interaction effects usually have high and significant t-statistics the further their predicted 
probabilities are from 0.50 (Figure 1, p. 127). Surprisingly, the interaction effects ranges of Interactions 1 and 2 for the Ugandan data 
include no positive values. For Kenya interaction 1 was dropped due to the underidentification problem.  
